Latest ABA data shows a continuing decrease of Black men enrolled in law schools

Any discussion of race, sex, and legal education has its own challenges about how to approach or how to interpret the topic, but some recent trends are noteworthy enough to raise, which I do here, and leave some of the discussion of implications for others.

Total 1L enrollment of Black law students has been fairly steady at law schools in the last decade. Total 1L enrollment has been fairly stable, mostly between 37,000 and 38,500 with occasional forays above 40,000. For Black 1Ls, it’s been mostly between 2900 and 3500 1Ls. (For figures, see the statistics here.)

For 2024, Black 1L enrollment is 3066, up a tick from 2023’s 2969. Stories like this one at the New York Times focus on a few elite law schools, particularly Harvard, and its declining Black 1L enrollment after the Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions. It’s a fairly anecdotal story, though—the picture for legal education as a whole looks a little different than a deep dive on a handful of schools.

One fairly significant and underreported story for that bigger picture of legal education is the wide, and now widening, gender gap among Black law students.

Let’s start with the overall portrait of sex and legal education. In 2016, women outnumbered men in the incoming 1L class for the first time. The total number of women has continued to climb, and the total number of men has continued to fall.

While men totaled around 18,000 to 19,000 of 1L enrollees about a decade ago, and even up until a few years ago, it’s down to around 16,000 now (16,679 for the incoming Class of 2024). Women enrolled rose both in absolute and relative numbers over the years, from 19,032 in that 2016 figure to 22,276 in 2024. Among men and women, women were 51% of the incoming class in 2016; they are more than 57% of the incoming class of 2024.

This is consistent with trends in higher education more generally, as men are increasingly eschewing college and women enroll at much higher rates. As the gap in undergraduate education widens, one would expect the gap in legal education to widen, too.

So, there is a story to tell in recent years about sex and legal education. But the interaction with race is a separate noteworthy development.

There are anecdotes about the gender gap between Black men and women in the legal profession in recent media. For instance, President Joe Biden recently appointed Embry Kidd to the federal court of appeals, and news outlets noted that it was the second Black man he appointed to the bench, compared to thirteen Black women. (At the district court level at the time of that story, it was 20 Black men and 25 Black women.)

But 1L enrollment tells a story about the current and future state of the legal profession, too. As the gender gap has widened more generally in legal education, it has widened particularly acutely for Black men.

Back in 2016, there were 1198 Black men enrolled in the 1L class, and 2076 Black women. Women were 63% of the total of Black men and women 1L enrollees. In the last decade, the total number of Black men has fallen to 918 in 2024, about a 25% decline since 2016. (And in 2017, 1L Black men totaled 1281, so the fall to 918 is even more precipitous compared to that bench mark.) For Black women, 1L enrollment is up slightly since 2016, to 2103 1Ls in 2024 (some years climbing into the 2200 range). That moves the percentage of Black women up to almost 70%—more than a 2 to 1 ratio.

There are challenges with this, like any, data. This data set only includes those who identify as a man or a woman, not another gender identity or refuse to reveal their sex (although the ABA aggregates those, but they are a much smaller number, around 32 Black 1Ls total in 2023 and 45 in 2024, to give two examples). It also includes only those who identify as “Black of African-American” (the category the ABA uses), not those who refuse to disclose, or who identify as two or more races (although the ABA aggregates those, too). But for consistency, we can make the comparative approach over the last decade with the same kind of data limitations.

In many respects, Black men have all but disappeared from legal education in many places. Consider the following statistics about the 918 Black men who make up the incoming 2024 1L class.

  • About one-sixth of Black men enrolled as 1Ls (154) are concentrated at the five HBCU law schools.

  • Another 13% (120) are concentrated at what might have historically been labeled “top 14” law schools.

  • 27 law schools (about 14% of law schools) report zero Black men who are 1Ls.

  • 51 law schools (about 26% of law schools) report one or two Black men who are 1Ls.

There are, of course, reasons for some schools to have such figures (e.g., lower racial diversity in some great plains or mountain west states and their affiliated law schools). But the figures are fairly noteworthy all the same.

In short, in the aggregate, Black 1Ls have been a fairly stable cohort in the entering 1L class over recent years, and the incoming 2024 admissions class is no exception. But there’s a deeper story to examine about race and sex when it comes to legal education.

As I opened this post, any discussion of race, sex, and legal education can be challenging. And presenting data always presents its own challenges, including what conclusions to draw or what implications the data offer. One could compare the current legal education picture to the legal profession as a whole. One could look at current trends and ask why certain trends are happening or what can or ought to be done about them. One could drill down to individual schools or cohorts of schools, by “prestige” or by geography. But there’s no question that the ABA data shows a continuing decrease of Black men enrolled in law schools, and the numbers are more stark than they’ve been in recent history.

Inside the USNWR law school rankings: when a median LSAT of 173 is better than a 174

The latest 509 data disclosed the LSAT medians of the entering 2024 students (Class of 2027) for law schools. Topping the list were Yale and Harvard, which each had a median LSAT of 174. Harvard’s 25th percentile was a 171, and Yale’s a 170. The next tranche of five schools had a median of 173—Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Stanford and Washington University in St. Louis. Columbia had a 25th percentile of 170; Chicago, Cornell, and Stanford a 169; and Washington University a much lower 163 (for reasons why schools have significant 50th-25th percentile gaps, check out this post). Another band of schools below that has a 172 median.

