New lawsuit perpetuates falsehood that Arizona legislature "endorsed" rival slate of electors

Earlier, I highlighted the erroneous assertion in some legal briefs that a state legislature has “endorsed” some rival slate of presidential electors. A new lawsuit from Arizona filed in Texas does the same, and more.

Here are some allegations from the complaint:

The Arizona Electors have cast Arizona’s electoral votes for President Donald J. Trump on December 14, 2020, at the Arizona State Capitol with the permission and endorsement of the Arizona Legislature, i.e., at the time, place, and manner required under Arizona state law and the Electoral Count Act.

As I explained earlier, “‘Permission’ to appear in the state capitol is no more an endorsement than allowing any group of tourists to step foot in the capitol and engage in some kind of activity.” It also is not clear that the legislature, as a legislature, endorsed such an activity.

The more deceptive claim is here:

On December 14, 2020, members of the Arizona Legislature passed a Joint Resolution in which they: (1) found that the 2020 General Election “was marred by irregularities so significant as to render it highly doubtful whether the certified result accurately represents the will of the voters;” (2) invoked the Arizona Legislature’s authority under the Electors Clause and 5 U.S.C. § 2 to declare the 2020 General Election a failed election and to directly appoint Arizona’s electors; (3) resolved that the Plaintiff Arizona Electors’ “11 electoral votes be accepted for … Donald J. Trump or to have all electoral votes nullified completely until a full forensic audit can be conducted;” and (4) further resolved “that the United States Congress is not to consider a slate of electors from the State of Arizona until the Legislature deems the election to be final and all irregularities resolved.[n. 11]

n.11: See Ex. A, “A Joint Resolution of the 54th Legislature, State of Arizona, To The 116th Congress, Office of the President of the Senate Presiding,” December 14, 2020 (“December 14, 2020 Joint Resolution”).

(Note that Exhibit A includes only 4 pages, not 5, which is the total number of original signatories. You can see that Twitter thread here. It appears the plaintiffs may have accidentally included only the 4 images in the first Twitter post without scrolling down to the second post.)

“Members” of the legislature are distinct from the legislature. They cannot “pass” a “Joint Resolution” under state law unless they go through the lawmaking process. It is not a “Joint Resolution” under any recognized authority of the state legislature, except that these lawmakers want it to be so.

A review of the signatories shows 17 members of the 60-member house, and 5 members of the 30-member senate, which means that it fails majority requirements in both chambers (of course, the presence of a quorum may mean fewer than all members present).

It’s also signed by 8 members-elect, who, of course, are not a part of the legislature right now and cannot engage in the lawmaking function.

And the “joint resolution” has no bill number and is not enrolled in any journal. No roll call was taken. No legislative session was established by any entity.

These members of the legislature are so strongly advancing the independent state legislature doctrine while simultaneously undermining legislative claims by asserting legislative power in contexts where the legislature is not acting.

UPDATE January 1, 2021: A similar falsehood was included regarding Michigan’s electors in a motion to intervene in Gohmert v. Pence. Here are the allegations:

Intervenors include portions of the slate of Republican Presidential Electors for the State of Michigan. Intervenors have cast their Presidential electoral votes for the State of Michigan for President Donald J. Trump on December 14, 2020, at the Michigan State Capitol with the permission and endorsement of the Michigan Legislature, i.e., at the time, place, and manner required under Michigan state law and the Electoral Count Act.
...
On December 14, 2020, pursuant to the requirements of applicable state laws and the Electoral Count Act, Intervenors, with the knowledge and permission of the Republican-majority Michigan Legislature, convened at the Michigan State Capitol, and cast Michigan’s electoral votes for President Donald J. Trump and Vice President Michael R. Pence.

Scrutinizing one voter fraud allegation: did 42,000 people vote more than once in Nevada in 2020?

A recent conversation with a friend led me to investigate, with some specificity, the origins and sources of some of the voter fraud claims from the 2020 presidential election. Isolated instances of fraud exist in every election. Occasionally, more systemic fraud exists, like North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District in 2018. But to find such widespread fraud at scale, in so many states, strains credulity.

But this is a hard point to raise. Many cite “irregularities” as evidence of fraud. But I think “irregularities” are a starting point to investigate fraud. And what’s happened in our elections discourse is that, too easily, “irregularities” are treated as proof of fraud, and the investigation into those irregularities receives much less attention.

I drilled deep into one specific claim with a friend to make this point—a claim that had a thorough judicial examination (as many such claims never even make it to court for standing concerns, laches, or other procedural defenses of bars). Did 42,000 people vote more than once in Nevada in 2020?

Here’s the most recent popular origin of the claim, courtesy of testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, as relayed by Jesse Binnall, December 16, 2020:

The election was inevitably riddled with fraud and our hotline never stopped ringing. While the media and the democrats accused us of making it all up, our team began chasing down every lead. Our evidence came both from data scientists and brave whistleblowers.

Here is what we found:

Over 42,000 people voted more than once. Our experts were able to make this determination by reviewing the list of actual voters and comparing it to other voters with the same name, address, and date of birth. This method was also able to catch people using different first name variations, such as William and Bill, and individuals who were registered both under a married name and a maiden name.

This is a specific claim, and it allows us to trace its origin. Binnall’s lawsuit in Nevada state court, Law v. Whitmer, relies on the expert report of Jesse Kamzol. (An expert report is something you file with the court and with the opposing counsel to give them a chance to determine if your expert is reliable and so one, meeting all the rules of evidence.)

Here's an excerpt from Kamzol's report:

Duplicate Voter Registrations:

I identified 42,284 voters who appear to have voted twice in the 2020 general election. This list includes individuals that have the same name, address, and birthdate, and that voted multiple times. All these voters had multiple voter registration numbers associated with substantially the same name, birthdate, and address. There are a few variations within this list because of first name deviations, i.e. Bill and William, but all 42,284 voters have multiple data point matches including birthdates from which I conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that these duplicate voters are each one and the same individual."

