What percentage of law school faculty have recently contributed to political candidates?

My recent post, “Law school faculty monetary contributions to political candidates, 2017 to early 2023,” has garnered a lot of attention and feedback, and I’m grateful for people’s interest in it! Some recurring questions came up.

First, what does this say about the percentage of politically-engaged faculty (an important question raised by Professor Milan Markovic and others)?

I tracked around 3300 faculty. That could double-count some faculty who moved around, so it could be smaller. And some could self-identify as a “law professor” but not teach at the law school (e.g., a business law professor in an undergraduate), another way it could be smaller.

But I sense I am somewhat understating the results, as I know of a non-trivial number of faculty (some of whom followed up with me after this post!) who are not included because they failed to list their occupation; listed some other occupation, like attorney or teacher; or whose title is, say, “professor of legal writing,” “professor of the practice,” or “Williams Chair in Constitutional Law.”

That’s all a hedge, and let’s set it aside for a moment. Based on what we know, what does it say about political engagement?

The window of contributions was a five-plus year window, 2017 to early 2023. I looked at law school faculties from 2022. That worked out to around 35.5% of “full time” faculty who contributed in this time (9195 faculty).

I looked at faculty that hit the 50% mark in terms of contributions, with, of course, all of the caveats I’ve listed.

School D R Both Pct
American 56 2   81.7%
Barry 19 1   71.4%
Irvine 37 1   67.9%
Widener Commonwealth 9 1   66.7%
Hastings 43     66.2%
NYLS 30     63.8%
Pace 24     61.5%
New Mexico 23     60.5%
Fordham 46 1 1 59.3%
Rutgers 59 2   56.5%
Wake Forest 27     56.3%
CUNY 31     55.4%
Loyola Los Angeles 36   1 55.2%
Indiana-Bloomington 27     55.1%
Catholic 9 3 1 54.2%
George Washington 49 3   54.2%
Cooley 21   1 53.7%
Atlanta's John Marshall 8     53.3%
Montana 8     53.3%
California Western 19     52.8%
Utah 20     52.6%
Chicago Kent 25     52.1%
SMU 21     50.0%
Illinois-Chicago 21     50.0%

One might be hard pressed to see any rhyme or reason for particular schools on the list or off the list. It’s possible, for instance, that some DC schools (like American, Catholic, and George Washington) attract disproportionately higher donors with some hope of service in a future administration. It’s possible that some schools’ faculty members (Irvine, Katie Porter) or famous alumni (Hastings now UC Law SF, Kamala Harris) prompted more donations. Only three of the Princeton Review’s “most liberal law students” (American, Irvine, George Washington) appear on the list.

School D R Both Pct
Regent   1   4.2%
Lincoln Memorial 1     4.5%
Faulkner   1   5.9%
North Dakota 1     6.3%
Idaho 3     7.9%
South Dakota 2     10.0%
LSU 4 1   12.8%
Southern 6 1   13.0%
Ave Maria 2 1   13.0%
Widener Delaware 4     13.3%
Indiana-Indianapolis 6     13.6%
Gonzaga 4     14.8%
Liberty 1 2   15.0%
Loyola New Orleans 6     15.0%
Baylor 5     16.7%
St. Thomas (Florida) 7     16.7%
Capital 4     17.4%
Mississippi College 4     17.4%
Villanova 8     17.8%
Tulane 9 1   18.2%
Wyoming 4     18.2%
Elon 7     18.4%
Texas A&M 11     18.6%
Washington University 18     18.8%
St. Thomas (Minnesota) 5     19.2%
Cleveland State 6     19.4%

Again, it’s interesting to return to the Princeton Review rankings of the “most conservative students.” Six of those top ten (Ave Maria, Regent, Faulkner, LSU, Idaho, Mississippi College) make the list of the least politically engaged faculty.

So there are varying things to consider. On the whole, contributions hover around 1/3 of the reported faculty (perhaps a bit higher but perhaps not by much) in the last five years. At a handful of schools (perhaps for some reasons), contributions are much higher or much lower as a percentage of overall faculty. It could be that political engagement is happening elsewhere. That said, with 1/3 of faculty reporting and nearly 96% of them going to Democrats, I am not sure that it is masking substantial numbers of Republican contributors who are simply sitting on the sidelines—but, perhaps a few more, if one sees how political engagement shakes out among those least-active institutions.