For USNWR rankings purposes, you might look at this data and realize, well, first, it’s odd to only use the median LSAT rather than considering other bands (e.g., 75th and 25th percentiles) of admitted students. But if medians are used, it might look like Yale and Harvard are tied for first, and the next five schools tied for third.

But, very roughly, here’s what USNWR sees:

1. Chicago 0.9815

1. Washington University 0.9815

3. Harvard 0.9784

4. Columbia 0.9771

5. Cornell 0.9762

6. New York University 0.975

6. Penn 0.975

6. Virginia 0.975

9. Yale 0.9728

10. Stanford 0.9703

*

The first thing that USNWR does is measure the percentile equivalent of the LSAT score. Near the very top of the LSAT scores, there is a very high degree of compression. The increase of a median LSAT score from 173 to 174 is much less valuable than, say, the increase of a median score from 163 to 164. A 174 puts you higher than 98.66% of test-takers; a 173, higher than 98.15%. A small gap (0.51 percentage points), all things considered. Compare that to the 163-164 gap (83.08% to 85.58%, 2.5 points), or 153-154 (49.98%-53.87%, 3.89 points).

But there is now tremendous compression at the top of the law school rankings, so even small differences can mean a lot. And even though USNWR significantly devalued “inputs” (like admissions metrics—LSAT medians are just 5% of the overall rankings now), again, small changes can mean a lot.

In theory, Yale and Harvard should place first with a 0.9866 in the metric. But USNWR adds a caveat:

These are the combined median scores on the LSAT and GRE quantitative, verbal and analytical writing exams of all 2023 full- and part-time entrants to the J.D. program. Reported scores for each of the four exams, when applicable, were converted to 0-100 percentile scales. LSAT and GRE percentile scales were weighted by the proportions of test-takers submitting each exam. For example, if 85% of exams submitted were LSATs and 15% submitted were GREs, the LSAT percentile would be multiplied by 0.85 and the average percentile of the three GRE exams by 0.15 before summing the two values. This means GRE scores were never converted to LSAT scores or vice versa. If a school was not required to report GRE scores to the ABA for the disclosure requirements because a small number of incoming students reported these scores, they were not used in the rankings.

Many schools reports some number of students admitted with a GRE score. But you are only required to disclose the GRE scores of your students if you admit at least 10. Chicago (5) and Washington University (6) admit them in sufficiently small numbers that they do not need to disclose. But Harvard (43) and Yale (24), among others, do.

USNWR uses a nonsensical methodology for GRE scores. As I’ve chronicled here, the Educational Testing Service, which administers the GRE, has its own comparison tool to take GRE scores and offer a predicted LSAT score.

Let’s take Yale for a moment. Its 24 GRE enrollees have a median verbal score of 167 and a median quantitative score of 164. ETS predicts that to be a 172—quite close to the 174 median, and around the 97.5 percentile.

USNWR instead simply takes the percentile equivalents of three GRE sections (not just two), the verbal (for Yale, 167 is 97%); the quant (for Yale, 164, 66%), and the analytical (for Yale, 5.5, 98%). It appears USNWR weighs them equally, for an 87% score—not only much lower than 98.66% for the LSAT, but also lower than the ETS percentile equivalent of 97.5%.

More than 10% of Yale’s enrollees with an LSAT or GRE opted for the GRE (24 GRE, 204 LSAT), so that is factored into the Yale median LSAT score.

You can see the total enrollees, and the enrollees with an LSAT score or a GRE score. It includes the medians for these scores, the average for the GRE scores, and an “LSAT equivalency” score at the end.

How significant is this decision? As you can see, a pure 173 LSAT median is more valuable than an LSAT median of 174 with a non-trivial GRE cohort that includes the average of the GRE percentiles, rather than the ETS measure of GRE-LSAT comparison.

And for Yale, the difference is so significant that, in my projected USNWR rankings, all else being equal, if Yale could simply rely on its 174 median instead of this GRE-LSAT composite metric, it would be tied for second rather than third.

Updated projected 2025-2026 USNWR law school rankings (to be released March 2025 or so)

The updated 509 data from the American Bar Association discloses a good deal of public information about law school admissions and law school faculty that is ultimately used in the USNWR law school rankings. We now have about 75% of the information that USNWR uses in its rankings and can do a pretty good job estimating it, subject to some methodological quirks that are hard to replicate and subject to the survey data that won’t be revealed until the spring (but that is notoriously sticky). It’s also possible USNWR modifies its methodology, of course. But I took the opportunity to update my projections from last spring now that we have even more data. I tried to add precision from the last go-around, so that can explain some changes; otherwise, changes to LSAT or UGPA medians, student-faculty or student-librarian ratios, or admissions rate may have moved schools around slightly. For more about (projected) changes in rankings to schools like NYU and Cornell, check out this blog post I wrote from last year about the changes in methodology. And one more note, the new methodology means more compression and volatility, so proceed with caution! Note: tied schools are not listed alphabetically, but by raw score—so that means there’s a higher likelihood that in a tier of tied schools that the top one could move up or the bottom one could move down depending on methodology tweaks or data errors.