It’s worth opening that this allegation of double voting comes from duplicate voter registrations, which has two complications worth considering. First, are the voter registrations themselves actually duplicates? Second, is there evidence that those who appeared to vote twice actually do so?

At the outset, however, Binnall wrongly characterizes Kamzol's report. Kamzol qualifies with "appears," while Binnall does not. (Nevertheless, Kamzol does conclude with a "reasonable degree of certainty that these duplicate voters are each one and the same individual.")

Kamzol says that the list "includes" individuals "that have the same name, address, and birthday," while Binnall states that the determination is made "comparing it to other voters with the same name, address, and date of birth." Kamzol says that "multiple data point matches" are his parameters. It's not clear what "multiple data point matches" mean.

It’s not clear, because Kamzol's report is very brief and lacks explanation about his methodology. (Go check it out.) A good study published this year in the American Political Science Review recounts some of the difficulties in state data in trying to identify actual duplicates and the rigor that goes into assessing irregularities in what appear to be, on their face, duplicates. Dig into this for rigorous methodology--methodology not explained in Kamzol's report.

In short, Kamzol's report offers a beginning for investigation. It is not the end in itself. And when pressed under cross examination, he could not defend even this conclusion.

*

When the court issued its order, it did not reject Kamzol's testimony outright as a non-expert, as the defendants had requested. The court deemed him an expert. But the court did qualify that there was a problem of methodology:

The Court questions Mr. Kamzol's methodology because he had little to no information about or supervision over the origins of his data, the manner in which it had been matched, and what the rate of false positives would be. Additionally, there was little or no verification of his numbers. [Here the court cites Kamzol's deposition, which I cannot find online, which apparently concedes the lack of methodology, supervision, matching, false positive rate, or verification of numbers.]

Again, without explaining how you got to 42,000, it is difficult for a court to accept the figure of 42,000. And without even a single individual that they followed up with to determine its accuracy, it was, again, an absence of evidence:

109. Despite two of Contestants' experts testifying to 'questionable ballots' and 'illegal ballots,' Baselice Dep. 52:20-25 ('questionable ballots'); Kamzol Dep. 53:10-14 ('illegal ballots'), neither provided evidence to support Contestants' allegations regarding the presence of illegal votes in the 2020 presidential election. See Herron Dep. 59:22-60:12, 68:13--69:12 (testifying that neither Mr. Baselice nor Mr. Kamzol disclosed the data underlying their analysis); Baselice Dep. 24:7-15 (explaining that he did not participate in compiling the data he used and 'shouldn't even surmise' 'what the original source of the data was'); Kamzol Dep. 58:6-59: 15 (explaining that he did not know how the matching work to enhance the data he used was performed); Baselice Dep. 60:8-61:17 (acknowledging that he could not determine how many 'questionable' ballots were actually counted, contained votes in the presidential election, or were cast for a particular candidate); Kamzol Dep. 92:4-16 (same). Little or no verification of numbers was done by Mr. Kamzol.

So, circling back to Para. 109, in the deposition (read: the opportunity to cross-examine a witness), Kamzol could not determine how many double votes were cast. That would seem to run up against the 42,000 figure in the expert report.

(There was a supplemental declaration, but it was rejected as filed too late. You can see even within that, however, weak methodology:

Birth dates were not provided on the DMV file and name suffix (JR/SR/etc.) presence appeared to be inconsistent, so false positive matches of like-named family/household members are possible within these matches; however and again, these are all high to mid-high confidence matches that are reliable and merit further investigation.

I don’t think the supplemental declaration advances much in this regard.)

When it came to double voting, there was no evidence that "any Nevada voter voted twice." Here's the specific paragraphs from the court's opinion--and by "any voter," it means not a single one (at least, as put forth by the plaintiffs):

93. The record does not support a finding that any Nevada voter voted twice. See Doe 4 Dep. 10:6-13 (testifying that two voters he checked in were not allowed to vote because of record 16 that they already voted).

94. The record does not support a finding that any individuals were sent and cast [note: an important qualification] multiple mail ballots. Cf Negrete Deel. (LAW 001626) (hearsay declaration alleging that she received two ballots, one each for her married and maiden names, but not that she or anyone else cast multiple votes); Finley Deel. (LAW 004944) (hearsay declaration alleging that voter received two ballots, but providing no evidence that ballot was cast or counted).

*

A journalist at the Nevada Independent looked at a version of the double voting list, and it offers a different kind of explanation.

The Washoe voter file from Nov. 5 has 303,989 records; about 3,800 are duplicates. Some duplicates exist because of a change of address, as the following vote trace data shows (for a friend of ours who is building a new home).

They had changed their address at the DMV (which is linked to their voter file) to the one for the new home, but as the home was not completed in the run-up to the election, when ballots were mailed out to everyone, theirs could not be delivered to that address. The family showed up to early vote, and was asked to fix their address by the poll worker. You can see the challenge code “MAIL” in their record, meaning the mail-in ballot was undeliverable. You can also see an Early Vote Code for the ballot that was counted. You can also see the Voter ID duplicated as there are now two addresses associated with the voter. This type of duplicate record is considered a change of address.

Another type of duplicate record occurs because a person voted by mail, then voted again in person. Analysis shows that registered Democrats and Republicans have about the same rate of these duplicate vote entries.

In an effort to trace one of the duplicate votes, I interviewed a person whose mail-in ballot was collected from her home, but who was concerned that the person wouldn’t turn it in. She wanted to be sure her vote was counted, and appeared at a polling place in person, explaining the situation to the poll worker. In the file, I could see that the mail ballot did arrive — and that her in-person vote canceled out the vote by mail (as it should be).

That is, even at times where it was actually a duplicate in the database, a ballot was only cast and counted once within this system. That is, what might appear to be a duplicate vote is not actually a duplicate vote on close scrutiny, because there are checks in the system that prevent double-voting (even if a voter is mailed or receives multiple ballots).

