Recanvassing rules for the Iowa Democratic Party and the Iowa caucuses

While the chair of the Democratic National Committee, Tom Perez, recently called for the Iowa Democratic Party to recanvass the results of the caucus. He can’t do that, nor do existing rules allow it. But there are ways to recanvass.

Rule 2 of the Delegate Selection Rules for the Democratic National Convention provides,

K. While parties are encouraged to use government-run primaries, in states where the State Party chooses to hold a Party-run process to establish presidential preference, the State Party’s Delegate Selection Plan shall prevent attempts at voter suppression, disenfranchisement, and ensure an open and inclusive process. Further, the Rules and Bylaws Committee shall determine whether the State Party’s Delegate Selection Plan meets the requirements specified in this section, including:

…

6. Ensuring final expressions of preference as part of the presidential nominating process are securely preserved, in a method to be specified in the State's Plan, that ensures the availability of a prompt and accurate recount or recanvas;

7. Providing a standard and procedure by which a presidential candidate may request a recount or recanvas that is paid for by the candidate and carried out in a timely manner;

The Iowa Democratic Party established the following recanvas rules for 2020:

8. Any presidential candidate may request a precinct-levelreview of caucus results by submitting a request in writing to the Iowa Democratic Party Chair.

a. Requests for precinct-level review must include the name of the county or counties, the precinct(s), and a credible explanation describing the reason for the request.

b. Requests for precinct-level review must be received by the Chair no later than Friday, February 7, 2020, at 12:00 p.m.

c. The State Party will respond to a request for precinct-level review within 48 hours of receipt. The response will include an anticipated timeline for the review and an estimate of fees to be assessed to the campaign in order to complete the review.

9. Any presidential candidate may request a recanvas of district or state results by submitting a request in writing to the Iowa Democratic Party Chair.

a. Requests for recanvas must include the scope of the desired recanvas, a thorough description of the challenge, and an explanation about how the national delegation could be altered as a result of the problem or its correction.

b. Requests for recanvas must be received by the Chair no later than Friday, February 7, 2020, at 12:00 p.m.

10. The State Central Committee will certify caucus results no later than February 29, 2020.

In short, while the National Committee might examine challenges to the Iowa caucuses at the convention, the formal recanvassing process occurs when a candidate asks for a recanvassing, by Friday, February 7, at 12 pm. I assume, of course, some candidate will take Mr. Perez’s public statement to heart and make the request, but we shall see. (UPDATE: That deadline was extended.)

More transparency in Iowa caucuses leads to more complexity

The 2016 Democratic caucuses in Iowa were close, hotly contested, and left supporters of candidate Bernie Sanders frustrated. The caucuses operated as usual—voters show up at a variety of sites around the state, herd into corners of rooms to express their first preference of candidates, realign if their candidates are “non-viable,” and then that final alignment is translated into “state delegate equivalents,” which turn into the way of measuring “victory” from the caucuses. Only those delegate equivalent totals were reported. Questions arose about what happened in those earlier stages of the process.

Reform efforts looked at increasing transparency. “First alignment,” “final alignment,” and “state delegate equivalents” would all be reported.

Of course, increased disclosure means increased complexity in reporting results (related, in part, to the “app” fiasco). And increased disclosure also means increased opportunities to look back at consistency.

It turns out that there have been extensive inconsistencies in how some of the results have been reported.

Truth be told, such inconsistencies probably happen each year. Herd hundreds of people into a gymnasium, line them up in corners, and ask volunteers to count them? Probably some errors are going to happen.

For the most part, these errors are assuredly (1) innocent (e.g., due to incompetence, not malice); (2) randomly distributed (i.e., not likely to systematically favor one candidate over another); and (3) less important if the “state delegate equivalents” are the right result even if other inaccuracies exist.

For instance, suppose a candidate is listed as having 40 supporters (20% of those present) in the “first alignment” but only 39 supporters (19.5% of those present) in the “final alignment,” when present (new) rules forbid “realigning” if your candidate is “viable” (i.e., has at least 15% support) in the first alignment? If the error is in the tabulation of the “first alignment,” it doesn’t actually matter when it comes to the final alignment that translates into the state delegate equivalents.

In previous years, we’d never find that error. But that error is also immaterial to the result. Granted, it exposes this year that the math was not precise, or that there were some errors at some stages of the process, or that volunteer caucus workers were not as careful as they ought to have been—and one can draw preferred inferences from those new details.

