Select posts from the Election Law Blog in 2021

"Supreme Court Raised the Bar for Challenge to GA Election Law"

I have this piece over at RealClearPolitics, “Supreme Court Raised the Bar for Challenge to GA Election Law.” It begins:

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee has prompted extensive commentary about the implications for future challenges to election laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Litigants arguing that some laws, such as Georgia’s newly enacted SB 202, disproportionately affect racial minorities may have a greater challenge meeting the standard set forth by the court than the standard that some lower courts had been using in recent years.

But while the justices split on a 6-3 vote on whether a pair of Arizona statutes ran afoul of the Act, it voted 6-0 (with three justices not addressing the question) in concluding that Arizona did not act with discriminatory intent. This holding sets the stage for the Justice Department’s recent lawsuit against Georgia, and it offers hints at how district courts and reviewing courts should behave. In short, the Justice Department has an uphill battle.

"Electoral Votes Regularly Given"

I have this (late stage!) draft at SSRN on a piece forthcoming in the Georgia Law Review, entitled “Electoral Votes Regularly Given.” Here’s the abstract:

Every four years, Congress convenes to count presidential electoral votes. In recent years, members of Congress have objected or attempted to object to the counting of electoral votes on the ground that those votes were not "regularly given." That language comes from the Electoral Count Act of 1887. But the phrase "regularly given" is a term of art, best understood as "cast pursuant to law." It refers to controversies that arise after the appointment of presidential electors, when electors cast their votes and send them to Congress. Yet members of Congress have incorrectly used the objection to challenge an assortment of pre-appointment controversies that concern the underlying election itself. This Essay identifies the proper meaning of the phrase "regularly given," articulates the narrow universe of appropriate objections within that phrase, and highlights why the failure to object with precision ignores constraints on congressional power.

"Brnovich, election-law tradeoffs, and the limited role of the courts"

I have this essay at SCOTUSblog, “Brnovich, election-law tradeoffs, and the limited role of the courts.” It begins:

Arizona “generally makes it quite easy for residents to vote.” This framing from Justice Samuel Alito in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee set the path for the six-justice majority of the Supreme Court to reject challenges to two Arizona laws.

It marks a major victory for states that seek to innovate or tinker with their election laws — to expand them or to contract them. And it is the latest in a string of cases pushing the federal courts out of second-guessing state election laws.

And from near the end:

Brnovich is the latest in a line of cases suggesting that the federal courts should play a smaller role in the patrolling of how states administer elections. Crawford approved Indiana’s voter-identification law. The court’s 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause said that federal courts should not entertain challenges to partisan gerrymandering under the Constitution. In 2020, it decided a series of cases, including Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, which mostly instructed federal courts not to make late-breaking changes to how states administer elections, even in the middle of a pandemic. And it rejected a challenge to the presidential election in Texas v. Pennsylvania, letting state election officials’ decisions stand.

Contributing to the Election Law Blog

I’m honored that Professor Rick Hasen has invited me, along with an all-star cast of election law scholars, to join as a contributor to the Election Law Blog. I’ll continue to blog here, of course, especially on legal education and federal courts issues, but I’ll also occasionally cross-post more in-depth content on election law issues.

DOJ attorneys routinely mocked 2020 conspiracy theories ahead of January 6

From Professor Rick Hasen, the House Oversight Committee has documents showing the pressure that Mark Meadows and others in the White House had on the Department of Justice to investigate allegations of fraud. Principal officers in the Department of Justice, from my reading, ever flinched. Several resigned in the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election. But two emails struck me.

First was an email January 1 from Mr. Meadows to Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen. Mr. Meadows alleged “signature match anomalies in Fulton county, Ga.” Mr. Rosen forwarded the email to another, “Can you believe this? I am not going to respond to the message below.”