*

It’s tough to get a concise look at a specific claim, given how many free-wheeling claims there are out there. But the origin of this story begins with an expert report that lacked methodology or underlying data; a report that was minimized and in some cases retracted on cross-examination; evidence deemed low value and low reliability by the court; and evidence lacking any specific backing upon scrutiny. Examination of the evidence offers explanations about some of the apparent irregularities or inconsistencies as misreading the database or misunderstanding the controls in place to ensure each voter casts a single ballot.

But when someone testifies before a committee of Congress about a hard figure like 42,000, that’s what gets picked up. Digging deep into even this claim takes hours of research to identify its origin and its weakness. One could do this with dozens of other claims floating out there. But I thought, given that I’d done the effort elsewhere, I’d share the origins of this one claim.

"Iowa's Second Congressional District Contest Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Exhaustion of State Remedies"

Over at the Election Law Blog, I have this guest post, “Iowa’s Second Congressional District Contest Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Exhaustion of State Remedies.” It begins:

Iowa’s Second Congressional District is officially one of the closest congressional elections in American history. Congresswoman-Elect Mariannette Miller-Meeks led by 47 votes after the official canvass. After challenger Rita Hart requested a recount in all 24 counties, Miller-Meeks led by just six votes. Miller-Meeks received a certificate of election from the state and will be seated, absent an extraordinary move from the House of Representatives, in the 117th Congress.

Hart has filed an election contest under the Federal Contested Elections Act of 1969. Under the Constitution, each House is “the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members.” In doing so, however, Hart skipped the opportunity to file an election contest in Iowa courts.

Hart’s lead-up to the election contest was a thaumatrope. On one side, the Hart campaign alleged that not all the votes were counted, and every vote needed to be counted. On the other side, the Hart campaign complained that the time to seek an election contest in state court was too short, so the House was the only mechanism for it. Spinning this thaumatrope, the two claims appeared as a single concern.

But now that the contest has been filed, we see two distinct claims. The first are discrete claims about twenty-two ballots that were not counted that the Hart campaign argues should have been counted, amply within the window of a state court contest to resolve. The second are sweeping claims asking for, effectively, a second recount (or a third count) of thousands of ballots, something a contest court would never have entertained because Hart would have been estopped from raising it.

I’ll provide an overall setup of the dispute, then dig into some of the specific claims Hart raises in the contest. I’ll refer to some of the points in the Notice of Contest, but I’ll also refer to relevant facts omitted from the Notice. But in short, Hart raises two types of claims, and both should be dismissed, in my judgment, on fairly straightforward procedural grounds: the first claim should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion; the second claim should be dismissed for estoppel, waiver, or laches.

"Texas v. Pennsylvania Would Have Upended the Electoral College"

Over at Law and Liberty, I have this post, “Texas v. Pennsylvania Would Have Upended the Electoral College.” It begins:

The Electoral College is a designedly decentralized process for the selection of the President of the United States. Each State may choose its presidential electors in the manner that the legislature deems appropriate.

The State of Texas, in Texas v. Pennsylvania, sought to upend this system in advance of one end: get the Supreme Court to do something, anything, to prevent President-Elect Joe Biden from taking office.

Some data on law school-specific debt load disparities between men and women

The ever-valuable LSSSE data recently noted that women tend to graduate from law school with higher debt loads than men. The ABA has tracked this, too. On the heels of recent Department of Education data disclosures, however, we can drill down on law school-specific figures.

I looked at mean debt data for males and non-males. (That’s how the DOE codes the data—I assume the vast majority of non-males are females, but it could include non-binary individuals, and I’ll formally use the DOE coding.) Unsurprisingly (given the aggregate figures from LSSSE & ABA, among others), there are more schools where the mean debt loads for non-males are greater than the mean debt loads for males. At about half the schools, the debt ratios are close to parity—of the 208 schools in my data set, about 100 have a mean debt load of less than a $5000 difference between the sexes.

But I found 72 schools where average debt incurred was at least $5000 more among non-males than males. That gap was at least $10,000 at 34 schools. And it was at least $20,000 among four.

On the other side, there were 35 schools where average debt incurred was at least $5000 more among males than non-males. The gap was at least $10,000 at 14 schools, and at least $20,000 at one school.

I looked at schools on mean non-male debt, less mean male debt. A positive figure (+$10,000) means that the average non-male debt was that much larger than male debt. A negative figure (-$5000) means that the average male debt was that much larger than non-male debt.

Below is a table, then a visualization. These are 2018-2019 figures.