School Projected Rank This Year's Rank
Stanford 1 1
Chicago 2 3
Yale 3 1
Virginia 4 4
Penn 4 4
Harvard 4 4
Duke 7 4
Michigan 7 9
Northwestern 7 9
NYU 10 9
Columbia 10 8
UCLA 12 13
Berkeley 13 12
Washington Univ. 14 16
Vanderbilt 14 19
Texas 16 16
Georgetown 16 14
North Carolina 16 20
Cornell 19 14
Notre Dame 20 20
Minnesota 21 16
Boston Univ. 22 24
Georgia 22 20
USC 24 20
Texas A&M 24 26
Wake Forest 24 25
Boston College 24 28
Ohio State 28 26
Florida State 28 48
William & Mary 28 36
BYU 28 28
Florida 28 28
George Mason 28 28
Alabama 28 33
Washington & Lee 28 33
George Washington 36 41
Irvine 36 42
Utah 38 28
Wisconsin 38 36
Iowa 38 36
Emory 38 42
Baylor 42 46
Fordham 42 33
SMU 42 42
Arizona State 45 36
Indiana-Bloomington 46 42
Colorado 46 48
Illinois 48 36
Villanova 48 48
Davis 48 55
Connecticut 48 55
Temple 48 54
Pepperdine 53 52
Kansas 54 46
Washington 54 48
Tennessee 54 52
San Diego 54 68
Missouri 58 61
Oklahoma 58 55
Arizona 60 55
Penn State-Dickinson 60 75
Maryland 62 55
Loyola-Los Angeles 62 61
Kentucky 62 61
Houston 65 68
South Carolina 65 66
Penn State Law 65 68
Cardozo 65 61
Wayne State 65 55
Pitt 65 91
Tulane 65 78
Cincinnati 65 78
UNLV 73 78
St. John's 73 68
Catholic 73 94
Seton Hall 73 61
Nebraska 73 82
Northeastern 73 68
Drexel 73 75
Marquette 80 68
Florida International 80 68
Richmond 80 66
LSU 80 91
Georgia State 84 75
Maine 84 120
Belmont 86 91
Loyola-Chicago 86 78
Miami 86 82
Texas Tech 86 82
Denver 90 89
UC Law-SF 90 82
Drake 90 82
Duquesne 90 94
Stetson 94 98
Oregon 94 82
Lewis & Clark 96 82
St. Louis 96 94
Chapman 96 108
Buffalo 96 108
Montana 100 103
Regent 100 108
Rutgers 100 103
American 100 98
Hawaii 100 127

Law school 1L JD, non-JD enrollment rebound from last year's decline

The 2024 law school enrollment figures have been released. They show an uptick in JD enrollment and a big rebound in non-JD enrollment. About 16% of law school enrollees are not enrolled in a JD program.

For nine of the last 11 years, 1L JD enrollment has been between 37,000 and 38,500, remarkable consistency. In 2021, it hit a recent high of 42,718, but it trended down for a couple of years. It’s back up to 40,650.

Total JD enrollment sits at 115,410, down a bit from last year and well off the peak of 2010-2011 with 147,525.

Non-JD enrollment has been more fickle in recent years. It ballooned to more than 24,000 students in 2022, good for more than 17% of all law school enrollees, but settled down to 21,966, 15.8% of all law school enrollees last year. It’s back up to 23,583 enrollees, good for 17% of total law school enrollment.

Eleven schools have at least 40% of their total overall law school enrollment made up of non-JD students in 2024.

Some thoughts on the Ho-Thapar debate on federal judicial clerkship boycotts

Imagine this: you grew up in rural Texas to a lower-income family, and no one in your family attended college. But you’re attending college, as best you could figure out, and attend a nearby regional public university. You excel and thrive. You choose political science because you find it fascinating, and you’re interested in law school. There isn’t much of a pre-law program at your school. No one in your family has gone to law school, and outside a couple of family members who had brief encounters with the criminal justice system, you’ve never met a lawyer, to your knowledge.

But you study for the LSAT and score well—very well. You have a high GPA, too. And so you apply broadly. Not knowing much else, you look around for law school rankings, and the same schools are always at the top, so you apply to them. You are accepted at Yale, which offers generous financial aid given your socioeconomic status. Yale is very far from home, but you realize the opportunity means something. You attend. And very quickly, you hear people talking about “clerkships,” jobs that can really help you in your career and really outstanding experience.

After one semester at Yale, you learn that judges are already hiring. In something of a panic, you follow the lead of other students and start to apply. You’re from Texas, so you look to Texas. And you’re told, still learning, of course, that the federal courts of appeals—one step below the United States Supreme Court—are the most desirable. So you send out applications to some of those judges, including one particular federal appellate judge in Texas.

Sorry, the judge says in a reply letter, I won’t hire you, because I don’t hire from Yale because of some things that happened before you ever applied.

*

The background story is, in many respects, not unlike my own (but I did not attend Yale—for that, perhaps instead consider Clarence Thomas or JD Vance…), a first-gen law student who never traveled far from home and had little concept of the legal profession or “clerkships” before entering law school. And it’s here to highlight the significant student-oriented cost of any “boycott” that federal judges might impose on law schools.

