Supreme Court analysis: Trump v. Anderson

This is a high level overview of the decision in Trump v. Anderson, written in a format as I’ve been presenting in various ways over the last few days. Disclosure: I did file an amicus brief in support of neither party in this case, and in the court below.

On March 4, 2024, the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Anderson. It issued a per curiam opinion reversing the Colorado Supreme Court and effectively permitting Donald Trump’s name to appear on the Republican primary ballot.

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

The State of Colorado, after a divided decision by the Colorado Supreme Court, had held that Donald Trump had engaged in insurrection for purposes of Section 3 for his role in the January 6, 2021 riots at the Capitol. It concluded he could not appear on the Republican primary ballot in that state. While he was excluded from the ballot, it stayed the ruling, so he appeared on the ballot as the case was appealed.

The United States Supreme Court expedited review and issued its decision in a little less than a month. It was mostly unsurprising after listening to oral argument. The sense was that at least eight justices, if not all nine, were inclined to reverse the Colorado Supreme Court on some theory that the that the state of Colorado, or any single state, didn't have this power to exclude ineligible presidential candidates from the ballot and didn't have the power to enforce this provision for varying structural or practical reasons. There was just the question from the court about how it got there.

Trump v. Anderson is a per curiam decision, which means we do not know the author, and, although I shouldn't speculate, it reads in some respects like the voice of Chief Justice Roberts. The result was unanimous, 9-0, essentially saying that Colorado lacks this power. But there are sharp elbows on the path there—the path not only to that one holding, but whether other holdings should be reached. So six justices, Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett all agreed with heart of the reasoning in the per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett wrote separately to explain she only agreed with part of the majority per curiam opinion. And then there was a concurring opinion jointly authored by justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson concurring in the judgment only, but they too agreed with the heart of the reasoning of the majority.

I’ll focus on the consensus view of the court for a moment. That part of the decision really focuses on sort of this overall constitutional point, the text, structure, context, and so on. It begins with a quotation from U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, a 1995 case, which says that that states had no power to add term limits or additional qualifications for congressional candidates. That case had in turn cited the great Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries in the Constitution, to say that if states are exercising power in federal elections, that power has to come from some source in the constitution.

So if you are looking at Section 3 in the context of a presidential election, where is the state power? Well, it's certainly not going to be found in the 14th Amendment, which is a constraint on state power. And Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce it, but it gives no power to the states. As you run through the rest of the Constitution, you can't find other provisions of the Constitution empowering states to enforce this provision against a presidential candidate. Articles I and II deal with congressional elections and presidential elections. But it's not clear that implicitly within them is the later power to come back and enforce Section 3.

By the structure of the Constitution, this is a provision that's designed for congressional enforcement, for national remedies and national mechanisms. As a practical matter, it makes very little sense for states to add the sorts of burdens on presidential candidates. If they want to do it for state candidates, it's their own thing. But to do so for presidential candidates makes very little sense. That makes very little sense given that Congress can lift the disability by a two thirds vote, so for a state to step in and hold a candidate not qualified for Congress to swoop in later and have to say, well, now we're going to lift the disability, would seem to force Congress’s hand rather than leave the power to Congress.

And the very end of the opinion are a series of practical concerns that one state’s evidentiary law or state’s procedural setup for how these challenges are filed could have a ripple effect throughout the United States, and we might reach inconsistent verdicts across the United States. And states in particular have less of an interest in presidential elections, simply because they are national offices, and the notion that states could adjudicate qualifications make these determinations and contested factual claims, and then reach kind of a patchwork result across the United States, not something that makes a whole lot of sense structurally.

That was Part II-B of the per curiam opinion, joined in full by Justice Barrett, and joined again in logic, if not in full, by the concurring opinion by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson. So that that could have been it. That would have been easy in a way, for the Court.

But instead, there is a lot of friction on the court in a different context. So Part II-A of the opinion, where Justice Barrett peels off, along with the other concurring justices, addressed this sort of a separate question, which is not simply whether states have the power to enforce Section 3. It's more a question of who else and in what context has the power to enforce it. And for that, the court turns to the way that Section 3 is set up.