School Mean non-male debt less mean male debt
Univ. of Massachusetts-Dartmouth $42,979
Univ. of the District of Columbia $25,457
Widener Univ. $24,442
Western Michigan Univ.-Thomas M. Cooley $20,851
Tulane Univ. of Louisiana $18,508
Pepperdine Univ. $18,209
Barry Univ. $18,017
Mercer Univ. $17,882
Nova Southeastern Univ. $17,881
Saint Louis Univ. $17,587
Washington and Lee Univ. $17,286
Lewis & Clark College $17,245
Univ. of Georgia $16,200
The John Marshall Law School $15,927
Univ. of Akron Main Campus $15,761
Santa Clara Univ. $14,160
Univ. of Richmond $13,590
Northern Kentucky Univ. $13,087
Mississippi College $12,907
Arizona Summit Law School $12,693
Santa Barbara and Ventura Colleges of Law $12,043
Suffolk Univ. $12,000
Univ. of Oklahoma-Norman Campus $11,975
Univ. of Kansas $11,939
Case Western Reserve Univ. $11,852
Univ. of La Verne $11,705
Southern Univ. Law Center $11,593
Campbell Univ. $11,431
Whittier College $10,906
Wake Forest Univ. $10,609
Univ. of Detroit Mercy $10,458
North Carolina Central Univ. $10,227
Univ. of Memphis $10,088
Thomas Jefferson School of Law $10,048
Harvard Univ. $9,671
Univ. of Idaho $9,472
Arizona State Univ.-Tempe $9,329
Samford Univ. $9,257
Seattle Univ. $9,223
Stanford Univ. $9,134
Florida Coastal School of Law $9,116
Mitchell Hamline School of Law $9,114
Univ. of Houston $9,071
The Univ. of Texas at Austin $8,970
Southwestern Law School $8,517
St John's Univ.-New York $8,355
Cornell Univ. $8,213
Touro College $8,136
Univ. of Missouri-Columbia $7,997
Southern Illinois Univ.-Carbondale $7,938
Univ. of Chicago $7,675
St. Mary's Univ. $7,570
Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill $7,440
New England Law-Boston $7,232
Ohio Northern Univ. $6,882
West Virginia Univ. $6,867
Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign $6,859
The Catholic Univ. of America $6,859
Univ. of South Carolina-Columbia $6,776
Univ. of Baltimore $6,579
Western State College of Law at Argosy Univ. $6,425
Argosy Univ.-Orange County $6,425
Stetson Univ. $6,127
Georgia State Univ. $6,041
Capital Univ. $6,023
Rutgers Univ.-New Brunswick $6,005
Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore $5,959
Yale Univ. $5,666
American Univ. $5,456
Georgetown Univ. $5,390
Concordia Univ.-Portland $5,229
Texas A & M Univ.-College Station $5,119
Univ. of Wyoming $4,994
Pontifical Catholic Univ. of Puerto Rico-Ponce $4,925
New York Univ. $4,850
Univ. of Notre Dame $4,832
Trinity Law School $4,802
Trinity International Univ.-Illinois $4,802
Wayne State Univ. $4,799
Fordham Univ. $4,747
George Washington Univ. $4,736
Golden Gate Univ.-San Francisco $4,609
Univ. of Arkansas at Little Rock $4,545
Texas Tech Univ. $4,425
Univ. of Denver $4,405
Univ. of Utah $4,403
Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City $4,345
Appalachian School of Law $4,001
Univ. of Iowa $3,976
Seton Hall Univ. $3,831
DePaul Univ. $3,825
Albany Law School $3,732
Univ. of Virginia-Main Campus $3,627
Washington Univ. in St Louis $3,569
Univ. of Florida $3,352
Northwestern Univ. $3,326
Gonzaga Univ. $3,324
Emory Univ. $3,273
Charleston School of Law $3,086
Willamette Univ. $2,836
Univ. of Michigan-Ann Arbor $2,793
Univ. of Oregon $2,746
Univ. at Buffalo $2,366
Syracuse Univ. $2,337
Univ. of Arkansas $2,249
Illinois Institute of Technology $2,042
Belmont Univ. $1,987
Texas Southern Univ. $1,680
Washburn Univ. $1,609
Inter American Univ. of Puerto Rico-School of Law $1,426
California Western School of Law $1,411
Ohio State Univ.-Main Campus $1,357
Chapman Univ. $1,341
Univ. of the Pacific $1,001
Univ. of Louisville $988
St. Thomas Univ. $664
Cleveland State Univ. $619
Charlotte School of Law $457
Univ. of Hawaii at Manoa $402
Univ. of North Dakota $284
Brigham Young Univ.-Provo $257
Atlanta's John Marshall Law School $104
Savannah Law School $104
Univ. of Dayton $50
Univ. of Colorado Boulder -$93
Brooklyn Law School -$169
Boston College -$214
Univ. of Toledo -$343
Pace Univ. -$406
Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ.-Indianapolis -$410
Purdue Univ. Global-Davenport -$417
Purdue Univ. Global -$417
Loyola Marymount Univ. -$700
Hofstra Univ. -$750
Florida State Univ. -$766
Temple Univ. -$809
Univ. of Miami -$1,194
South Texas College of Law Houston -$1,195
Yeshiva Univ. -$1,236
Univ. of Tulsa -$1,309
The Univ. of Tennessee-Knoxville -$1,316
Michigan State Univ.-College of Law -$1,475
Howard Univ. -$1,521
Duquesne Univ. -$1,652
William & Mary -$1,685
Massachusetts School of Law -$1,906
Univ. of California-Davis -$2,086
The Univ. of Alabama -$2,118
Columbia Univ. in the City of New York -$2,226
Univ. of Washington-Seattle Campus -$2,408
Univ. of San Francisco -$2,461
Univ. of New Mexico-Main Campus -$2,618
Duke Univ. -$2,882
Univ. of Kentucky -$3,042
Loyola Univ. Chicago -$3,172
Univ. of New Hampshire-Main Campus -$3,180
Vermont Law School -$3,241
Ave Maria School of Law -$3,298
Quinnipiac Univ. -$3,330
Univ. of Nevada-Las Vegas -$3,412
Univ. of Southern Maine -$3,502
Univ. of California-Berkeley -$3,644
New York Law School -$3,675
Univ. of Nebraska-Lincoln -$3,685
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical Univ. -$3,805
Louisiana State Univ. -$3,869
The Univ. of Montana -$3,982
Northern Illinois Univ. -$4,129
Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison -$4,137
Florida International Univ. -$4,781
Univ. of California-Hastings College of Law -$4,803
Univ. of Pennsylvania -$4,860
Univ. of Arizona -$4,860
Univ. of Connecticut -$5,274
Taft Univ. System -$5,295
Univ. of Cincinnati-Main Campus -$5,311
Drexel Univ. -$5,630
Univ. of St Thomas -$5,638
George Mason Univ. -$5,982
Villanova Univ. -$6,181
Roger Williams Univ. -$6,393
Univ. of Minnesota-Twin Cities -$6,726
Univ. of San Diego -$6,806
Southern Methodist Univ. -$6,873
Boston Univ. -$7,034
Univ. of Mississippi -$7,069
Univ. of California-Los Angeles -$7,678
Univ. of South Dakota -$8,142
Univ. of Southern California -$8,502
Marquette Univ. -$8,537
Creighton Univ. -$8,542
Regent Univ. -$8,954
Pennsylvania State Univ.-Dickinson Law -$9,492
Pennsylvania State Univ.-Main Campus -$9,492
Oklahoma City Univ. -$10,330
Valparaiso Univ. -$10,441
Ohio Northern Univ. -$10,673
Lincoln Memorial Univ. -$11,282
Univ. of Pittsburgh-Pittsburgh Campus -$12,507
Baylor Univ. -$13,041
CUNY School of Law -$13,275
Indiana Univ.-Bloomington -$13,515
Loyola Univ. New Orleans -$13,696
Drake Univ. -$13,700
Northeastern Univ. -$15,642
Chapman Univ. -$17,551
Vanderbilt Univ. -$18,237
Univ. of California-Irvine -$23,266

Despite what Court briefs say, no state legislature has appointed--or "endorsed"--a rival slate of presidential electors

Briefs before the Supreme Court are making deceptive (at best) claims about what state legislatures have done this December when it comes to presidential elections and the selection of presidential electors.