I haven’t really weighed in on this debate, because it was playing out very publicly more than two years ago, and I didn’t know it would stretch very far or or last very long. I did note that the whole debate was focusing on a very narrow sliver of clerkships and would not affect very many people.

But it’s recently come back into the public consciousness, as Judge James Ho has given multiple talks in the last several days, including a recent Advisory Opinions podcast, in defense of the boycott—a boycott he initiated. His new tour takes aim at the critics, including, on the other side, Judge Amul Thapar, among others. I use them as the sides of this “debate,” but one could easily construct other ways of setting up the debate (and the debate is on quite amicable terms).

I do know I am adequately positioned to weigh in. I’ve worked at three law schools, including playing significant roles with clerkships institutionally at all three; I’ve had extensive examination of legal education and employment outcomes, and specific studies on federal judicial clerkships. This blog is filled with discussions of clerkship figures and statistics, along with the market of legal education and legal employment. So I can speak much more confidently about the overall economy of legal education and judicial clerkships.

To set the stage. From Sarah Isgur’s interview at Advisory Opinions with Judge Ho (around the 11:30 mark, lightly cleaned up):

Ho: The main argument that I’m hearing from some of the judges on your podcast, and Judge Thapar, his most recent remarks, is that, we shouldn’t do this, because it will hurt students. And with respect, I don’t understand that argument. And let me explain why. I would regard that as what I’ll call a “losing” attitude when we should have a “winning” attitude. And let me explain what I mean by that.

Every boycott throughout history, just the very concept, by definition, it’s people refraining from engaging in transactions they would otherwise want to because of some larger goal that they have in mind. So if you just assume, 100% chance it’s not going to work, it’s not going to change anything, then all you do is calculate the losses, the consequences. Under that theory, nobody would ever boycott, the word wouldn’t exist, nobody would every do this. I think you should have a winning attitude. What that means is, actually do what rational decisionmakers do, figure out the benefits of success, the costs of failure, and then measure that against the probability of a certain tactic succeeding or failing.

So let me ask you a simple question, I appreciate you quoting my earlier speech, when I talked about the customers of a big company, so I don’t have to go through that again. Just a very simply question. If a dozen, two dozen federal circuit judges, agree that, you know, this school is adding more toxicity to our future leading class, class of leaders in the future, if we decide we’re going to hire from other schools from now on, what would the law school do? Would they say, no sweat, we’ll just send our kids to other law firms, other employers, no big deal? Or would they change? Honestly, what do you think?

Isgur: I don’t know. It depends on the school.

Ho: That’s the first time I’ve heard that. Every time I’ve asked that question, everybody’s agreed, no, every school cares deeply about this.

Isgur: Ten years ago I would have agreed. Now I wonder if we’ve gotten to the point where—I don’t know, maybe they shoot themselves in the foot and just be like, well, you shouldn’t be around those bad people anyway.

. . .

Ho: What they’re saying is, what happened is terrible. We regret all this. Please keep hiring our students. You don’t need to do this. Et cetera et cetera. So they're not acting as if you know, no big deal. They don’t care.

Isgur: Will you give us an update on the boycott, like where it stands right now? What schools are included in your boycott? How effective do you think it’s been based on what you just said?

Ho: Sure, well, so I’ll tell you in terms of effectiveness, quick story justice, William Brennan. . . .

I don’t know what the future will hold. My hope is that they will change.

Isgur: Is Yale the only school you’re not hiring from right now?

Ho: Yale. A year later, there was an incident at Stanford that was, that was, that was, let’s say, universally described as has a bad development. And then, of course, Columbia, that became essentially ground zero for all the post October 7 intolerance. So those are the three schools we've talked about.

And so we’ll see, I mean compared to the three year boycott that Justice Brennan did, this is still in its infancy.

Respectfully, I think Judge Ho doesn’t quite grasp the current economy of law schools with respect to employment for their students, and the overall economy for judicial clerkships, especially in the present moment.

Let’s start with the “clerkship.” It’s true that a clerkship has long been deemed a valuable experience and an important part of a new lawyer’s entry in the profession, particularly for elite law schools, both as a credential and as a learning opportunity. For a wide variety of reasons—some of which are directly attributable to federal judges’ behavior—that is much less the case.

The market for federal judicial clerkship opportunities is quite large. Between 1100 and 1200 new graduates each year take a federal judicial clerkship. And there are many more positions filled by other graduates. And as that linked post shows, a generation ago, many more students took clerkships directly out of law school than today. Many judges prefer clerks with work experience, and now take them after a prior clerkship or after working. The value of the clerkship, in and of itself, has somewhat diminished. The clerkship is no longer the signaling or credentialing mechanism that it once was. It is still important, but less so.

Judge Ho suggests that a “dozen” or “two dozen” court of appeals judges could move the needle. I don’t think that’s quite right. The first, of course, is that there aren’t two dozen judges on the boycott. Those judges hold would, at most, around 90 of the more than 1500 positions (with caveats of multi-year clerkships, career clerks, and the ratio of judicial assistants and clerks in a chambers). It’s true that appellate clerkships are more coveted. But even there, there are 179 federal appellate judgeships, and many more senior status judges, for something like 700 or so clerkship positions.

