Fictional Attorney of the Month: Paul Biegler

Anatomy of the Murder is one of the very best courtroom dramas ever filmed. It concerns a homicide in Michigan's rural Upper Peninsula, an Army Lieutenant accused of killing an innkeeper. The defendant's wife contacts Paul Biegler, played by Jimmy Stewart, to represent her husband.

Biegler faces off against the sophisticated prosecutor Claude Dancer, portrayed by George C. Scott, called in to help the small-town case. Dancer and Biegler are formidable foes for one another.

The film is notable not simply for its dramatic courtroom scenes but also for the charged topics it deftly introduces, especially a rape allegation that provides the bulk of the defense's case. Biegler perhaps stretches his ethical bounds in an attempt to zealously represent his client in a case that takes him in directions he'd never have anticipated.

It's a phenomenal script for a film beautifully shot with a stellar cast, but a movie often forgotten today. But Biegler's memorable role make him this month's Fictional Attorney of the Month.

Has Congress been improperly counting prisoners in the Census since 1790?

Following up on yesterday's take on the Rhode Island "prison gerrymandering" case, a few more thoughts come to mind.

The district court linked apportionment to redistricting (as the Supreme Court in Evenwel did), identifying women, children, slaves, and other non-voters as appropriately included within the apportionment base. The court went on

The inmates . . . share none of the characteristics of the constituencies described by the Supreme Court. They don't have a stake in the Cranston public school system and they are not receiving constituent services, such as help with public-benefits bureaucracies. They are not making requests of and suggestions to Cranston elected officials (or if they are, they are receiving no response), nor are they receiving "the protection of government," at least not from Cranston elected officials.

The Census Bureau has, since 1790, counted prisoners as residents of the place where they are incarcerated. When Congress apportions members of Congress to the states, it includes those prison populations--even if a number of the prisoners come from out-of-state.

Does this mean Congress has been unconstitutionally apportioning members of Congress since 1790? That prisoners should have been counted as residents of their home states for the last 220 years, and Congress has simply got it wrong this whole time?

Surely, the swift rejoinder to this claim is that very few long-term prisoners were included in a Census, much less out-of-state prisoners, until recently. But this was the same claim raised by the plaintiffs in Evenwel--that the United States had a very small non-citizen population until recently, a claim that was soundly rejected.

Further, the analogy of apportionment to redistricting grows even worse when one considers redistricting itself--where should prisoners be included for redistricting purposes?

Suppose one makes the claim that prisoners should be located as residents of the address they resided at before being incarcerated. Does this somehow cure the concerns raised by the district court? Suppose you are an incarcerated prisoner in Cranston who was originally residing in Providence. Do you suddenly "have a stake in the Providence public school system"? Do you "receiv[e] constituent services"?

The dangerously overbroad language from the district court would effectively make prisoners invisible! If they are constitutionally forbidden from being considered members of the political community where they are incarcerated, surely considering them members of the political community where they last resided is even more attenuated. It risks making prisoners invisible, uncounted members of any political community.

Instead, the better claim--and it is not a terribly good constitutional claim at that--is that this artificial concentration of non-voters into a single location is suboptimal for other voters in adjacent districts, and an attempt should be made to more naturally redistribute those non-voters in some way.

But this is not a constitutional claim. It is simply a way--perhaps a better way--of drawing districts. But the Supreme Court's decision in the "one person, one vote" cases imposed a one-size-fits-all requirement to redistricting. And rhetoric in cases like this Rhode Island prison gerrymandering case further complicate any meaningful understanding of what that mantra means.

The revival of the Three-Fifths Clause in a Rhode Island prison gerrymandering case

A federal district court handed down a memorandum and order for summary judgment in Davidson v. City of Cranston, a case concerning "prison gerrymandering" in Rhode Island. The court concluded that the city improperly drew districts that included all of the incarcerated individuals in a prison into a single district, distorting representation and voting strength in other districts.