Consider this statement from a brief in King v. Whitmer:

As a result of the foregoing, there are now competing slates of electors from the four states at issue [Arizona, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin] in the four cases mentioned above, (as well from Nevada, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania).

These four slates of electors have received the endorsement of the legislatures in each of these States, as reflected in permission for them to cast (or attempt to cast) their electoral votes, as an electoral body, for President Donald J. Trump in the respective State Houses at the time and place as set forth under applicable State law, the Electoral Count Act, and the authority delegated under the U.S. Constitution’s Electors Clause. U.S. Const. Art II, § 1, cl. 2.

Or these statements from a brief in In re Pearson:

While the Georgia Legislature did not go so far as to formally withdraw or nullify this delegation of authority on December 14, 2020, its endorsement of the contingent slate of Republican electors preserved its right to do so at the time and in the manner of its choosing.

...

Any contention that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over these controversies is likewise without merit. The events of December 14, 2014 giving rise to competing slates of electors for the State of Georgia – one endorsed by the State Legislature and one by the Respondent State executives – creates a new and very live “case or controversy” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

The “legislature” is the elected lawmaking body in a state, but that lawmaking body has some rules. To act as a legislature, it has to be in session. It has to have a quorum present. It has to hold a vote. It typically requires a public report in a journal, like the federal Constitution requires. These aren’t controversial propositions for even most the ardent defender of a state legislature’s power under the Presidential Electors Clause.

But no legislature has done any such thing. No legislature has appointed a slate of electors. No legislature has “endorsed” the actions of a slate of electors that attempted to vote contrary to the electors certified from the popular election in the state.

“Permission” to appear in the state capitol is no more an endorsement than allowing any group of tourists to step foot in the capitol and engage in some kind of activity.

While some individuals purporting to be groups of Republican electors cast votes in their respective states recently—arguing they were a “rival” slate opposed to the winning Democratic slate—none of these slates were appointed by the legislature. All acted on their own. While individual legislators may have approved of their decisions, no legislature did so.

In contrast, one can go back to 2000 and the special session of the Florida legislature that met to consider choosing a slate of electors as Bush v. Gore languished in the courts. One can open the House journal to find the vote of the Florida House approving a slate of electors. Yet it still wasn’t an appointment of the legislature, as the Senate never acted on it.

These statements in the briefs before the Supreme Court are designed to sow confusion and uncertainty, to act as if there are questions of the legitimacy of more than one slate of electors when, in reality, there is only one slate in each of the fifty states that has any legally-recognized authority.

Which law schools have the best and worst debt-to-income ratios among recent graduates? 2020 edition

Last year, a treasure trove of data from the Department of Education offered incredible insights into debt and earnings of law school graduates. A recent update for 2018-2019 has been made available, and we can look at the data again.

One intriguing figure is the “debt-to-income” ratio (last year, plenty of people hated this term, but I’m still using it), or how much student debt recent graduates have compared to their earnings. Lower is better. (A slightly better way is to calculate what percentage of your monthly paycheck is required to service your monthly debt payment, or the debt-service-to-monthly-income ratio, but this gives a good idea of the relationship between debt and income.) It’s entirely imperfect, of course—graduates have interest accrued on that debt when they graduate; they may have other debt; and so on. It’s just one way of looking at the data!

I took the raw data file and pulled out all domestic schools that had a concentration in “law” for a “doctoral degree” or “first professional degree.” I then compared the median debt load to the median earnings figures. (Of course, there’s no guarantee these figures are the same person, and there may be other mismatches, like high earners with low debt or low earners with high debt. Again, just one way of looking at the data!)

The Department of Education site defines these figures as follows:

Field of Study Median Earnings

The median annual earnings of individuals who received federal financial aid during their studies and completed an award at the indicated field of study. To be included in the median earnings calculation, the individuals needed to be working and not enrolled in school during in the year when earnings are measured. Median earnings are measured in the second full year after the student completed their award.

These data are based on school-reported information about students’ program of completion. The U.S. Department of Education cannot fully confirm the completeness of these reported data for this school.

For schools with multiple locations, this information is based on all of their locations.

Field of Study Median Total Debt for Loans Taken Out at This School

The median federal loan debt accumulated at the school by student borrowers of federal loans (William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, the Federal Family Education Loan Program, and Graduate PLUS Loans) who completed an award at the indicated field of study. Non-federal loans, Perkins loans, and federal loans not made to students (e.g., parents borrowing from the federal Parent PLUS loan program) are not included in the calculation. Only loans made at the same academic level as the award conferred are included (e.g., undergraduate loans are not included in the median debt calculation for graduate credential levels). Note that this debt metric only includes loans originated at this school, so this metric should be interpreted as the typical debt level for attending this school alone, not necessarily the typical total debt to obtain a credential for students who transfer from another school. For schools with multiple locations, this information is based on all of their locations.

These data are based on school-reported information about students’ program of completion. The U.S. Department of Education cannot fully confirm the completeness of these reported data for this school.

That means debt loads can of course be higher if undergraduate loans were factored in. These count Academic Year 2018-2019 figures.