The five-justice majority speaks about how Congress has this role now to enforce the provisions of Section 3. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment Amendment provides for Congress to have the power to enforce this provision of the Constitution with appropriate legislation, that appropriate legislation must be, in the words of other Supreme Court precedent, including City of Boerne v. Flores, a “congruent and proportional” remedy for the concerns that are addressed by these provisions of the Constitution.

When we look at the fact that we're dealing with this question, the factual dispute of a class of individuals barred for engaging in an “insurrection,” as Justice Kavanaugh at oral argument noted, we must ascertain who is covered. That requires a determination. This is something the Colorado Supreme Court recognized was necessary, in this case—the determination of whether someone engaged in insurrection ,which required procedures and factual findings.

And this is also what Justice Chase on the United States Supreme Court, then writing circuit as a circuit justice in 1869, noted in a case call Griffin's Case. It has a lot of attention and in some of the scholarly discourse, where a federal judge was deciding this case one year after ratification of the 14th Amendment, which was ratified in 1868. Justice Chase is hearing a habeas challenge from Griffin, who had been convicted in West Virginia state court. And he's challenging that conviction in federal court to say, well, I my conviction is invalid because it was adjudicated issued by a judge who was barred from holding office by Section 3. And Chase, writing this opinion says, Look, I'm not in a position to be able to determine these things. In part I have to make a determination, and “proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcement of decisions are indispensable.” Unless he's given some guidance, especially from Congress to figure out what to do here, the justice is not in a position to make this adjudication.

So Part II-A of the opinion really rides heavily on Congress's role here, because the Constitution empowers Congress. It enables Congress, subject to judicial review, to pass appropriate legislation, and Congress's Section 5 power is “critical” when it comes to Section 3. The per curiam opinion provides these sorts of statements before it then leads into the argument that the state lacks the power.

At the very end of the opinion, the per curiam opinion says these two things kind of go hand in hand. All of these things are essential. It's that Congress is the one that does these things, and that states lack the power to do so.

Now, Justice Barrett writes separately to say, I agree on the state's lack the power, we don't need to decide anything else today. I would not go in the path of the majority has done.

And then you have the concurring opinion the concurring opinion by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. They seem to agree with part two of the opinion essentially agreeing that states don't have any such authority. They fracture very badly with the majority's approach, thinking about this congressional role. Some of the language the court that the concurring opinion uses, saying that these musings about Griffin's Case and about congressional power are as inadequately supported as they are gratuitous. And they go on to suggest that Section 3 is not special and does not require congressional enforcement alone. They point out that other provisions of the Constitution, including the Reconstruction Amendments, including things like Due Process, Equal Protection, and the abolition of slavery, which don't require additional congressional implementing legislation. They worry about how this is going to be applied in the future and whether or not they're adding these constraints, and how Congress goes about enforcing Section 3 or prohibiting other actors from enforcing Section 3.

The only concrete example they give is the concern that the forecloses judicial enforcement of that provision such as might occur when a party is prosecuted by an insurrectionist and raises a defense on that score. The notion being that without congressional implementing legislation, if you have someone who had taken an oath to support the Constitution, engaged in insurrection, and now we're serving as a prosecutor, it could be impossible for somebody to raise a defense to say this prosecutor is not authorized to hold this office. So there were some sharp elbows.

A few things to talk about here.

The first is the court doesn't touch really any factual issues. It doesn't touch questions about whether January 6 was an insurrection, or their Donald Trump engaged in an insurrection, whether his speech or his conduct was protected. These are just pure legal questions that the court is focused on.

Another is that this really closes the door and any of these ballot challenges going forward, whether it's the primary election or the general election. The court is quite clear that there's no role for the state and enforcing these provisions.

Another is that the opinion is very centered on section three of the 14th amendment. So it doesn't seem to foreclose the possibility that states exercising their power under Article II of the Constitution, to exclude, say, a 21 year old from the ballot or a Nicaraguan national from the ballot, and states might continue to be able to do so. Instead that the opinion looks much more at Section 3 and how the Fourteenth Amendment shifts this balance of power among the the federal government and the state governments to say that it's foreclosing some authority from the States. And there's not affirmative enforcement authority given to the States as a result. So it seems very much limited to what's happening with the Fourteenth Amendment and doesn't really touch on other presidential qualifications, disputes, election disputes, ballot access disputes, if we're just dealing with Section 3.