One might have concluded that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Evenwel v. Abbott mandated this case come out the other way. There, the Court permitted Texas to use total population in drawing its districts, even if it included non-citizens (i.e., non-voters) in its population base. Had the case come out the other way and some voter- or citizen-based measure been required for drawing districts, prison gerrymandering may well have ended.

As Adam Liptak and others noted, a win for Texas in Evenwel would deeply undermine constitutional arguments against prison gerrymandering. After all, prisoners are people ineligible, just like non-citizens or children. They're drawn into districts with the rest of the total population. Instead, one must come up with a political theory for excluding this set of non-voters from redistricting, but not other sets of non-voters.

In a recently-published article in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Perpetuating "One Person, One Vote" Errors, I highlight the deep problems that arise when courts attempt to insert ever more-detailed theories of political representation into the constitutional doctrine of "one person, one vote." Mercifully, I remarked, the decision in Evenwel leaves some discretion to the states (and cities) in redistricting.

But the decision in Davidson takes away some of this discretion. And it does so using bizarre support from the Three-Fifths Clause. It even suggests prisoners are less worthy of representation than slaves.

To start, one has to make a pair of logical inferences to get from the Court's theoretical findings in Evenwel (and its predecessors) to this case. As I explained at the George Washington Law Review Docket, the Court linked the theory of apportionment of congressional representatives to the reason for drawing equal numbers of people in congressional districts, and then linked that finding to the reason for drawing equal numbers of people in other non-federal districts. It opens with this theory of apportionment--how many congressional representatives should each state get? As the Davidson court explained:

In its review of the drafting history of the Constitution and later the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court repeatedly stresses the prevailing view that women, children, slaves, tax-paying Indians, and non-land-holding men (in some areas) all deserved representation - though none of these groups could vote.

That syncs with the Court's holding in Evenwel:

In other words, the basis of representation in the House was to include all inhabitants - although slaves were counted as only three-fifths of a person - even though States remained free to deny many of those inhabitants the right to participate in the selection of their representatives. Endorsing apportionment based on total population, Alexander Hamilton declared: "There can be no truer principle than this - that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of the government."

One must appreciate a serious concern here--the Three-Fifths Clause. By including slaves (albeit fractionally) in the apportionment base, the South would receive dramatically more political power in the House than if slaves counted as zero-fifths.

But one should not seriously claim that the Three-Fifths Clause somehow means that slaves were virtually represented by their masters--that voters in the South somehow were protecting slaves through their votes! Instead, as I've pointed out in another piece, one justification commonly raised by the Founders for including slaves in the apportionment base was a notion that it was a proxy for wealth. Population (and slave total) meant roughly the wealth in an area; and more wealthy (or more "productive") areas should have more political power.

Such political theory likely would not garner much support today--indeed, it has been expressly rejected in the "one person, one vote" line of cases. (This is also a major reason Justice Alito wrote separately in Evenwel--he viewed the apportionment question as distinct from the question of drawing districts.) But the only way for "one person, one vote" to work is if one adopts a kind of theory of "virtual representation," where the elected representatives serve the entire population of the region, regardless of whether they are eligible to vote. (Indeed, the Court in Evenwel expressly made this point concerning children.)

The district court's next findings, then, are fairly breathtaking:

The inmates . . . share none of the characteristics of the constituencies described by the Supreme Court. They don't have a stake in the Cranston public school system and they are not receiving constituent services, such as help with public-benefits bureaucracies. They are not making requests of and suggestions to Cranston elected officials (or if they are, they are receiving no response), nor are they receiving "the protection of government," at least not from Cranston elected officials.