A number of elite schools are near the top—despite their high debt levels, they translate into high median incomes among their graduates. A number of lower-cost schools also fare well near the top.

A good rule of thumb might be that “manageable” debt loads are those where debt is about equal to expected income at graduation—i.e., a ratio of 1.00 or lower. Only 22 schools meet that definition among median debt and earnings, and a few others are close. But it was 11 in the last data set, so the figure improved. Many ratios, however, are significantly higher than that. That said, law graduates to have higher earnings and see their salaries rise faster than a typical borrower, so maybe it’s not the best rule of thumb, either.

Of course, medians are likely skewed in other ways—the highest-earning graduates likely received the largest scholarships and, accordingly, graduated with the lowest debt (as I mention earlier).

But, the figures are below. I sort by the lowest (i.e., best) debt-to-income ratio. (Due to size of chart, results may be best viewed on a desktop or on a phone turned sideways.) I noted earlier that schools at the bottom of the list (i.e., with the highest ratio) appeared at a much higher risk of facing “adverse situations.”

UPDATE: A helpful commenter noted that many borrowers will be eligible for Public Service Loan Forgiveness programs. If schools have disproportionately higher percentages of students entering those programs, their debt levels will appear worse than they actually and their salaries will appear on the lower end of the income side. It’s another limitation in thinking about a single-figure metric.