It also seems that it would appear to foreclose some challenges even might arise after the election. This is some of the opinion that I'm still wrapping my mind around and trying to understand how different parts of the opinion interact with one another. But the courts emphasis on speaking about Congress and legislation, and how that remedy needs to be tailored adequately to the remedy that are to the harm that you've identified, really does seem to say that other challenges would be inappropriate—at least without specific congressional legislation. But it's very hard to identify exactly what the court is doing when it is when it is suggesting that Congress has a role here with legislation.

What are those things that Congress can do apart from legislation such as seating its own members, as opposed to enacting legislation? What things by as the concurring opinion points out general federal statutes, such as (which the concurring opinion does not mention) the Administrative Procedures Act or the Electoral Count Reform Act? What kinds of deference is going to be given to Congress when it is acting pursuant to those rules, or when courts are acting pursuant to those rules, rather than things under its enforcement authority under Section 3? So there are some myriad questions that are ahead. And it fails to provide some of the clarity, which I think was part of the goal of the opinion

Matters are now largely left to the political process. There will be major questions about presidential immunity coming up in the weeks ahead, as the Supreme Court hears that case, and a number of criminal challenges to Trump in the United States. I think there's not going to be a closing off of the fact that the public will continue to intensely dispute, what is an insurrection, whether Trump engaged in an insurrection, and so on going forward, but that will be a matter of debate in the general election. The Court has at least closed that door when it comes to states attempting to enforce it for their ballot access provisions.

"Supreme Court Raised the Bar for Challenge to GA Election Law"

I have this piece over at RealClearPolitics, “Supreme Court Raised the Bar for Challenge to GA Election Law.” It begins:

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee has prompted extensive commentary about the implications for future challenges to election laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Litigants arguing that some laws, such as Georgia’s newly enacted SB 202, disproportionately affect racial minorities may have a greater challenge meeting the standard set forth by the court than the standard that some lower courts had been using in recent years.

But while the justices split on a 6-3 vote on whether a pair of Arizona statutes ran afoul of the Act, it voted 6-0 (with three justices not addressing the question) in concluding that Arizona did not act with discriminatory intent. This holding sets the stage for the Justice Department’s recent lawsuit against Georgia, and it offers hints at how district courts and reviewing courts should behave. In short, the Justice Department has an uphill battle.

"Brnovich, election-law tradeoffs, and the limited role of the courts"

I have this essay at SCOTUSblog, “Brnovich, election-law tradeoffs, and the limited role of the courts.” It begins:

Arizona “generally makes it quite easy for residents to vote.” This framing from Justice Samuel Alito in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee set the path for the six-justice majority of the Supreme Court to reject challenges to two Arizona laws.

It marks a major victory for states that seek to innovate or tinker with their election laws — to expand them or to contract them. And it is the latest in a string of cases pushing the federal courts out of second-guessing state election laws.

And from near the end:

Brnovich is the latest in a line of cases suggesting that the federal courts should play a smaller role in the patrolling of how states administer elections. Crawford approved Indiana’s voter-identification law. The court’s 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause said that federal courts should not entertain challenges to partisan gerrymandering under the Constitution. In 2020, it decided a series of cases, including Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, which mostly instructed federal courts not to make late-breaking changes to how states administer elections, even in the middle of a pandemic. And it rejected a challenge to the presidential election in Texas v. Pennsylvania, letting state election officials’ decisions stand.

Supreme Court issues two unanimous reversals of the Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit’s reputation as the most-reversed circuit has improved in the last decade, but days like today suggest that it still tends to buck Supreme Court precedent and is reluctant to correct errors en banc. Two unanimous reversals from the Supreme Court highlight that today.