There are some other contribution figures to consider, perhaps for later posts.

Analysis of first-time bar passage data for Class of 2023 and ultimate bar passage data for Class of 2021

The ABA has released its new batch of data on bar passage. The data includes the first-time passage data for the Class of 2023 and the “ultimate” passage data for the Class of 2021. As I noted earlier, USNWR has increased the weight on bar passage as a metric (18% of the methodology is for first-time passage, 7% for ultimate), and it is one of the biggest metrics. It is also one of the most volatile metrics.

To offer a snapshot of what the data means, I looked at both the first-time and ultimate passage data. I compared schools’ performance against their Class of 2022 and 2020 metrics. I weighed the data the way USNWR does for a point of comparison.

Note that USNWR has not yet released its latest rankings for Spring 2024. That will include the Class of 2022 and 2020 metrics. This new batch of data will appear on rankings released in 2025.

Here are the schools projected to improve in this metric (which, again, under the current methodology, is 25% of the rankings) over the Classes of 2022 and 2020. The numbers below show the change in score; that is, they show how much a school is projected to improve or decline in the scoring. It is not the bar passage data, which is a comparative metric that can be harder to make meaningful if viewed simply in raw terms. That said, these numbers are, in their own way, meaningless, as they are just one factor among several.

Pontifical Catholic University of P.R. 0.316441

Appalachian School of Law 0.2564

Texas Southern University Thurgood Marshall School of Law 0.230382

Widener University-Delaware 0.225445

Northern Kentucky University 0.201138

Stetson University College of Law 0.188107

Villanova University 0.179214

Miami, University of 0.158228

Kansas, University of 0.152897

Albany Law School 0.141105

Baltimore, University of 0.129179

Texas Tech University 0.127884

Southern Illinois University 0.127633

Cincinnati, University of 0.127493

Saint Louis University 0.122641

North Carolina Central University 0.118442

Pittsburgh, University of 0.116755

Memphis, University of 0.106309

Vanderbilt University 0.104692

Boston College 0.102051

Here are the schools projected to decline in this metric over the Classes of 2022 and 2020.

Willamette University -0.41276

New Hampshire, University of -0.3903

Illinois, University of -0.32793

Case Western Reserve University -0.32763

Florida A&M University -0.31228

Ohio Northern University -0.30423

City University of New York -0.25318

Kentucky, University of -0.20322

Southern University -0.18699

Missouri, University of -0.17881

Puerto Rico, University of -0.166

Seattle University -0.16593

Pennsylvania State-Dickinson Law -0.15274

Regent University Law School -0.14854

Tulsa, University of -0.14119

Colorado, University of -0.1361

Gonzaga University -0.1291

Cleveland State University College of Law -0.12842

California Western School of Law -0.12533

St. Thomas University (Florida) -0.12298

Law school faculty monetary contributions to political candidates, 2017 to early 2023

I’ve done some work looking at law firms and where political contributions from each went among the largest law firms. I thought I’d try my hand at gathering some comparable data among law professor at law schools.

I drew FEC data from 2017 to early 2023 (when I started running data for this study). Contribution disclosure is only required for those who contribute more than $200, but many outlets like ActBlue or WinRed disclose even $1 contributions.

I looked for all faculty who self identified as a “law” “professor” as their occupation. That included professors of law and all potential titles, but it did not include professors with “legal” alone in the title, or those who identified as a law “teacher” or “educator.” Of course, if faculty members primarily self-identified as an “attorney” or some other title, they fell outside the filter. I then screened out anyone with the title “adjunct” or “emeritus/emerita” to return only full-time faculty members. It includes anyone in “doctrinal,” “clinical,” “research,” “writing,” “dean,” or other faculty roles, as long as “law” and “professor” appeared in the title.

The final data set had around 80,000 items. I sorted and standardized their institutions, the law schools they taught at. Some were more ambiguous (e.g., Was “UM” Michigan, Minnesota, or Maryland? Was “Widener” in Pennsylvania or Delaware?), but I tried to standardize as readily as I could.