School Debt-to-Income Ratio Median Debt Median Income
Brigham Young Univ. 0.76 $49,710 $65,457
Cornell Univ. 0.78 $139,926 $179,153
Northwestern Univ. 0.78 $138,065 $176,087
Stanford Univ. 0.80 $130,762 $163,869
Harvard Univ. 0.82 $141,190 $172,423
Duke Univ. 0.83 $139,961 $168,296
Univ. of Pennsylvania 0.84 $150,634 $179,672
Univ. of Virginia 0.90 $157,870 $175,653
Univ. of Chicago 0.90 $156,934 $173,847
Santa Barbara and Ventura Colleges of Law 0.90 $53,000 $58,673
Univ. of California-Berkeley 0.94 $150,000 $160,316
Univ. of Iowa 0.94 $59,711 $63,788
Washington Univ. in St Louis 0.94 $88,000 $93,342
Columbia Univ. in the City of New York 0.95 $177,000 $185,760
Wayne State Univ. 0.95 $61,500 $64,415
Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 0.96 $71,701 $74,666
Yale Univ. 0.97 $126,398 $130,669
Temple Univ. 0.97 $67,518 $69,477
Univ. of Michigan-Ann Arbor 0.97 $141,505 $145,235
Georgia State Univ. 0.98 $65,768 $67,225
Vanderbilt Univ. 0.98 $126,907 $129,252
The Univ. of Texas at Austin 0.99 $105,553 $106,117
The Univ. of Alabama 1.00 $63,595 $63,572
Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison 1.04 $61,500 $58,995
New York Univ. 1.04 $184,952 $177,207
Univ. of Kansas 1.04 $61,500 $58,898
Univ. of Nebraska-Lincoln 1.04 $58,621 $56,140
Texas Tech Univ. 1.05 $73,000 $69,732
The Univ. of Tennessee-Knoxville 1.05 $61,500 $58,744
Univ. of Arkansas 1.08 $61,500 $56,949
Boston Univ. 1.09 $119,295 $109,286
Univ. of Houston 1.10 $81,118 $73,446
Univ. of Utah 1.12 $74,100 $66,420
Univ. of Cincinnati-Main Campus 1.12 $64,066 $57,318
Univ. of Missouri-Columbia 1.13 $63,084 $55,840
Georgetown Univ. 1.13 $164,954 $145,898
Univ. of California-Los Angeles 1.13 $124,812 $110,067
Univ. of Oklahoma-Norman Campus 1.15 $73,500 $63,997
Univ. of Connecticut 1.15 $86,158 $74,845
Univ. of North Dakota 1.16 $61,500 $53,045
Baylor Univ. 1.16 $86,862 $74,786
Univ. of Nevada-Las Vegas 1.17 $85,790 $73,579
CUNY School of Law 1.19 $70,450 $59,438
Boston College 1.19 $109,256 $91,744
Univ. of California-Davis 1.20 $89,009 $74,200
Univ. of Georgia 1.23 $81,080 $65,840
Rutgers Univ.-New Brunswick 1.24 $76,500 $61,855
Villanova Univ. 1.25 $78,619 $63,140
Indiana Univ.-Bloomington 1.25 $81,500 $65,238
Univ. of St Thomas 1.25 $73,500 $58,673
Univ. of Mississippi 1.25 $65,900 $52,584
Drexel Univ. 1.26 $73,894 $58,823
Univ. of Hawaii at Manoa 1.27 $80,116 $63,302
Fordham Univ. 1.27 $150,000 $118,210
Pennsylvania State Univ.-Dickinson Law 1.29 $70,763 $54,867
Pennsylvania State Univ.-Main Campus 1.29 $70,763 $54,867
Univ. of Southern California 1.30 $129,000 $99,325
Univ. of Arizona 1.30 $77,069 $59,288
Univ. of Tulsa 1.30 $76,373 $58,673
Univ. of New Hampshire-Main Campus 1.33 $83,797 $63,005
Univ. of Notre Dame 1.33 $126,962 $95,295
Florida State Univ. 1.34 $72,302 $54,005
George Mason Univ. 1.34 $99,248 $73,870
Mitchell Hamline School of Law 1.36 $78,744 $57,948
Univ. of Washington-Seattle Campus 1.37 $95,727 $70,100
Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1.39 $95,390 $68,778
Case Western Reserve Univ. 1.41 $83,500 $59,288
Arizona State Univ.-Tempe 1.43 $92,309 $64,706
Louisiana State Univ. 1.43 $75,768 $53,080
Washburn Univ. 1.44 $75,093 $52,226
Univ. of Richmond 1.44 $86,056 $59,819
Univ. of Oregon 1.44 $86,641 $60,156
Duquesne Univ. 1.44 $82,620 $57,318
Univ. of Florida 1.44 $92,076 $63,869
Northern Illinois Univ. 1.45 $74,611 $51,551
West Virginia Univ. 1.45 $82,128 $56,544
Univ. of Akron Main Campus 1.46 $73,530 $50,272
Washington and Lee Univ. 1.47 $97,097 $66,007
Indiana Univ.-Purdue Univ.-Indianapolis 1.48 $89,961 $60,714
Pace Univ. 1.49 $94,806 $63,699
William & Mary 1.50 $105,414 $70,083
Ohio State Univ.-Main Campus 1.51 $100,481 $66,512
The Univ. of Montana 1.51 $76,994 $50,922
Quinnipiac Univ. 1.51 $93,151 $61,516
Saint Louis Univ. 1.51 $91,143 $60,162
St John's Univ.-New York 1.52 $109,414 $71,940
Yeshiva Univ. 1.53 $110,033 $71,725
Michigan State Univ.-College of Law 1.54 $90,168 $58,402
Univ. of California-Irvine 1.56 $119,986 $76,998
Massachusetts School of Law 1.56 $78,600 $50,439
Texas A & M Univ.-College Station 1.56 $102,723 $65,825
Univ. of Colorado Boulder 1.57 $100,082 $63,600
Northeastern Univ. 1.58 $93,751 $59,485
Univ. of Arkansas at Little Rock 1.58 $78,617 $49,737
Univ. of San Diego 1.59 $122,698 $77,013
Univ. of New Mexico-Main Campus 1.60 $85,991 $53,908
Illinois Institute of Technology 1.61 $102,823 $64,051
Southern Methodist Univ. 1.61 $141,372 $87,718
Univ. of Kentucky 1.61 $82,450 $51,106
Univ. of South Dakota 1.63 $83,269 $51,169
Univ. at Buffalo 1.63 $94,804 $58,252
Univ. of Memphis 1.65 $91,826 $55,512
Univ. of Toledo 1.66 $79,000 $47,729
Wake Forest Univ. 1.66 $105,577 $63,666
Univ. of Louisville 1.66 $80,928 $48,703
Univ. of Minnesota-Twin Cities 1.66 $112,944 $67,879
Concordia Univ.-Portland 1.67 $93,836 $56,234
Cleveland State Univ. 1.68 $85,892 $51,273
Albany Law School 1.68 $105,731 $62,880
Seton Hall Univ. 1.71 $114,394 $66,781
Univ. of Wyoming 1.72 $98,352 $57,110
Syracuse Univ. 1.72 $104,570 $60,714
Brooklyn Law School 1.74 $120,042 $68,880
Emory Univ. 1.76 $136,500 $77,643
Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore 1.77 $117,611 $66,335
Tulane Univ. of Louisiana 1.79 $109,928 $61,516
Univ. of Baltimore 1.79 $104,000 $57,995
Univ. of California-Hastings College of Law 1.81 $138,152 $76,460
Univ. of Pittsburgh-Pittsburgh Campus 1.81 $101,541 $56,028
Drake Univ. 1.83 $116,582 $63,749
Univ. of Idaho 1.84 $97,842 $53,150
Univ. of the District of Columbia 1.85 $111,015 $60,099
Univ. of Southern Maine 1.85 $100,974 $54,655
Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City 1.86 $98,485 $53,017
Florida International Univ. 1.89 $103,947 $54,996
Santa Clara Univ. 1.90 $151,269 $79,561
Loyola Univ. Chicago 1.97 $138,223 $70,136
George Washington Univ. 1.98 $172,333 $87,242
Loyola Marymount Univ. 1.98 $143,433 $72,564
Lincoln Memorial Univ. 1.98 $85,713 $43,240
Northern Kentucky Univ. 1.99 $88,500 $44,418
Suffolk Univ. 2.03 $119,123 $58,629
Ohio Northern Univ. 2.04 $100,224 $49,064
South Texas College of Law Houston 2.05 $133,762 $65,338
Western State College of Law at Argosy Univ. 2.06 $124,476 $60,523
Argosy Univ.-Orange County 2.06 $124,476 $60,523
Univ. of South Carolina-Columbia 2.06 $110,100 $53,450
St. Mary's Univ. 2.07 $114,578 $55,383
The Catholic Univ. of America 2.07 $145,649 $70,386
Gonzaga Univ. 2.08 $111,584 $53,739
Southern Illinois Univ.-Carbondale 2.12 $97,582 $46,087
New York Law School 2.13 $150,358 $70,596
DePaul Univ. 2.13 $125,162 $58,704
North Carolina Central Univ. 2.14 $98,248 $45,986
Appalachian School of Law 2.14 $101,278 $47,260
Loyola Univ. New Orleans 2.15 $112,662 $52,420
Chapman Univ. 2.20 $155,229 $70,680
Lewis & Clark College 2.24 $130,058 $58,142
Texas Southern Univ. 2.25 $116,166 $51,652
Regent Univ. 2.25 $116,588 $51,750
Southern Univ. Law Center 2.26 $101,655 $44,959
Howard Univ. 2.26 $153,893 $68,033
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical Univ. 2.27 $103,971 $45,826
Univ. of Denver 2.28 $140,174 $61,558
Creighton Univ. 2.29 $130,998 $57,168
Touro College 2.29 $141,289 $61,622
Pepperdine Univ. 2.30 $162,500 $70,651
Hofstra Univ. 2.30 $146,890 $63,749
California Western School of Law 2.33 $141,521 $60,643
Capital Univ. 2.35 $111,600 $47,553
Mercer Univ. 2.35 $129,917 $55,356
Univ. of Detroit Mercy 2.35 $135,776 $57,657
Univ. of Massachusetts-Dartmouth 2.36 $116,322 $49,214
Widener Univ. 2.37 $128,868 $54,462
Seattle Univ. 2.45 $154,269 $62,856
Univ. of Miami 2.46 $153,562 $62,384
Roger Williams Univ. 2.49 $123,384 $49,547
Roger Williams Univ. School of Law 2.49 $123,384 $49,547
Belmont Univ. 2.50 $135,522 $54,275
Samford Univ. 2.50 $127,411 $50,952
Univ. of the Pacific 2.55 $160,450 $63,005
Willamette Univ. 2.58 $147,911 $57,318
Stetson Univ. 2.59 $141,439 $54,543
American Univ. 2.70 $177,999 $65,833
Univ. of Dayton 2.76 $133,728 $48,432
New England Law-Boston 2.78 $146,068 $52,542
Golden Gate Univ.-San Francisco 2.84 $158,774 $55,813
Campbell Univ. 2.85 $140,880 $49,498
Trinity Law School 2.85 $138,605 $48,667
Trinity International Univ.-Illinois 2.85 $138,605 $48,667
The John Marshall Law School 2.87 $157,559 $54,970
Marquette Univ. 2.87 $156,615 $54,622
Valparaiso Univ. 2.87 $136,455 $47,553
Mississippi College 2.95 $140,178 $47,595
Univ. of San Francisco 2.96 $196,166 $66,240
Univ. of La Verne 3.10 $161,762 $52,107
Nova Southeastern Univ. 3.14 $162,536 $51,829
Charleston School of Law 3.18 $144,682 $45,500
St. Thomas Univ. 3.23 $152,124 $47,056
Southwestern Law School 3.40 $211,466 $62,192
Ave Maria School of Law 3.54 $158,206 $44,666
Inter American Univ. of Puerto Rico 3.65 $100,520 $27,532
Barry Univ. 3.86 $167,186 $43,345
Western Michigan Univ.-Thomas M. Cooley 3.97 $180,337 $45,383
Thomas Jefferson School of Law 4.27 $205,025 $48,041
Arizona Summit Law School 4.27 $198,258 $46,432
Atlanta's John Marshall Law School 4.31 $180,883 $41,937
Savannah Law School 4.31 $180,883 $41,937
Charlotte School of Law 4.36 $196,998 $45,213
Pontifical Catholic Univ. of Puerto Rico-Ponce 4.94 $106,290 $21,508
Florida Coastal School of Law 4.95 $204,226 $41,280
Whittier College 5.02 $204,664 $40,747