This is a stark contrast to the anecdote involving Justice Brennan (an interesting choice of exemplar, to say the least), which involved (1) Supreme Court clerkships, which are more prestigious and far more scarce (~36/year); (2) withdrawal from one school for three years (Ho here suggests this boycott is in its “infancy”; and (3) the return to choosing Harvard clerks. But that’s really not the whole story—Justice Brennan used to hire exclusively Harvard clerks before his “boycott,” and after that he did hire clerks, but at a much lower rate than before. The damage was, essentially done.

There is quite obviously not the same leverage in these circumstances. And it’s quite clear that there’s a massive collective action problem. Judge Ho puts the terms of a “dozen” or “two dozen,” but in order to reach scale for effectiveness, you’d probably need a majority of federal appellate judges to even dent the clerkship economy market. Isolated actions will not alter the market in a meaningful way. (More on who it does affect in a moment.)

Another is the nebulous definition of “toxicity.” The ad hoc decisions to include Yale, Stanford, and Columbia [ed.: few Columbia law students pursue federal clerkships, anyway] do not seem particularly coherent. At Yale and Stanford, there were administrative problems at the law school; at Columbia, the university. The latter is much more problematic to manage from a boycott like this. Other schools, like UCLA had very public problems very similar to Columbia. Why is UCLA not included? I won’t pick on other schools (and there are many that could be named); I just mean to suggest, the categories of “toxicity” worthy of a boycott do not seem to track particularly helpful criteria.

It’s also not clear when the “end” will arrive for the boycotts or what that “end” game is. Take Yale. In recent months, it has hired Professors Keith Whittington and Garrett West, among others, and two faculty, I think, someone like Judge Ho would quite strongly approve of as reducing the “toxicity” of the faculty (again, to use his term). Why isn’t that enough to drop the boycott? What steps must the school take?

Regardless, it seems quite clear, to me, anyway, that the “boycott” has expanded to more schools, of indefinite time and scope, and that there are not particular actions any schools have yet taken that have assuaged the concerns of boycotting judges.

The ever-expanding list and non-responsiveness of schools suggests, I think, that the employment economy suggests a boycott will not be effective.

For rankings purposes, clerkships do not mean anything. A job is a job in those rankings. For career advancement, as I’ve mentioned, clerkships are less valuable. Additionally, the sheer enormity of the law firm salary makes clerking less attractive, even with a clerkship bonus—and the mere lack of opportunities will only mean more students earn more money. Indeed, we’ve seen stories about law students affirmatively failing to apply for clerkships because of a lack of interest. And more schools are appreciating the value of state court clerkships in ways they did not before.

So the market for clerkships is fairly large; there are high quality replacements for clerkships (i.e., a lucrative law firm salary); the opportunities are fairly fungible for students; and the schools do not suffer from employment-related or rankings-related metrics for a loss of clerkships.

In short, there are lots of reasons to think the market won’t particularly respond to a boycott—indeed, it has not.

But let’s get back to my opening anecdote. The burden here will fall on someone. There are intensity of preferences concerns that individual law students bear, but the school does not. A student greatly desires a particular clerkship; for the school, another clerkship will suffice, because, after all, clerkships are largely fungible, and the market can be idiosyncratic. A student wants to go back to Texas; for the school, there are other ways of getting there, or other desirable regions.

Maybe this student in my opening hypothetical will land on his feet. He’ll apply a little more and find the clerkship he wants. Or maybe he’ll skip the clerkship altogether. But the point is, I’m not sure the benefits, whatever they are, will be terrible measurable, and the tactics do not strike me as ones likely to succeed.

Let me close with this. Judge Ho in the interview notes, “What they’re saying is, what happened is terrible. We regret all this. Please keep hiring our students. You don’t need to do this. Et cetera et cetera. So they're not acting as if you know, no big deal.”

That’s assuredly right. Anytime someone has a very public rift with the school, especially somebody in a position of authority, the school’s reaction will naturally be—in private if not public—how can we fix this? They do care.

But “caring” is a very different matter from making major institutional choices in reaction to the boycott. I’m not convinced thing will change as a result of this boycott, as opposed to other institutional pressures (e.g., major donors threatening to withhold funding). And given that there appear to have been insufficient changes at these three boycotted schools in the last couple of years to appease the boycotting judges, so far, this view may end up being right.

It's time for the AALS to bring back the Faculty Recruitment Conference

The Association of American Law Schools’ annual Faculty Recruitment Conference—sometimes the “Meet Market” (or “Meat Market”)—was a longstanding complaint among legal academics. It took place at a now-demolished hotel in Washington, DC, known for its “towers” across the complex and challenging means for interviewees to race from interview to interview. It was an expensive endeavor for everyone involved. It was a draining experience. Covid disrupted the status quo—now, screening interviews could take place leisurely, over Zoom, with less cost and more flexibility.

But… it’s time to bring the FRC back.

I’ve run appointments on both sides of Covid, and I’ve seen the appointments process play out several times on both sides of it, too. There are major costs to the absence of the FRC.

Let’s start with how the process works for candidates now.