All this is to say, the fuzziness of the caucus results worked in previous years because these errors were never disclosed publicly, likely were randomly distributed, and at least sometimes never altered the ultimate results. But more transparency leads to more complexity. And more complexity leads to more highlights of errors or inconsistencies. Ironically, perhaps, the increased transparency has undermined confidence in the results.

Time will tell whether this means changes for the Iowa caucuses. But these are simply my initial thoughts that transparency may yield complexity, which creates its own challenges.

The Iowa caucuses and political party leverage

The 2020 Democratic caucuses in Iowa ended with uncertainty, as an unvetted closed-source app from an undisclosed developer for reporting results was canned the night of the caucuses, and as some “inconsistencies” led to delayed reporting results. Already, obituaries for the Iowa caucuses are being written—even for the Republican caucuses, which were largely uncontested last night and have less of the dynamism and “realignment” of the Democratic caucuses.

As someone about to embark to the University of Iowa College of Law to teach election, I think about the Iowa caucuses a lot these days. And two common questions arise: why Iowa, and why caucuses? One shortcut answer is tradition—Iowa benefited from a first mover advantage after the disruption of the presidential selection process in the 1960s, and one can easily find plenty written on it.

But another answer is more complicated. Iowa benefits because the Democratic and Republican parties allow it to benefit—or, at least, have been unwilling to challenge the existing structure that has allowed it to benefit.

The Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee develop private sets of rules to decide how the party will choose its presidential nominee. It awards each state (and territory) a certain number of delegates to attend a presidential nominating convention. Those delegates must be chosen in each state pursuant to specific rules. And those rules are extensive.

Consider the Democratic Party rules. It includes timing, which includes Rule 12(a):

No meetings, caucuses, conventions or primaries which constitute the first determining stage in the presidential nomination process (the date of the primary in primary states, and the date of the first tier caucus in caucus states) may be held prior to the first Tuesday in March or after the second Tuesday in June in the calendar year of the national convention. Provided, however, that the Iowa precinct caucuses may be held no earlier than 29days before the first Tuesday in March;that the New Hampshire primary may be held no earlier than 21days before the first Tuesday in March; that the Nevada first-tier caucuses may be held no earlier than 10days before the first Tuesday in March; and that the South Carolina primary may be held no earlier than 3days before the first Tuesday in March.

These rules specifically privilege Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina.

On top of this is New Hampshire, which has a statute that requires that its presidential preference primary happen before all other preference primaries. Because Iowa holds caucuses, it doesn’t run afoul of New Hampshire’s statute.

So why a caucus? Well, in part, (1) party rules privilege the Iowa caucuses in particular, and (2) caucuses allow it to precede New Hampshire.

Now, after last night, there will be deep soul searching in the Democratic Party (and, I think, the Republican Party) about whether such caucuses should remain. It would require not just to adjust Iowa, but to think about how New Hampshire and other states might react.

It has been deeply difficult for parties to get out of the traditional path-dependent practices of previous years. But this is a moment of leverage—never let a serious crisis go to waste.

And it’s worth reflecting on the leverage exerted by the Democratic Party in 2008. Then, Michigan and Florida attempted to defy party rules by holding early primaries. The Democratic Party rule said that delegates selected in this process would receive zero weight at the nominating convention. Very late in the process, they negotiated a half weighted process. Once Barack Obama was the apparent nominee despite losing Michigan and Florida, they were given full weight.

So, Michigan and Florida bucked the party’s rules—and, I think, in many sense, lost, only to “win” when it no longer mattered. And neither has attempted to buck party rules since.

I wonder if rules changes ahead of 2024 have this moment of leverage for the parties in the face of tradition or existing state rules. Maybe. There are many moving parties and vested interests, so time will tell how the aftermath of Iowa shakes out. But it will, I think, be primarily driven by a strong party desire and a strong willingness to adhere to whatever codification of that desire occurs. Whether that happens is an open question.

In today's WSJ: "No Country for Old Presidents"

In today's Wall Street Journal, I have an opinion piece entitled, “No Country for Old Presidents.” It begins:

Should there be an upper age limit on the presidency? Former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 77, may join a crowded and aging field of candidates. Last month Bernie Sanders, 78, was hospitalized with what the campaign called “chest discomfort” and turned out to be a heart attack. In September 2016, Hillary Clinton, then 68, was privately diagnosed with pneumonia. The campaign concealed the diagnosis until she was caught on camera fainting from dehydration.