Law school first-year academic dismissals drop more than 50% after spring semester without grades

Back in March, I shared some reflections that were mostly against the idea of moving to pass-fail grading, identifying some value of grades in the spring, especially among first-year students, and some problems. One included concerns about academic dismissal of law students.

We now have some figures from law schools. Academic dismissals among first-year law students were down over 50% year-over-year. They dropped from 1182 among ABA-accredited law schools (excluding schools in Puerto Rico) in 2019 down to 558 in 2020. (1L enrollment was basically flat.)

But I want to parse out what this means. Most law schools moved to pass-fail grading. Law schools were obviously aware that moving to pass-fail grading would cut half of a first-year student’s GPA. So many law schools may well have postponed their academic dismissals until this winter to get a second semester’s worth of grades.

From my look at the date, about 11 schools had a 5% or higher academic dismissal rate in 2019 that dropped to 0 this year. My assumption is those schools would be in a prime place for it.

A lot of other schools typically don’t academically dismiss any students, so their figures are unchanged.

But a lot of schools saw dramatic reductions in academic dismissal rates—from, say, 5 to 8% in 2019 to 1 to 2% this year. Some saw 10-20% rates drop to 4-6%.

It’s not clear if these rates mean schools were more lenient in their standards. Or maybe it means that they enforced them coupled with a true “failing” grade arising in pass-fail classes. That is, perhaps there were some actual failing grades issued when, well, let’s face it, pass-fail typically means “pass” in most courses. Or maybe schools articulated standards based on Fall 1L GPA performance alone.

In any case, we won’t know until next December what the 2L academic dismissal rates look like, and whether they’ll back-fill academic dismissals into this class. But I thought I’d flag the continuing lingering effects from the spring semester pandemic-related shutdowns and grading changes, and look at what it might yield in the year ahead.

Law school 1L JD enrollment holds steady for 7th straight year as non-JD enrollment climbs to all-time highs

The 2020 law school enrollment figures have been released. They show a slightly worse first-year JD enrollment and continued growth in non-JD enrollment. Almost 16% of law school enrollees, nearly 1 in 6, are not enrolled in a JD program.

While this is the second straight year of a slight decline in 1L enrollment, it remains mostly flat. (The 2010 peak was 52,488 1Ls.) In 2018, 1L enrollment was 38,283; it fell to 38,202 this year. It’s the seventh straight year of enrollment between 37,000 and 38,500, remarkable consistency.

Total JD enrollment also increased slightly to 114,520, the highest figure since 119,775 in 2014-2015 (but still well off the peak of 2010-2011 with 147,525).

Non-JD enrollment continues to climb. I’m mildly surprised, as I thought pandemic-related travel restrictions coupled with some Department of Education regulations might have dampened the market for at least some foreign-educated non-JD enrollment, but apparently the non-JD market remains strong.

The ABA changed its definitions a few years ago, which resulted in a spike in reported non-JD enrollment, but the steady climb continues. (It’s also worth noting that those enrolled in both JD and non-JD programs simultaneously, at least in recent years, are counted in each set, so this slightly overstates, to an unknown degree, non-JD enrollment.)

21,292 were enrolled in non-JD programs, a 1,400-student jump over last year. It’s now about 16% of all law school enrollment.

The ABA didn’t track non-JD online enrollment separately this year, and understandably so, I suppose, given that most is online. More information about the kinds of degrees and the outcomes of those who secure these degrees would be welcome information, the kind of information that remains unavailable at this time. (I recently looked at debt and earnings of graduates of such programs from data disclosed by the Department of Education.)

Here I also highlight a handful of schools with the highest non-JD enrollment as a percentage of total law school enrollment. There are a few heavy-hitters that are driving a lot of the non-JD enrollment.