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Second was an email forwarded by Mr. Meadows to Mr. Rosen, with the title—I can’t make it up—”Brad Johnson: Rome, Satellites, Servers: an Update - YouTube.” Richard Donaghue at the Department of Justice emailed Mr. Rose, “Pure insanity.” Mr. Rosen responded about why these conspiracy theorists never brought evidence to the FBI, and about why he would not discuss these matters with Rudy Giuliani.

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In short, the conspiracy theories surrounding the 2020 presidential election never got off the ground within any faction of the officials in the Department of Justice.

Potential double-voting problems and District of Columbia statehood

I’ve blogged for a couple of years about voting rights problems with District of Columbia statehood proposals, and my recent piece at RealClearPolicy discusses some of them. I thought I’d give a little detail on one item I mentioned: double voting.

Supporters of D.C. statehood suggest that instead of repealing the Twenty-third Amendment, Congress could choose the electors. The Constitution gives Congress the power to direct the manner of appointing presidential electors, which it has done by allowing D.C. residents to hold a popular vote to choose electors, like all other states. For the first time, Congress would have a direct say over presidential elections.

But if Congress did try to pick its own electors, that would introduce another problem. The Voting Rights Act prohibits individuals from voting twice in the same election. If Congress selects its own presidential electors, then every member of Congress who votes back home would violate the Voting Rights Act. Many states also have rules in place prohibiting voting more than once on Election Day, too.

Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, as classified at 52 U.S.C. § 10307(e), provide:

(e) Voting more than once

(1) Whoever votes more than once in an election referred to in paragraph (2) shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(2) The prohibition of this subsection applies with respect to any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the United States Senate, Member of the United States House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands, or Resident Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(3) As used in this subsection, the term “votes more than once” does not include the casting of an additional ballot if all prior ballots of that voter were invalidated, nor does it include the voting in two jurisdictions under section 10502 of this title, to the extent two ballots are not cast for an election to the same candidacy or office.

The legislative context in which this provision arose in 1975 focused on dilution of the vote, including in an interstate context. As one legislator put it:

Section 11 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 currently regulates voter fraud and conspiracy in Federal elections. Severe criminal penalties are provided to punish anyone who knowingly gives false information for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or vote. But, no criminal law prohibits anyone from voting twice--and this can occur in at least seven States which have no law prohibiting voting in more than one location. Thus, a person voting in Wyoming could move to Arkansas and register, where he could register within 30 days without having to give up his Wyoming registration. If such a person were to vote twice in a subsequent Federal election, no law would be violated because each registration was procured with true information.

This amendment which I will propose remedies this gap in Federal law by prohibiting, in a new subsection, 11(e), voting more than once in the same Federal election.

I confess, the statute is not a model of clarity. Is it “vot[ing] more than once in an election,” specifically, “any general . . . election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any candidate for the office of . . . presidential elector,” if one is voting in both the District of Columbia presidential elector election and, say, the Arizona presidential elector election? Those electors, after all, are two different elections, in theory. But it is one general election, held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. The context weighs in favor of the latter interpretation.

Double voting rules vary by state, too. A clear prohibition on this type of double voting is Arizona:

3. Knowingly votes in two or more jurisdictions in this state for which residency is required for lawful voting and the person is not a resident of all jurisdictions in which the person voted. For the purposes of this paragraph, a person has only one residence for the purpose of voting.

4. Knowingly votes in this state in an election in which a federal office appears on the ballot and votes in another state in an election in which a federal office appears on the ballot and the election day for both states is the same date.

Congress could, of course, alter the dates of elections to give itself the power to choose electors on a different day for the District of Columbia than the rest of the United States. That, I think, seems mischievous, and a reason why Congress created a uniform date for the selection of presidential electors in the early nineteenth century. It’s also not clear that changing the date would evade the Voting Rights Act problem if it is construed as the single “general” election, simply on different dates.

Finally, it’s not clear to me that Congress would be functioning in some legislative or special capacity to exempt itself from these rules. Congress may direct the “manner” of appointing electors. If it directs the manner of congressional appointment, that’s little different, in my judgment, than a rule directing popular appointment, or other such mechanisms of defined appointment.