The first is Garland v. Ming Dai, unanimously reversing a decision of the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt. Ming Dai earned a “dissental” from rehearing en banc from 10 active judges (Callahan, Bybee, Bea, M. Smith, Ikuta, Bennett, R. Nelson, Bade, Collins, and Lee) (joined by two senior judges, O'Scannlain and Trott), and Justice Neil Gorsuch repeatedly mentioned in his opinion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was rendered over the dissenting views of at least 12 members of that court.

The second is United States v. Cooley, unanimously reversing a decision by Judge Marsha Berzon. A dissental by Judge Daniel Collins (joined by Bea, Bennett, and Bress) from rehearing en banc did, however, earn this particular meta-critique by Judge Berzon (joined by Hurwitz):

Even within the questionable genre of dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, see Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 2019) (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc), Judge Collins’s dissent to the denial of rehearing (“dissent”) is an outlier. It misrepresents the legal context of this case and wildly exaggerates the purported consequences of the panel opinion. . . .

This case involves an unusual factual scenario and a technical issue of Indian tribal authority. It certainly does not present a “question of exceptional importance” meriting en banc consideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2). There is no conflict among the circuits regarding the question presented here, the opinion is not in conflict with a Supreme Court decision, and the practical implications are limited. . . .

But the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari and then reverse suggests that it was “important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.”

Less than a month after the Cooley decision, the Los Angeles Times ran a story about the “strain” on the Ninth Circuit from new judges, particularly Judge Collins, and specifically on his dissental in Cooley:

Among those who have caused the most consternation is Judge Daniel P. Collins, a former federal prosecutor and partner of a prestigious law firm.

Some judges say that, in the early months of his tenure, Collins has appeared oblivious to court tradition. He has sent memos at all times of the night in violation of a court rule and objected to other judges’ rulings in language that some colleagues found combative, they said.

Collins also moved quickly to challenge rulings by his new colleagues, calling for review of five decisions by three-judge panels, and some of the calls came before Collins even had been assigned to his first panel, judges said.

Active judges vote on the calls behind the scenes, and the public becomes aware of a failed effort only when dissents are later filed by the judges who favored reconsideration. Judges said it was unprecedented for a new jurist to try to overturn so many decisions in such a short period of time. The court has so far rejected most of Collins’ calls.

“Collins has definitely bulldozed his way around here already in a short time,” one 9th Circuit judge said. “Either he doesn’t care or doesn’t realize that he has offended half the court already.”
. . .

The behind-the-scenes tensions over Collins spilled into public last month in an order rejecting a call, presumably made by Collins, to reconsider a panel’s decision. The panel had upheld a lower court’s ruling in favor of suppressing evidence from a tribal officer’s search of a vehicle on a public highway. The highway ran through tribal land.

Collins, dissenting from the court’s refusal to reconsider, was joined by three judges, two Trump appointees and one appointed by President George W. Bush.

Collins called the panel’s decision “deeply flawed,” “plagued” by legal error and marked by “confused analysis.”

Two Democratic appointees whose ruling Collins wanted reversed wrote that, even in the genre of such dissents, Collins’ was an “outlier.”

“It misrepresents the legal context of this case and wildly exaggerates the purported consequences of the panel opinion,” wrote Judge Marsha S. Berzon, a Clinton appointee, and Judge Andrew D. Hurwitz, an Obama appointee.

“This case involves an unusual factual scenario and a technical issue of Indian tribal authority,” they said. “It certainly does not present a ‘question of exceptional importance’ meriting en banc consideration.”

While the Ninth Circuit may have “so far rejected most of Collins’ calls,” the Supreme Court is a different matter.

"Texas v. Pennsylvania Would Have Upended the Electoral College"

Over at Law and Liberty, I have this post, “Texas v. Pennsylvania Would Have Upended the Electoral College.” It begins:

The Electoral College is a designedly decentralized process for the selection of the President of the United States. Each State may choose its presidential electors in the manner that the legislature deems appropriate.

The State of Texas, in Texas v. Pennsylvania, sought to upend this system in advance of one end: get the Supreme Court to do something, anything, to prevent President-Elect Joe Biden from taking office.