AALS sends out the Faculty Appointments Register to interested law schools in mid-August. Schools review candidates, then extend invitations to candidates to interview. Because of time zones, windows of opportunity may reasonably range from 5 am Pacific, to 9 pm Eastern, depending on one’s time zone. Suppose you secure an interview at 10 am on a Tuesday. You might need to cancel or move a class if you are currently teaching, or you might need to block out time on your work calendar. A 30-minute screening interview probably needs more than 30-minute block from you. You are preparing for that interview well before the interview—perhaps an hour before, and perhaps the night before. The brief screening interview becomes a fairly sprawling episode. And suppose your next interview is 9 am Friday. You do it all again a couple of days later.

These are early schools, calling in September. And one of them asks you to visit for a callback in late September. Great! But you still have screeners to juggle, one this week, another the next week. It’s possible that some schools are extending offers in mid-October—while others are still scheduling screening interviews. It becomes challenging to juggle a very drawn-out screening process over three months, in conjunction with offers extended and questions about timing of those offers in relation to other stages of the process. Candidates have no real knowledge of what a “normal” timeline is or how schools are behaving except by anecdote or rumor.

For law schools, it is likewise a drawn-out process, as rarely do schools schedule all interviews on a single day but have to stretch it out. That makes it more challenge to compare candidates head to head when they are taking place over a longer period of time. Likewise, it makes it a challenge to coordinate around candidates given time zones or the erratic nature of callback interviews.

(There are other soft advantages, too, like in-person interviews being a somewhat more meaningful way of interacting with a candidate, but I’ll put that to the side. There are other advantages I find better, like the informal conversations among candidates at receptions during the interview process, which I found very rewarding both as a candidate and as an interviewer, but I know that can be a high cost that is less appreciated.)

To me, this process is now needlessly prolonged and draining. The purported “efficiencies” from having a virtual set of screening interviews on an irregular timeline have not yielded the promised payoff. (As an addendum, it is not unlike some of the deficiencies in the law school clerkship hiring market, when federal judges went “off-plan” resulting in a dramatic reduction of information for candidates and a much longer window for hiring, rather than a limited couple of weeks with ample opportunities for comparison and for information for students; or the on-campus interview process for law firms, which now get ever-earlier with virtual screening interviews in an ever-sprawling timeline, rather than a condense fall 2L semester of comparison and information for students.)

I understand that returning to the FRC is a costly endeavor. But it should also help both candidates and faculty compress the “pain,” if you will, to a couple of days, with better comparisons of candidates, a more consistent timeline, and some of those other soft advantages.

I also know that no one can “force” schools to attend AALS. But it would be nice to see—even as simply as an AALS survey to hiring chairs!—if a critical mass of schools were interested in attending a scaled-down version of the FRC. It would not preclude schools from using Zoom interviews, either exclusively or to supplement in-person recruiting (e.g., for candidates with too few interviews to make the FRC trip economically feasible or with other commitments).

If the FRC were moved up to early October or late September—in the past, it was often mid- to late-October—it would also help the trend from schools to move hiring earlier when possible.

Professor Brian Leiter (no fan of the FRC!) offers some thoughts on the generalized trends in hiring here. It does seem quite spread out, and there is certainly a lack of information (see Professor Paul Horwitz’s comment) for candidates.

I’m sure there will be opponents to the FRC and prefer the status quo. That’s fine, but I just close with two reflections. The first is that while the FRC might be better for (some!) law school faculty, I’m not sure it’s better for (some!) candidates, and it’s worth reflecting on those tradeoffs in a meaningful way. The second is that a return to the FRC does not preclude some remote interview opportunities—even opponents might admit that the flexibility to format, in-person and remote, might allow different schools and candidates express different preferences in a way that (largely!) suits everyone. (The timeline is not mandatory, of course, to assuage any “antitrust” concerns; it is simply a coordinated and convenient activity run by the AALS for law schools.)

Recent trends in law school lateral hiring, 2019-2024

I recently pulled data from Professor Brian Leiter’s extraordinarily helpful list of law school hires. I looked at the last six years, 2019-2024, to see if there were any interesting trends. His reports capture the vast majority of law school lateral hiring, but perhaps misses a few. I tried to clean the data as best I could. This included de-duping, removing hires who changed their minds, and identifying the right year for a hire.

There are 706 laterals in the data set. There has been a sharp uptick in lateral hires, from 68 in 2019, to 99 in 2020, up to 153 in 2022 and 155 in 2023, tapering off a bit last year.

It’s also worth noting a significant amount of laterals do not end up in a U.S. law school, or did not come from a U.S. law school. Many land as university presidents or provosts, or into other departments, or into foreign schools. I report 617 coming from U.S. law schools and 657 going to U.S. law schools.

Of course, some of those laterals are law deans coming and going, which are different in kind, but I didn’t differentiate among those types.

Schools with the biggest migration out:

Brooklyn 11
Florida 11
Irvine 11
Duke 10
UCLA 10
Alabama 9
American 9
Arkansas 9
Colorado 9
Georgia 9
Houston 8
Ohio State 8
Penn State University Park 8
USC 8

And schools with the biggest migration in:

Boston Univ. 17
Virginia 17
Florida 16
Irvine 16
Emory 15
Georgetown 14
Michigan 14
UCLA 14
Berkeley 12
Texas A&M 11
USC 11
Brooklyn 10
Columbia 10
Wayne State 10

A few schools appear on both lists. A few others stand out (Boston University, Virginia, and Michigan) for some rather significant numbers of hires in recent years.