I then coded all contributions as “Democratic,” “Republican,” or “other.” Some, like ActBlue or WinRed, are of course obvious. But I sifted through every label to identify whether they were Democratic- or Republican-leaning. OpenSecrets helped reveal if an ostensibly “neutral” political organization overwhelmingly contributed to candidates of one political party or another. Those whose contributions were at least 25% to each party I labeled “other.” So, too, were contributions to the Green Party or the Libertarian Party. These ended up being a trivial part of the data set.

I cleaned up the names of faculty. For instance, “William O’Connor” might sometimes label himself “Bill O’Connor” in some places, or “William OConnor” elsewhere. Data entry for contributors is often quite sloppy. I created a function that took the first five letters of a donor’s last name and the first letter of the first name to create a unique ID, eliminating any punctuation or spaces. I then spot checked to clean up situations where the “William” v. “Bill” scenario could arise. Undoubtedly, this method cleaned up most things but might have errors.

I then sifted through each school to identify how many faculty at each school contributes to Democratic, Republican, or other candidates. I also separately identified faculty who contributed to both Democratic and Republican candidates in this window. If faculty moved from one school to another in this window, it is possible that faculty member is listed twice.

In the end, I identified 3148 law faculty who contributed only to Democrats in this 5+ year span—95.9% of the data set of those identified as contributing to either Democrats or Republicans in this period. Another 88 (2.7%) contributed only to Republicans. And 48 others contributed to both Democrats and Republicans.

The dollar figures were likewise imbalanced but slightly less so. About $5.1 million went to Democrats in this period, about 92.3% of the total contributions to either Democrats or Republicans. About $425,000 went to Republicans. (Around $6000 went to others.)

Of course, there are limitations to this study like any others. For some law schools, law faculty were running for office (e.g., former Harvard Law professor Elizabeth Warren running for Senate and for President), and contributions could be skewed to support a colleague. Faculty can “contribute” in other ways, such as volunteering for a campaign or even work in an administration. Faculty might be very “political” in a sense but refuse to contribute to candidates.

That said, I was surprised to see very few cross-partisan contributions. Even a $1 contribution to, say, Senator Mitt Romney or Representative Liz Cheney would have put a Democratic-leaning faculty member into the contributor to both Democrats and Republicans. But the data reveals very few cross-partisan contributions.

The first chart breaks down total faculty who gave to Democrats, Republicans, or both at each school in this time period.

Next shows the dollars contributed at each school in this time period.

Raw figures for the faculty donors, and the total dollars contributed, are below.