Parsing the holdings in Texas v. Pennsylvania

There’s already been a lot written about the Court’s brief statement in Texas v. Pennsylvania, but I thought I’d offer my sense of the holdings. Here’s the Court’s order issued December 11, 2020:

The State of Texas’s motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections. All other pending motions are dismissed as moot.

Statement of Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins: In my view, we do not have discretion to deny the filing of a bill of complaint in a case that falls within our original jurisdiction. See Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. ___ (Feb. 24, 2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I would therefore grant the motion to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief, and I express no view on any other issue.

Texas filed three motions: a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint; a motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for stay and administrative stay; and a motion for “expedited consideration of the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint and for expedition of any plenary consideration of the matter on the pleadings if plaintiffs’ forthcoming motion for interim relief is not granted.”

The Court, I think, had four holdings:

First, does 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) allow the Court to decline a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint in an “original and exclusive jurisdiction” case? The Court divided 7*-2 on this issue in concluding that yes, it can decline. And it’s not a surprise, as I told a reporter last week: Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito have repeatedly in other cases argued that the Court may not decline the motion.

Second, if the Court is allowed to decline such a motion, should the Court grant the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint? By a 7*-0 vote (an issue Justices Thomas and Alito would not reach), the Court said no, and the Court declined the motion for leave. The Court did not need to give a reason, but here it did—because, the Court noted, Texas lacked standing.

Third, should the Court grant the motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for stay and administrative stay? By a 9*-0 vote, the Court said no—7* justices because the answer to the Second holding (above) rendered the motion moot, and 2 justices (Thomas and Alito) because of unarticulated reasons (more on this in the closing thoughts below).

Fourth, should the Court grant the motion for expedited consideration, etc.? By at least a 7*-0 vote, the Court said no, as all other motions were “dismissed as moot.” It is not clear whether Justices Thomas and Alito thought so—the separate statement indicates they “would not grant other relief,” but expediting the proceedings is not really a request for “relief.”

One last wrinkle: did Justices Thomas and Alito, in their statement that they “would not grant other relief,” opine on whether they would grant relief requested in the complaint? I don’t think so. Granting the motion for leave to file a bill of complaint would open the process up to the ordinary rules of civil cases, including allowing the defendant States to file an answer, or a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, and so on. (No State filed such a motion.)

It’s possible that this ambiguity should be construed as Justices Thomas and Alito agreeing to grant the the motion, but turning around and sua sponte rejecting the relief sought in the complaint for lack of standing or on the merits (for unarticulated reasons). But the phrase, “I express no view on any other issue” suggests that this isn’t the case.

In closing, that’s how I parse this case at the moment. And I don’t think it tells us really anything about any justices’ thoughts on the merits. But it does suggest that even Justices Thomas and Alito saw no likelihood of success on the merits, as their denial of the motions for preliminary injunction, etc. suggest as much.

*UPDATE: Jon Endean in the comments helpfully points out that because the justices are not on the record, we do not know if all of them agreed. Some may have disagreed but were not on the record about it. So it could be only 5 or 6 justices instead of 7, or it could be 7 or 8 justices instead of 9. And it’s entirely fair to emphasize that the “shadow docket” does not formally record all of the justices’ positions. So my instinct is that if a justice disagreed, she might write separately; but that is not necessarily the case, and so I include the asterisks.

A puzzle to consider in Colorado Department of State v. Baca

The two “faithless elector” cases were originally consolidated to be heard together. But Justice Sonia Sotomayor late in the process discovered she knew one of the parties in the Colorado case and withdrew. That may have been a fortuitous act and provided a clean opinion in Chiafalo v. Washington—and the per curiam opinion in Colorado Department of State v. Baca gives us a hint why.

Many have focused on the substantive difference between the Washington and Colorado laws—Washington counts a faithless vote but fines faithless electors; Colorado does not count a faithless vote and replaces a faithless elector.

But there were material procedural differences, too—specifically, multiple material problems with the Colorado plaintiffs’ case in Baca. In Washington, the electors were fined and contested that in state court. Easy injury to provide (a $1000 fine), easy remedy to seek, easy cause of action to raise.