Really? First, descriptively, this is false at almost all levels. A quick look at Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15 offers myriad ways (in the right-to-vote context) someone can "have a stake" in the public school system--merely being "interested in" the school board as a resident may be enough, or the note that "[a]ll members of the community have an interest in the quality and structure of public education," which may have "grave consequences to the entire population." Prisoners may write letters to representatives--even if they are not, they are able to do so. It may well be that these are still pretty weak reasons for including prisoners in a district; but that is a far cry from saying that they are constitutionally forbidden from being included in a district.

Second, it rather brazenly suggests that eighteen-century slaves were better represented, and better deserving of representation, than twenty first-century prisoners. How else is one supposed to construe the phrase that "the inmates . . . share none of the characteristics" of "slaves"? It turns the Three-Fifths Clause into a rather favorable view of representation. Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Evenwel is perhaps wise guidance on the Three-Fifths Clause. But its failure to carry a majority of the Court leads to curious decisions such as this.

It may well be the case that Rhode Island and other states should include incarcerated persons in the districts where they last resided. It makes sense to me, as a political matter. As an administrative matter, it also seems to be sensible to include the easy total of the prisoners in the prison where they reside. Indeed, that's how the Census counted them in 2010! It becomes a fairly significant task, then, to create a new population total for redistricting, one that the Census Bureau does not provide. (Indeed, this was a major claim raised in Evenwel.)

But for a federal court to make the claim that slaves were favorably represented in apportionment while prisoners ought never be included in redistricting is a deeply problematic claim. The "one person, one vote" line of cases cannot sustain such decisions of representation equality or political theory, which are best left to the political process.

Jefferson v. Hamilton and House of Representatives v. Burwell

Last fall, a federal district court concluded that the House of Representatives had standing (PDF) to sue the Secretary of Health & Human Services for spending money not appropriated by Congress in violation of the Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 7. Today, the court concluded (PDF) that the Secretary had, in fact, improperly spent such money.

Why did a court get involved in this challenge, rather than letting a legislative branch fight with the executive in the political realm? Perhaps a lesson from the Giles Resolutions is in order.

In 1793, a longstanding fight between Federalists and Republicans culminated in the Giles Resolutions, an effort led by Thomas Jefferson to censure Alexander Hamilton. (For an excellent history, do read Eugene Sheridan's article on the subject.)

Two of the resolutions raised in the by William Branch Giles of Virginia in February of 1793 read as follows:

1. Resolved, That is is essential to the due administration of the Government of the United States, that laws making specific appropriations of money should be strictly observed by the administrator of the finances thereof.
2. Resolved, That a violation of a law making appropriations of money, is a violation of that section of the Constitution of the United States which requires that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

Federalist William Loughton Smith rejected these two resolutions, emphasizing that such critiques were "abstract propositions," raising specific concerns with the second proposed resolution:

It might with propriety be questioned whether, as a general rule, the position was well founded. A law making appropriations may be violated in the particulars without infringing the Constitution, which only enjoins that no moneys shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of the appropriations made by law. This is only to say, that every disbursement must be authorized by some appropriation. Where a sum of money is paid out of the Treasury, the payment of which is authorized by law, the Constitution is not violated, yet there may have been a violation of the law in some collateral particulars. There may even have been a shifting of funds, and however exceptionable this may be on other accounts, it would not amount to that species of offence which is created by the Constitution.

The disputes about Hamilton's role as Secretary of the Treasury, and the House's role in policing executive officers, were myriad in these debates--could the House censure the officer and recommend that George Washington remove him from office, or should the House impeach the officer; were the other resolutions sufficient to address the concerns of Hamilton's behavior; did the facts suggest that Hamilton had actually spent money from the Treasury improperly.

But on these two resolutions, the House votes 32-25 not to take them up, and moved on to consider the other Giles Resolutions. This "abstract proposition" of the Appropriations Clause would not be fit for House consideration.

What we can expect about legal education and the Class of 2019

Much has been written about the "bottoming out" of the law school applicant pool, as schools have experienced a small uptick in applicants over last year. It's true. But I'll offer a few visualizations of where things stand this year for the incoming Class of 2019 and where it stands in relation to recent history.