School D R Both
Stanford 30 2  
Yale 27    
Chicago 23 1 1
Penn 28    
Duke 40 1 1
Harvard 56   1
NYU 50   3
Columbia 32 2  
Virginia 38   2
Berkeley 34   1
Michigan 46    
Northwestern 32   1
Cornell 22    
UCLA 42 1  
Georgetown 74 2 1
Minnesota 19 1  
Texas 37   1
USC 19    
Vanderbilt 19   1
Georgia 13    
Washington University 18    
BYU 6 2  
Florida 22    
North Carolina 22    
Ohio State 19 1  
Wake Forest 27    
Boston University 26    
Notre Dame 14    
Boston College 21   1
Fordham 46 1 1
Texas A&M 11    
Arizona State 16   1
George Mason 11 6 2
Utah 20    
Alabama 11   1
Emory 21 1  
George Washington 49 3  
Iowa 13   1
Irvine 37 1  
Kansas 9    
Washington & Lee 17    
Wisconsin 14    
Illinois 12 1 1
Villanova 8    
Indiana-Bloomington 27    
Pepperdine 8 1 1
SMU 21    
William & Mary 9 1  
Baylor 5    
Washington 15    
Maryland 28 1  
Oklahoma 8   1
Tennessee 9 1 1
Arizona 21    
Temple 28    
Colorado 16 1 1
Florida State 10 1  
Seton Hall 18    
Wayne State 16   2
Davis 17    
FIU 10 1  
Hastings 43    
Houston 21    
Kentucky 11 1  
Loyola Los Angeles 36   1
Richmond 18    
South Carolina 14 1  
St. John's 14 1  
Cardozo 32    
Georgia State 18    
Connecticut 21   1
Marquette 8    
Miami 30   1
Missouri 8 1  
Northeastern 20    
Texas Tech 9   1
Tulane 9 1  
Oregon 11    
San Diego 12 3 1
Case Western 17   2
Denver 25 1  
Drexel 14    
Penn State Law 12    
Cincinnati 10    
Lewis & Clark 16    
Loyola Chicago 25    
Stetson 10 1  
Drake 10    
American 56 2  
Duquesne 11 1  
Nebraska 7    
Penn State Dickinson 7    
Pittsburgh 12 1 1
St. Louis 14   1
UNLV 19    
Montana 8    
New Mexico 23    
St. Thomas (Minnesota) 5    
Chicago Kent 25    
Gonzaga 4    
Indiana-Indianapolis 6    
Louisville 8   1
LSU 4 1  
Mercer 10   1
School D R Oth
Stanford $136,819 $8,205  
Yale $57,735    
Chicago $78,264 $7,904  
Penn $85,283    
Duke $46,535 $2,075  
Harvard $366,949 $1,000  
NYU $215,348 $3,470  
Columbia $68,598 $650  
Virginia $80,013 $21,073  
Berkeley $65,097 $500  
Michigan $103,402    
Northwestern $64,460 $167,245  
Cornell $30,666    
UCLA $62,972 $4,525 $2,724
Georgetown $223,280 $21,325  
Minnesota $37,115 $12,960 $900
Texas $41,912 $500  
USC $11,794    
Vanderbilt $37,174 $1,000  
Georgia $17,684    
Washington University $18,413    
BYU $3,248 $850  
Florida $28,752    
North Carolina $48,831    
Ohio State $32,457 $1,500  
Wake Forest $19,769    
Boston University $37,609    
Notre Dame $42,164    
Boston College $21,498 $2,500  
Fordham $277,494 $745 $30
Texas A&M $4,945    
Arizona State $19,899 $3,000  
George Mason $40,509 $18,932  
Utah $20,736    
Alabama $7,461 $250  
Emory $64,257 $500  
George Washington $103,639 $2,350  
Iowa $10,104 $200  
Irvine $55,211 $356  
Kansas $6,235    
Washington & Lee $18,461    
Wisconsin $17,193    
Illinois $61,570 $1,103  
Villanova $3,223    
Indiana-Bloomington $38,198    
Pepperdine $17,660 $3,476  
SMU $34,839    
William & Mary $7,494 $4,421  
Baylor $5,925    
Washington $19,149    
Maryland $40,920 $415  
Oklahoma $7,535 $2,000 $1,250
Tennessee $10,195 $2,000  
Arizona $9,893    
Temple $32,976    
Colorado $7,160 $3,193  
Florida State $11,286 $50  
Seton Hall $30,759    
Wayne State $16,078 $28,760  
Davis $16,359    
FIU $18,588 $1,565  
Hastings $98,908   $500
Houston $12,523    
Kentucky $8,853 $1,000  
Loyola Los Angeles $30,281 $1,000  
Richmond $18,044    
South Carolina $24,716 $2,000  
St. John's $14,519 $100  
Cardozo $44,321    
Georgia State $10,763    
Connecticut $12,097 $100  
Marquette $4,492    
Miami $40,449 $4,200 $250
Missouri $1,763 $77  
Northeastern $24,891    
Texas Tech $3,805 $1,584  
Tulane $4,396 $463  
Oregon $2,744    
San Diego $52,386 $14,450  
Case Western $15,988 $211  
Denver $51,519 $100  
Drexel $24,604    
Penn State Law $8,116    
Cincinnati $2,764    
Lewis & Clark $6,226    
Loyola Chicago $23,904    
Stetson $4,829 $20  
Drake $15,490    
American $199,403 $1,795  
Duquesne $12,098 $4,750  
Nebraska $10,638    
Penn State Dickinson $8,445    
Pittsburgh $10,160 $2,780  
St. Louis $21,462 $5,100  
UNLV $20,659    
Montana $9,529    
New Mexico $20,443    
St. Thomas (Minnesota) $2,184    
Chicago Kent $64,248    
Gonzaga $232    
Indiana-Indianapolis $6,221    
Louisville $5,480 $1,000  
LSU $4,020 $60  
Mercer $11,161 $500  

Supreme Court analysis: Trump v. Anderson

This is a high level overview of the decision in Trump v. Anderson, written in a format as I’ve been presenting in various ways over the last few days. Disclosure: I did file an amicus brief in support of neither party in this case, and in the court below.