There are assuredly subtleties to these figures—for instance, as a percentage of overall faculty, it may be a large or small percentage.

Among top 100-ish schools that saw zero laterals out in six years, there were four: Harvard, NYU, Baylor, and Catholic. (Baylor is also distinctive in having zero laterals out and zero laterals in.)

Below is the aggregate data for the top 100-ish schools. Any data entry mistakes are my own!

Out In
Stanford 3 6
Chicago 7 8
Yale 1 6
Virginia 5 17
Penn 6 9
Harvard 0 9
Michigan 3 14
Duke 10 9
Northwestern 4 9
Columbia 3 10
NYU 0 5
UCLA 10 14
Berkeley 6 12
Vanderbilt 3 3
Washington Univ. 6 8
Georgetown 5 14
Texas 5 9
North Carolina 3 6
Cornell 6 5
Notre Dame 5 4
Minnesota 7 7
Boston Univ. 7 17
Wake Forest 5 5
Georgia 9 3
USC 8 11
Texas A&M 5 11
Boston College 3 6
Florida 11 16
William & Mary 5 5
Alabama 9 5
Ohio State 8 9
George Mason 4 3
BYU 2 0
Washington & Lee 6 5
Utah 6 4
Irvine 11 16
Florida State 6 5
Iowa 7 9
George Washington 6 9
Emory 6 15
Baylor 0 0
Fordham 4 9
SMU 4 1
Arizona State 6 5
Wisconsin 4 6
Illinois 2 2
Colorado 9 9
Indiana 7 6
Villanova 3 3
Davis 5 4
Connecticut 6 3
Pepperdine 2 0
Kansas 3 2
Washington 5 2
Temple 3 8
Tennessee 1 2
San Diego 3 2
Missouri 4 4
Penn State University Park 8 4
Arizona 4 3
Penn State Dickinson 3 5
Oklahoma 6 8
Maryland 3 7
Wayne State 3 10
Kentucky 3 1
Loyola Los Angeles 4 4
Pittsburgh 5 5
Houston 8 2
Cardozo 6 8
South Carolina 4 2
UNLV 2 1
Cincinnati 4 4
St. John's 7 8
Tulane 3 4
Seton Hall 4 4
Nebraska 5 1
Catholic 0 2
Northeastern 5 7
Florida International 5 1
Richmond 2 2
LSU 3 2
Drexel 2 1
Georgia State 2 1
Maine 4 0
Loyola Chicago 3 6
Belmont 1 0
Marquette 2 1
Texas Tech 2 2
Miami 6 6
Denver 5 3
UC Law SF 5 3
Drake 1 1
Duquesne 3 0
Stetson 1 0
Lewis & Clark 1 3
Oregon 1 1
Saint Louis 4 7
Chapman 1 0
American 9 6
Buffalo 5 3
Dayton 2 0
Rutgers 4 9

Some figures are lightly revised as schools share new information with me.

Four (unlikely) ways the 2024 presidential election ends up in the House of Representatives

Following up on a post I wrote in 2020, there’s been some discussion that the 2024 presidential election could be thrown to the House of Representatives.

But how does this work? And how likely is it?

It happens when no candidate wins a majority of the Electoral College. The House (the new House, which is sworn in January 3, then joins the Senate to count electoral votes on January 6) then chooses among the top three vote-getters, with each state casting one vote. Vermont gets one vote; California gets one vote. It takes a majority (here, 26 states) to choose the next president. As occurred historically, a tie vote in a state’s delegation (say, one state with 26 representatives is 13-13) did not count toward that majority.

A so-called “contingent election” is rare. It happened in 1800, when it took 36 votes in the House before Thomas Jefferson was chosen as President. Since the Twelfth Amendment, it happened only once, after the 1824 election, when Andrew Jackson won a plurality of the electoral vote but John Quincy Adams carried the House vote in the contingent election. (The vice presidential election of 1836 was also thrown to the Senate.)

So, how can it happen? Briefly, there are four ways to look at it (with some sub-scenarios noted, and some even more unusual outliers omitted).

First, there’s a tie in the Electoral College. The 12th Amendment requires that the president receive “a majority of the whole number of electors appointed.” If two candidates tie at 269-269, the House chooses between those two candidates.

When did this last happen? Since the Twelfth Amendment, which separated presidential and vice presidential votes, never. (A tie did happen in 1800 under different presidential election rules.)

How is this scenario possible? Presidential electors are based on each state’s Senate and House delegation. The Senate always has an even number of Senators, because each state receives two. The House is currently fixed at 435 members, an odd number. The District of Columbia is guaranteed a number of presidential electors, but no more than the least populous state (which, at the moment, is three, two senators plus one representative). Even number (Senate) + odd number (House) + odd number (DC) = even number. (We could increase the size of the House to 436….)

What are the odds? Very low. Nate Silver, for instance, puts the odds of no one winning a majority (which includes a tie scenario and others, below) at less than 1 in 200.

Second, three or more candidates divide up presidential electoral votes on Election Day, and no one gets a majority.