Jerry Organ over at the Legal Whiteboard recently offered some helpful thoughts about what we might expect. For one, the quality of this year's applicant pool is up somewhat. The visualization below shows the year-over-year change in applicants in each LSAT band, with the raw total of applicants beside each figure. (This is probably slightly more than 90% of the applicants for this cycle.)

Good news right? Applicant quality is up. But as I noted earlier this year, a problem is that the nationwide applicant quality for the Class of 2018 was down. Here's what that data, year-over-year, looks like.

This year's gains in the quality of the applicant pool, then, roughly offset the declines in the quality of the applicant pool last year. So the Class of 2019 will look more like the Class of 2017.

But it's also worth noting that despite a small projected uptick in applicants, the total incoming class will also look like the Class of 2017--and be demonstrably smaller than recent classes before that. Here's the high-level overview (sorry for the non-zero Y-axis, but it demonstrates the relative change in various groups).

Good news for law schools? LSAT test-takers are up in quantity and quality, as are applicants (and probably matriculants). The bad news? It's not nearly what it was several years ago. The projected JD matriculant Class of 2019 shows this, too.

Law schools can breathe easy, in that applicants and matriculants will have been relatively steady for a few years now. But absent a projected surge in applicants--and not by a couple of percentage points, but by something like 20-30%--this is the new normal for law schools (although, I feel as though the word "new normal" has been tossed about for quite some time). While it may be a fool's errand to project or guarantee too much, law schools may hope for a total matriculant pool of something around 40,000 or so--but it will be far from not only the recent peak, but also the previous historical average of around 49,000. For the fourth straight year, the incoming class size will be smaller than 40,000.

Visualizing law school federal judicial clerkship placement, 2013-2015

The release of the latest ABA employment data offers an opportunity to update the three-year federal judicial clerkship placement rates. Here is the clerkship placement rate for the Classes of 2013, 2014, and 2015. Methodology and observations below the interactive visualization. The "placement" is the three-year total placement; the "percentage" is the three-year placement divided by the three-year graduating class total.

The placement is based on graduates reported as having a full-time, long-term federal clerkship. (A one-year term clerkship counts for this category.) I thought a three-year average for clerkships (over 3500 clerks from the graduating classes of 2013, 2014, and 2015) would be a useful metric to smooth out any one-year outliers. It does not include clerkships obtained by students after graduation; it only includes clerkships obtained by each year's graduating class.

I had to add a couple of new-reporting law schools (Belmont & Lincoln) that only report one year's data. Additionally, I merged the entries for Rutgers-Camden and Rutgers-Newark. The three schools in Puerto Rico are excluded.

A raw chart is below.