On March 4, 2024, the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Anderson. It issued a per curiam opinion reversing the Colorado Supreme Court and effectively permitting Donald Trump’s name to appear on the Republican primary ballot.

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

The State of Colorado, after a divided decision by the Colorado Supreme Court, had held that Donald Trump had engaged in insurrection for purposes of Section 3 for his role in the January 6, 2021 riots at the Capitol. It concluded he could not appear on the Republican primary ballot in that state. While he was excluded from the ballot, it stayed the ruling, so he appeared on the ballot as the case was appealed.

The United States Supreme Court expedited review and issued its decision in a little less than a month. It was mostly unsurprising after listening to oral argument. The sense was that at least eight justices, if not all nine, were inclined to reverse the Colorado Supreme Court on some theory that the that the state of Colorado, or any single state, didn't have this power to exclude ineligible presidential candidates from the ballot and didn't have the power to enforce this provision for varying structural or practical reasons. There was just the question from the court about how it got there.

Trump v. Anderson is a per curiam decision, which means we do not know the author, and, although I shouldn't speculate, it reads in some respects like the voice of Chief Justice Roberts. The result was unanimous, 9-0, essentially saying that Colorado lacks this power. But there are sharp elbows on the path there—the path not only to that one holding, but whether other holdings should be reached. So six justices, Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett all agreed with heart of the reasoning in the per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett wrote separately to explain she only agreed with part of the majority per curiam opinion. And then there was a concurring opinion jointly authored by justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson concurring in the judgment only, but they too agreed with the heart of the reasoning of the majority.

I’ll focus on the consensus view of the court for a moment. That part of the decision really focuses on sort of this overall constitutional point, the text, structure, context, and so on. It begins with a quotation from U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, a 1995 case, which says that that states had no power to add term limits or additional qualifications for congressional candidates. That case had in turn cited the great Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries in the Constitution, to say that if states are exercising power in federal elections, that power has to come from some source in the constitution.

So if you are looking at Section 3 in the context of a presidential election, where is the state power? Well, it's certainly not going to be found in the 14th Amendment, which is a constraint on state power. And Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce it, but it gives no power to the states. As you run through the rest of the Constitution, you can't find other provisions of the Constitution empowering states to enforce this provision against a presidential candidate. Articles I and II deal with congressional elections and presidential elections. But it's not clear that implicitly within them is the later power to come back and enforce Section 3.

By the structure of the Constitution, this is a provision that's designed for congressional enforcement, for national remedies and national mechanisms. As a practical matter, it makes very little sense for states to add the sorts of burdens on presidential candidates. If they want to do it for state candidates, it's their own thing. But to do so for presidential candidates makes very little sense. That makes very little sense given that Congress can lift the disability by a two thirds vote, so for a state to step in and hold a candidate not qualified for Congress to swoop in later and have to say, well, now we're going to lift the disability, would seem to force Congress’s hand rather than leave the power to Congress.

And the very end of the opinion are a series of practical concerns that one state’s evidentiary law or state’s procedural setup for how these challenges are filed could have a ripple effect throughout the United States, and we might reach inconsistent verdicts across the United States. And states in particular have less of an interest in presidential elections, simply because they are national offices, and the notion that states could adjudicate qualifications make these determinations and contested factual claims, and then reach kind of a patchwork result across the United States, not something that makes a whole lot of sense structurally.

That was Part II-B of the per curiam opinion, joined in full by Justice Barrett, and joined again in logic, if not in full, by the concurring opinion by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Jackson. So that that could have been it. That would have been easy in a way, for the Court.

But instead, there is a lot of friction on the court in a different context. So Part II-A of the opinion, where Justice Barrett peels off, along with the other concurring justices, addressed this sort of a separate question, which is not simply whether states have the power to enforce Section 3. It's more a question of who else and in what context has the power to enforce it. And for that, the court turns to the way that Section 3 is set up.