When did this last happen? In 1824, four presidential candidates divided up the electoral votes. The top three vote-getters were then sent to the House. While Andrew Jackson had 99 electoral votes to John Quincy Adams’s 83 (but neither crossed 131, the number needed for a majority), the House ultimately backed Adams.

How is this scenario possible? It requires one or more strong third-party candidates. Because all states award their presidential electors on a winner-take-all basis (except for Maine and Nebraska, where it’s winner-take-all for two statewide, and winner-take-all, or really winner-take-each, per congressional district), a third-party candidate would need more votes than both the Republican and Democratic candidates in a state, and end up depriving those candidates of a majority in the Electoral College. Strong third-party candidates like Ross Perot in 1992 won zero electoral votes. Others, like George Wallace in 1968, won a substantial number of electoral votes but did not deprive a candidate of the majority in the Electoral College.

What are the odds? Very low—and here I’ll add, exceedingly low. I’ve seen no state polling to suggest that any third-party candidate is close to exceeding even 5% of the statewide popular vote total in any state. That is particularly true since the once-viable Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has withdrawn from the race.

Third, faithless presidential electors deprive the apparent majority-winner of electoral votes, and no one gets a majority.

When did this last happen? Never.

How is this scenario possible? When we vote for the president and vice president on Election Day, we’re actually voting for a slate of presidential electors who later formally vote for president and vice president. Those electors are typically “faithful” to the popular will of the people of the state. Sometimes, however, electors vote for someone else, behaving as “faithless” electors. Historically, however, faithless electors have been rare. They’ve been rarer still to defect from the majority vote-getter to someone else. A few years ago, the Supreme Court in Chiafalo approved of state moves to cabin the discretion of presidential electors. And the faithless electors in 2016 likely have prompted the parties to look closely at how they vet electors in 2020. So there aren’t many faithless electors in the first place, and by law there cannot be in some places.

What are the odds? Very low, likely exceedingly low. It requires a narrow electoral vote victory (certainly plausible), and faithless electors denying a majority (not just faithless electors generally). If the margin is 275-263, for instance—a seemingly-close election—you’d need six faithless electors from the winning candidate to defect to someone else. And Chiafalo reduces those odds further.

Fourth, the House rejects some number of electoral votes that denies any candidate of a majority.

When did this last happen? Never.

How is this scenario possible? There are a few ways it could occur, because Congress formally counts the vote. A state might not send electors to Congress (which seems unlikely in the present day). It could send a slate of electors, but Congress refuses to count them (like it did in Louisiana in 1872)—perhaps because Congress deems the votes not “regularly given.” It could choose between multiple slates of electors (which has only happened once since 1876, Hawaii in 1960), and end up with a tie (which has never happened). One wrinkle is that the winning candidate under the Twelfth Amendment is among those from “a majority of the whole number of electors appointed” (emphasis added). If Congress throws out votes, it depends on whether it includes those votes in the denominator of “electors appointed.” (In other words, if it throws out 20 electoral votes, it might go from a majority requirement of 270 of 538, to 270 of 538—with 20 votes not counting—or, instead, and easier to meet, 260 of 518.) In short, there are a number of complicated things that might happen in Congress, which would be unusual and historic decisions in Congress.

Congress has also clarified under the Electoral Count Reform Act that is a state refuses to send its electors to Congress or if its votes are not “regularly given,” those votes also come out of the denominator. In other words, it becomes harder to “throw” the election to the House on this basis, because you would need to have a much larger margin. It is instead more likely that one candidate or another simply holds a majority (unless they happen to tie). Throwing out the winning candidate’s votes because Congress concludes the candidate is not qualified, however, creates the greater risk of an election being sent to the House.

What are the odds? Well, again, likely on the verge of exceedingly low. It takes a majority of both houses of Congress to vote to throw out votes. Congress has been reluctant to throw out electoral votes since Reconstruction. Recent attempts to do so in Congress—Florida in 2000, Ohio in 2004, and a slate of states in 2016 and in 2020—lacked even modest support in Congress (only Ohio 2004, and Arizona and Pennsylvania 2020, went to a congressional vote, where objections were soundly defeated and the votes were counted). It all depends on the complexity of the decisions left to Congress and Congress’s trust in the electoral outcomes—all with the added condition that these decisions ultimately deny any candidate a majority.

*

In short, the 2024 presidential election could end up in the House, as it could have done for any presidential election in the last 200 years. There are plausible reasons to think up any one of these scenarios. But, I think, it’s worth thinking through, with some precision about these scenarios, and how they may or may not occur.

Multistate Bar Exam scores for July 2024 rebound to highest level since 2013

The Multistate Bar Exam scores for July 2024 have been released, and they show promising signs. The mean scaled score is a 141.8, the highest since 2013’s 144.3 (before the grim numbers that started in 2014). That score is slightly higher than some other recent years (2014’s 141.5 and 2017’s 141.7), but a good bit higher than the 139- and 140-range scores in some other recent years.

We are now through the COVID-19 pandemic cohort, so the vast majority of Class of 2024 students taking the July 2024 exam had in-person instruction and a somewhat “normal” legal education experience. But it’s hard to draw many conclusions from small cohorts like this.

The figures suggest overall bar passage rates will increase in most jurisdictions. That may also portend slightly stronger employment outcomes for some students. Time will tell.