st School Pct Total Clerks
CT Yale University 31.3% 202
CA Stanford University 28.6% 165
MA Harvard University 16.8% 295
VA University of Virginia 14.6% 158
CA University of California-Irvine 13.6% 39
IL University of Chicago 13.5% 84
CA University of California-Berkeley 11.0% 95
NC Duke University 10.2% 68
TN Vanderbilt University 10.1% 59
MI University of Michigan 9.4% 108
TX University of Texas at Austin 9.3% 101
PA University of Pennsylvania 9.2% 72
NY Cornell University 8.3% 47
IL Northwestern University 8.1% 70
AL University of Alabama 7.7% 37
NY New York University 7.3% 109
IN University of Notre Dame 7.0% 38
KY University of Kentucky 7.0% 27
MT University of Montana 7.0% 17
GA University of Georgia 6.8% 45
IA University of Iowa 5.9% 30
CA University of California-Los Angeles 5.4% 54
VA William and Mary Law School 5.1% 31
NY Columbia University 5.0% 66
NC University of North Carolina 5.0% 36
PA Temple University 4.5% 36
VA Washington and Lee University 4.5% 20
MN University of Minnesota 4.4% 34
LA Tulane University 4.4% 32
MA Boston College 4.3% 33
MO Washington University 4.2% 33
VA University of Richmond 4.2% 19
DC Georgetown University 4.1% 79
DC George Wasihngton University 4.1% 67
GA Emory University 4.1% 36
MS University of Mississippi 4.1% 21
AR University of Arkansas, Fayetteville 3.8% 15
IL University of Illinois 3.7% 22
DC American University 3.6% 51
CA Pepperdine University 3.6% 22
UT Brigham Young University 3.6% 15
WY University of Wyoming 3.6% 8
GA Georgia State University 3.5% 21
WA University of Washington 3.5% 20
CA University of Southern California 3.4% 23
GA Mercer University 3.4% 14
TN University of Memphis 3.3% 12
VA Regent University 3.2% 12
LA Loyola University-New Orleans 3.1% 21
TX Baylor University 3.1% 13
WV West Virginia University 3.1% 12
TX Texas Tech University 3.0% 20
LA Louisiana State University 3.0% 19
MO University of Missouri 3.0% 12
OH Ohio State University 2.9% 18
IN Indiana University - Bloomington 2.8% 18
AZ University of Arizona 2.8% 12
UT University of Utah 2.8% 11
NY Brooklyn Law School 2.6% 31
MD University of Maryland 2.6% 22
NE Creighton University 2.6% 10
ME University of Maine 2.6% 7
NC Wake Forest University 2.5% 12
TN University of Tennessee 2.5% 11
DC Howard University 2.5% 9
CA Loyola Law School-Los Angeles 2.4% 28
FL University of Florida 2.4% 23
FL Florida State University 2.4% 18
VA George Mason University 2.4% 14
MS Mississippi College 2.4% 12
PA Pennsylvania State University 2.4% 9
TX Southern Methodist University 2.3% 17
SC University of South Carolina 2.3% 14
OH University of Toledo 2.3% 8
KY University of Louisville 2.2% 8
NE University of Nebraska 2.2% 8
ND University of North Dakota 2.2% 5
CT University of Connecticut 2.1% 11
KS University of Kansas 2.1% 9
NY Fordham University 2.0% 27
PA University of Pittsburgh 2.0% 13
PA Drexel University 2.0% 8
SD University of South Dakota 1.9% 4
MA Boston University 1.8% 13
CA University of California-Davis 1.8% 10
CO University of Colorado 1.8% 9
NV University of Nevada - Las Vegas 1.7% 7
NJ Rutgers Law School 1.6% 24
PA Villanova University 1.6% 11
AZ Arizona State University 1.6% 10
NC Campbell University 1.6% 7
OH University of Cincinnati 1.6% 6
CA University of California-Hastings 1.5% 16
OR Lewis and Clark College 1.5% 10
NY Syracuse University 1.5% 9
OR University of Oregon 1.5% 7
ID University of Idaho 1.5% 5
CA University of San Diego 1.4% 12
NJ Seton Hall University 1.3% 10