Mental health is another concern. “Gaffes” on the campaign trail drive observers to wonder whether the slip-ups reflect a candidate’s age and are a sign of some greater health concern. Voters have no way of knowing.

It concludes:

The Constitution sets a minimum age of 35 to serve as president. Maybe it should be amended to set an upper age limit at 70, 75 or 80. Like the 22nd Amendment limiting presidential terms, such an amendment shouldn’t take effect immediately, lest it affect the outcome of the 2020 race. But it’s worth having a conversation about age for future presidential candidates before an age-related crisis strikes a president.

I’ll have more about what a constitutional amendment might look like soon.

How changes to the Democratic presidential primaries may affect 2020 voting

One common phrase I’ve heard at conferences discussing proposed reforms to presidential primaries is something along the lines of, “Reformers are always targeting last cycle’s election.” That is, sometimes reformers are too myopic in trying to fix last cycle’s changes and fail to recognize the unintended consequences it could have on the next cycle—or that changes in events may alter how we view the next cycle.

I want to focus on two items for consideration well ahead of the 2020 Democratic presidential primaries. The first are changes to the Iowa caucuses. The second are changes to the primary calendar. Some speculation follows the observations of each change, with an assumption that a significant number of Democratic candidates (say, at least 10 and probably more than 15 viable candidates) will run, similar to the number in the 2016 Republican presidential nominating contest.

Iowa Caucuses

The Democratic caucuses in Iowa have long had distinctive features. Democratic voters show up at precinct caucus sites and publicly express support for one candidate or another. They group together in wings of the precinct site. Then there’s a period of “realignment,” where supporters of non-viable candidates (those with few supporters) throw their support behind another, more viable candidate. The caucus site names a winner; no popular vote is taken. Those caucus site winners are compiled into an overall distribution of delegates.

Multiple reforms appear to be shaping up for 2020. The caucus will resemble more of a traditional primary, if all the changes are approved. There will be absentee voting, which should dramatically increase popular participation. Raw vote totals will be released.

But it also means that this “realignment” may disappear. This was a potentially crucial opportunity for insurgent candidate Barack Obama in 2008. Reports widely circulated before the Iowa caucuses in 2008 that Bill Richardson, a second-tier candidate, had urged his supporters to throw their support behind Mr. Obama in the event of realignment (the same was true for marginal candidate Dennis Kucinich). The realignment period offered a kind of ranked choice voting. It also prevent too much fragmentation: three candidates—Mr. Obama, John Edwards, and Hillary Clinton—secured about 97% of precincts.

The Iowa caucus changes haven’t been finalized yet, but if the Iowa caucuses look more like a traditional primary, or the Republican caucuses in Iowa in 2016, we would expect to see more fracturing (no candidate broke 30% of the popular vote), more delegates awarded to more candidates, and, potentially, less opportunities for the kind of second-choice realignment that Mr. Obama benefited from in 2008.

2020 Calendar

Many states jockey for an early position in the primaries to exert their influence in the process. Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina have received privileged status in recent years. But by the first Tuesday in March, other states may follow suit with primaries.

In 2016, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Vermont held Democratic primaries or caucuses on the first Tuesday. In 2020, Arkansas has likely moved its primary back to May; California and North Carolina have moved their primaries up to the first Tuesday in March.

For candidates who survive the early stages, viability may come through home-state advantages, particularly among delegate-rich pools of states. Prospective candidates Elizabeth Warren (Massachusetts), Beto O’Rourke (Texas), and Julian Castro (Texas) all may find strength on this dates; so too would Kamala Harris (California), after California moves up its primary.

It’s worth noting that among the most viable challenger to Donald Trump for the Republican nomination after Super Tuesday appeared to be Ted Cruz—in part because he secured over 200 delegates that day, but largely because Texas’s primary (and 104 delegates of its 155 possible delegates he won) came on that day.

The fortune of the calendar, then, might provide added strength for certain candidates.

Speculation from procedural changes

Yes, much of this is speculative. But it’s worth considering that we often look back at a presidential primary and note certain things that occurred because of the procedures in place. The changes in this cycle will undoubtedly have some impact on the Democratic presidential primaries. We won’t really know what those look like until after the fact, but I hope thinking structurally and drawing some recent comparisons offers some useful perspective ahead of the 2020 presidential primaries.