In Colorado, however, plaintiffs faced several challenges. Were their claims moot? Could they sue a state under Section 1983—or, really, could the state waive this argument when sued for damages?

At oral argument in Baca, Justice Stephen Breyer in particular with concerned about these procedural wrinkles in the Colorado case. Justice Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch also raised versions of such concerns.

Now, because Justice Sotomayor was recused from Baca, the principal case became Chiafalo, because all nine justices could participate. Eight justices joined Justice Elena Kagan’s opinion; Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, which Justice Gorsuch joined in part.

Now, to the entirety of the Court’s per curiam opinion in Baca:

PER CURIAM.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed for the reasons stated in Chiafalo v. Washington, ante, p. ___.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR took no part in the decision of this case.

JUSTICE THOMAS concurs in the judgment for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Chiafalo v. Washington, ante, p. ___.

I looked at this opinion a few times wondering what happened. Specifically, what happened to Justice Gorsuch? He agreed with Justice Thomas’s Tenth Amendment argument in Chiafalo. What about here? Is the Tenth Amendment no longer in play?

And then I considered another possibility—as a per curiam opinion, we don’t see the lineup of justices. Some justices may not agree with the outcome but may choose not to note their dissenting opinion. It might be the case that Justice Gorsuch (and perhaps another, like Justice Breyer) didn’t agree to reverse for the reasons stated in Chiafalo. It might be that the procedural wrinkles would have been a reason to reverse, but they opted not to publicize that here and now, saving the issue for another day.

I don’t know. I would, however, resist the urge to call Baca a “unanimous” decision of the Court. It certainly appears unanimous. But there are reasons to think that some of the procedural wrinkles would lead some members of the Court to come out differently if they couldn’t hide behind the per curiam opinion here.

Avoiding the temptation to overread Chiafalo v. Washington

I’ve taken a day to chew over the Supreme Court’s decision in Chiafalo v. Washington, the “faithless electors” case. I’ve read a lot of commentary and talked to a lot of people who’ve wondered about broader implications of this case. My reaction is: it might be best not to overread this case.

This is, in one sense, an extraordinary case, but in another, and perhaps more significant, sense, a narrow case. The case is really about one set of facts: the state power to penalize or replace electors who cast a vote contrary to statewide popular vote winner.

I think some of the Court’s language could plausibly be used in other contexts. For instance, when it talks about the “State’s popular vote,” could that preclude a pledge for the national popular vote winner? Maybe—but, then again, maybe because that’s the way states do it now, and that’s what Washington and Colorado do, so that’s the language used. When the Court says that the Equal Protection Clause binds legislative decisionmaking, does that mean the legislature no longer has the power to select electors itself? Maybe—but, then again, the Court elsewhere favorably cites the deferential approach in McPherson v. Blacker. Could Congress be bound by the Court’s reasoning? Maybe—but, then again, it favorably cited “Congress’s deference to a state decision” elsewhere.

In short, my instinct in a decision with an eight-justice majority is to closely heed the narrow holding—states, I think, are free to run with statutes that bind presidential electors—and to loosely consider the Court’s reasoning for later application. It might be persuasive to a five-justice majority considering a later issue, but it’s just as easily distinguishable for some of the reasons I identified. The context matters, and the context here—again, while extraordinary—is narrow. So, in short, the reasoning is as persuasive to later courts as later courts deem it—no more, no less, and, really, hardly binding. The “mays” are just mays, not musts.

That’s my sense of how to read this case, anyway.

Analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in the "faithless electors" cases

The Supreme Court has issued its decision in Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado Department of State v. Baca. The primary opinion in Chiafalo is here. A brief per curiam in Baca is here. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the principal opinion joined by all justices except Justice Clarence Thomas; Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch in part. The power of the state to regulate “faithless electors”—either fining them or replacing them—was affirmed.

In Chiafalo, three electors cast votes for Colin Powell for president and assorted candidates for vice president instead of Mrs. Clinton and Tim Kaine. Congress counted those votes for Mr. Powell. Those electors were each ultimately fined $1000.