WI Marquette University 1.3% 9
OH Case Western Reserve University 1.3% 7
KY Northern Kentucky University 1.3% 6
IA Drake University 1.3% 5
PA Widener-Commonwealth 1.3% 4
NC Elon University 1.3% 4
VA Liberty University 1.3% 3
NY Cardozo School of Law 1.2% 14
NM University of New Mexico 1.2% 4
NY St. John's University 1.1% 9
TX University of Houston 1.1% 8
NY University of Buffalo-SUNY 1.1% 7
SC Charleston School of Law 1.1% 6
FL Ave Maria School of Law 1.1% 4
NY New York Law School 1.0% 13
IL Loyola University-Chicago 1.0% 8
WI University of Wisconsin 1.0% 7
MA Northeastern University 1.0% 6
NY Albany Law School 1.0% 6
OK University of Oklahoma 1.0% 5
AL Samford University 1.0% 4
AR University of Arkansas, Little Rock 1.0% 4
NY City University of New York 1.0% 4
OK University of Tulsa 1.0% 3
FL University of Miami 0.9% 11
WA Seattle University 0.9% 8
MN University of St. Thomas (Minnesota) 0.9% 4
MI Michigan State University 0.8% 7
CO University of Denver 0.8% 7
FL Stetson University 0.8% 7
MI Wayne State University 0.8% 4
VT Vermont Law School 0.8% 4
PA Duquesne University 0.8% 4
OH Ohio Northern University 0.8% 2
MA Suffolk University 0.7% 10
IL John Marshall Law School 0.7% 9
CA California Western School of Law 0.7% 5
DE Widener University-Delaware 0.7% 5
CA McGeorge School of Law 0.7% 5
DC Catholic University of America 0.7% 4
OH Cleveland State University 0.7% 3
MO University of Missouri-Kansas City 0.7% 3
NH University of New Hampshire 0.7% 2
NY Hofstra University 0.6% 6
CA Thomas Jefferson School of Law 0.6% 5
NY Pace University 0.6% 4
IN Valparaiso University 0.6% 3
RI Roger Williams University 0.6% 3
IL Southern Illinois University-Carbondale 0.6% 2
IL Depaul University 0.5% 4
MO Saint Louis University 0.5% 4
FL St. Thomas University (Florida) 0.5% 3
LA Southern University 0.5% 3
OH University of Dayton 0.5% 2
AZ Arizona Summit Law School 0.4% 4
IN Indiana University - Indianapolis 0.4% 3
TX St. Mary's University 0.4% 3
TX Texas Southern University 0.4% 2
CA Chapman University 0.4% 2
VA Appalachian School of Law 0.4% 1
AL Faulkner University 0.4% 1
CA Southwestern Law School 0.3% 3
IL Northern Illinois University 0.3% 1
MA Western New England University 0.3% 1
CA Western State College of Law 0.3% 1
TX South Texas College of Law 0.2% 2
MN William Mitchell College of Law 0.2% 2
MD University of Baltimore 0.2% 2
NC Charlotte School of Law 0.2% 2
OH University of Akron 0.2% 1
FL Florida A&M University 0.2% 1
TX Texas A&M University 0.2% 1
MI University of Detroit Mercy 0.2% 1
FL Florida International University 0.2% 1
WA Gonzaga University 0.2% 1
MN Hamline University 0.2% 1
NC North Carolina Central University 0.2% 1
CA Whittier Law School 0.2% 1
MI Thomas M. Colley Law School 0.1% 2
MA New England Law | Boston 0.1% 1
IL Chicago-Kent College of Law-IIT 0.1% 1
FL Florida Coastal School of Law 0.1% 1
FL Nova Southeastern University 0.1% 1
GA Atlanta's John Marshall Law School 0.0% 0
FL Barry University 0.0% 0
TN Belmont University 0.0% 0
OH Capital University 0.0% 0
DC District of Columbia 0.0% 0
CA Golden Gate University 0.0% 0
HI University of Hawaii 0.0% 0
TN Lincoln Memorial 0.0% 0
OK Oklahoma City University 0.0% 0
CT Quinnipiac University 0.0% 0
CA University of San Francisco 0.0% 0
CA Santa Clara University 0.0% 0
NY Touro College 0.0% 0
CA University of La Verne 0.0% 0
MA University of Massachusetts Dartmouth 0.0% 0
KS Washburn University 0.0% 0
OR Willamette University 0.0% 0

Law school-funded positions dry up with U.S. News methodology change

Correlation doesn't equal causation, but I'll float the correlation out there for consideration.

The ABA has recently released the employment data for the Class of 2015. One item I've noticed anecdotally as I've pulled a few states' data has been the decline in law school-funded positions. And we can now confirm a significant decline in such positions.

Several years ago, U.S. News & World Report developed a more nuanced approach to weighing employment outcomes at law schools. They created a black box formula giving different categories of employment different weight. "Full weight" would be given to graduated in full-time, long-term positions that required bar passage or in which a J.D. was an advantage. It made no distinction between positions funded by law schools and those that weren't.

Last year, for the first time, U.S. News & World Report announced a change to the methodology. The rankings now "discounted the value of these types of jobs."

This year, the first full year of reporting after the change went into effect, law schools dramatically cut back on such positions. There were 520 law school-funded bar passage-required positions for the Class of 2012, up to 777 for the Class of 2013 and 833 for the Class of 2014. This year, however, the number plunged to 397. (For comparison, the number of law school-funded J.D.-advantage positions has been slowly declining.)

There are, of course, non-USNWR reasons to see such a decline. Perhaps the employment market is naturally picking up for the best schools, which were the ones that were primarily responsible for such positions; perhaps the declining graduating classes have finally meant a disproportional reduction in such programs; perhaps schools are simply reevaluating the benefit of those programs independent of USNWR.

Nonetheless, the trend was sufficiently pronounced to display above and suggest a factor that contributed to the decline in such positions.

 UPDATE: Jerry Organ has more thoughts here. He attributes some of the decline to changes in reporting requirements and definitions from the ABA.

Legal employment outcomes in Florida in 2015

This is the sixth in the series of visualizations of legal employment outcomes in 2015. The previous visualizations were for Texas, Ohio, California, New York, and DC-Maryland-Virginia.

As with some other jurisdictions, Texas employment outcomes worsened somewhat. There were 1383 full-time, long-term, bar passage-required jobs (excluded law school-funded positions) for the Class of 2015, down from 1419 for the Class of 2014. (As a separate note, Western Michigan University-Cooley separately reported its Tampa campus outcomes for the Class of 2015, and those totals are included for that class but not the Class of 2014.) There was a significant decline in graduates, from 2445 for the Class of 2014 to just 1973 graduates for the Class of 2015 (2079 if you include Cooley-Tampa's 2015 totals). That was the source of improvement in outcomes for most schools--the overall employment rate stood at 70.9%, up a couple of points from last year.

As usual, the chart is sorted by the "full-weight" positions, designating both full-time, long-term, bar passage-required and J.D.-advantage positions. There are additional designations for school-funded positions in these areas, and for all other outcomes. The table below the chart is sorted by the combined bar passage-required, J.D.-advantage, and law school-funded positions (as printed in U.S. News & World Reports), with raw figures and a year-over-year comparison beside. (As an additional note, these are the ABA-reported figures; subsequent amended figures from schools are not included. One school whose website self-reported it was not required to disclose its figures was excluded.)

As usual, please notify me of any errors.

Peer Score School 2015 YoY% BPR JDA LSF 2014 BPR JDA LSF
2.9 Florida State University 81.7% 4.5 183 23 0 77.2% 180 27 0
3.1 University of Florida 81.5% 5.4 232 15 0 76.1% 214 21 0
1.6 Florida International University 81.0% 2.4 97 22 0 78.6% 101 20 0
2.1 Stetson University 79.7% 4.8 171 49 0 74.9% 175 55 0
2.7 University of Miami 71.2% -8.2 257 40 0 79.4% 285 44 3
1.6 Nova Southeastern University 64.0% -3.1 173 10 0 67.1% 174 14 0
1.3 St. Thomas University 50.9% 0.0 71 13 0 50.9% 102 8 0
1.4 Florida A&M University 50.3% 7.2 56 18 0 43.1% 59 16 0
1.1 Ave Maria School of Law 50.0% 4.5 31 11 1 45.5% 40 9 1
1.1 Barry University 48.7% -8.2 80 33 0 56.9% 89 30 0
1.1 Western Michigan University-Cooley (Tampa) 45.3% n/a 32 16 0