In Baca, an elector who attempted to cast a vote for John Kasich for president instead of Hillary Clinton was deemed to have vacated his office. He was replaced, another elector voted for Mrs. Clinton, and that vote was counted in Congress. (Justice Sonia Sotomayor was recused from this case because she had a friendship with one of the parties.)

Justice Kagan’s opinion relies heavily in part on Ray v. Blair, the 1952 Supreme Court decision that permitted states to require a pledge to support the candidate, but it reserved on the enforceability of that pledge. The “longstanding practices” of electors weighed against the challengers in Ray v. Blair, and it’s the same here in Chiafalo. Justice Kagan’s opinion also relies on the NLRB v. Noel Canning decision (slip op. at 13) to emphasize longstanding practices.

Justice Kagan’s decision really relies on a phrase she notes on p.10 of the slip opinion, “The Constitution is barebones about electors.” This gives states broad power over electors.

Justice Kagan is less than impressed with the argument that “vote” or “ballot” necessarily implies choice. She explains, “But those words need not always connote independent choice. Suppose a person always votes in the way his spouse, or pastor, or union tells him to. We might question his judgment, but we would have no problem saying he 'votes' or fills in a 'ballot.'" (Slip op. at 11, with more onto 12.)

Justice Kagan also situated the Twelfth Amendment as an important qualification to the original understanding of the scope of elector discretion. She emphasized, “The Amendment thus advanced, rather than resisted, the practice that had arisen in the Nation’s first elections,” that is, party-line voting. (Slip op. at 14-15.)

Congressional deference matters some, but not the way the electors suggested: “Congress’s deference to a state decision to tolerate a faithless vote is no ground for rejecting a state decision to penalize one.” (Slip op. at 17.)

To my mind, of note includes footnote four, which provides, “And if a State adopts a condition on its appointments that effectively imposes new requirements on presidential candidates, the condition may conflict with the Presidential Qualifications Clause.” That’s a view suggested in Term Limits v. Thornton and which I get at in Weaponizing the Ballot, about whether states have the power to add qualifications to presidential candidates—yes, there’s a “may,” but the suggestion continues that states may not do so.

Footnote eight also concedes questions about how to handle candidates who die between Election Day and the meeting of the Electoral College. In my mind, there are interesting Twentieth Amendment questions in such circumstances, too, that may lessen the concern—but, as the Court notes, it’s not something for the Court to confront at this time.

Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined in part by Justice Gorsuch. Justice Thomas returned to his dissenting opinion in Term Limits v. Thornton (1995)—he views the Constitution’s elections clauses not as granting power to a state, but requiring states to perform a duty. He returned to a more vigorous view of the Tenth Amendment (this is the portion of the opinion Justice Gorsuch joined). The Constitution’s silence on the power to control electors should lean toward the state’s reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment to regulate them. His views didn’t carry the day, obviously, but they do get to the same place as the majority opinion.

In short, all nine justices agreed that states may fine faithless electors or replace them. I anticipate more states will enact statutes doing so just in the years ahead.

This post has been updated.

Related reading:

No, the Electoral College will not give the presidency to Hillary Clinton, Nov. 13, 2016

New effort (doomed to fail) calls for presidential electors to collectively exercise independent judgment, Dec. 6, 2016

The Electoral College won’t stop Trump—but it may change how political parties pick electors in 2020, Dec. 11, 2016

Faithless electors: Now it’s up to Congress, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 2016

Status of 2016 faithless presidential elector litigation, Dec. 19, 2017

Washington State Supreme Court upholds finds for 2016 faithless electors, May 23, 2019

Analysis: 10th Circuit finds Colorado wrongly removed faithless presidential elector in 2016, Aug. 21, 2019

Why “faithless electors” have little power to change the winner of presidential elections, Oct. 14, 2019

Symposium: Leave courts out of presidential elector dispute, SCOTUSblog, Apr. 20, 2020

Brief of Professor Derek T. Muller as amicus curiae in support of neither party, Chiafalo v. Washington & Colorado Department of State v. Baca

Oral argument analysis: Will the Tenth Amendment make a comeback in the faithless electors cases?, May 13, 2020