The five-justice majority speaks about how Congress has this role now to enforce the provisions of Section 3. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment Amendment provides for Congress to have the power to enforce this provision of the Constitution with appropriate legislation, that appropriate legislation must be, in the words of other Supreme Court precedent, including City of Boerne v. Flores, a “congruent and proportional” remedy for the concerns that are addressed by these provisions of the Constitution.

When we look at the fact that we're dealing with this question, the factual dispute of a class of individuals barred for engaging in an “insurrection,” as Justice Kavanaugh at oral argument noted, we must ascertain who is covered. That requires a determination. This is something the Colorado Supreme Court recognized was necessary, in this case—the determination of whether someone engaged in insurrection ,which required procedures and factual findings.

And this is also what Justice Chase on the United States Supreme Court, then writing circuit as a circuit justice in 1869, noted in a case call Griffin's Case. It has a lot of attention and in some of the scholarly discourse, where a federal judge was deciding this case one year after ratification of the 14th Amendment, which was ratified in 1868. Justice Chase is hearing a habeas challenge from Griffin, who had been convicted in West Virginia state court. And he's challenging that conviction in federal court to say, well, I my conviction is invalid because it was adjudicated issued by a judge who was barred from holding office by Section 3. And Chase, writing this opinion says, Look, I'm not in a position to be able to determine these things. In part I have to make a determination, and “proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcement of decisions are indispensable.” Unless he's given some guidance, especially from Congress to figure out what to do here, the justice is not in a position to make this adjudication.

So Part II-A of the opinion really rides heavily on Congress's role here, because the Constitution empowers Congress. It enables Congress, subject to judicial review, to pass appropriate legislation, and Congress's Section 5 power is “critical” when it comes to Section 3. The per curiam opinion provides these sorts of statements before it then leads into the argument that the state lacks the power.

At the very end of the opinion, the per curiam opinion says these two things kind of go hand in hand. All of these things are essential. It's that Congress is the one that does these things, and that states lack the power to do so.

Now, Justice Barrett writes separately to say, I agree on the state's lack the power, we don't need to decide anything else today. I would not go in the path of the majority has done.

And then you have the concurring opinion the concurring opinion by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson. They seem to agree with part two of the opinion essentially agreeing that states don't have any such authority. They fracture very badly with the majority's approach, thinking about this congressional role. Some of the language the court that the concurring opinion uses, saying that these musings about Griffin's Case and about congressional power are as inadequately supported as they are gratuitous. And they go on to suggest that Section 3 is not special and does not require congressional enforcement alone. They point out that other provisions of the Constitution, including the Reconstruction Amendments, including things like Due Process, Equal Protection, and the abolition of slavery, which don't require additional congressional implementing legislation. They worry about how this is going to be applied in the future and whether or not they're adding these constraints, and how Congress goes about enforcing Section 3 or prohibiting other actors from enforcing Section 3.

The only concrete example they give is the concern that the forecloses judicial enforcement of that provision such as might occur when a party is prosecuted by an insurrectionist and raises a defense on that score. The notion being that without congressional implementing legislation, if you have someone who had taken an oath to support the Constitution, engaged in insurrection, and now we're serving as a prosecutor, it could be impossible for somebody to raise a defense to say this prosecutor is not authorized to hold this office. So there were some sharp elbows.

A few things to talk about here.

The first is the court doesn't touch really any factual issues. It doesn't touch questions about whether January 6 was an insurrection, or their Donald Trump engaged in an insurrection, whether his speech or his conduct was protected. These are just pure legal questions that the court is focused on.

Another is that this really closes the door and any of these ballot challenges going forward, whether it's the primary election or the general election. The court is quite clear that there's no role for the state and enforcing these provisions.

Another is that the opinion is very centered on section three of the 14th amendment. So it doesn't seem to foreclose the possibility that states exercising their power under Article II of the Constitution, to exclude, say, a 21 year old from the ballot or a Nicaraguan national from the ballot, and states might continue to be able to do so. Instead that the opinion looks much more at Section 3 and how the Fourteenth Amendment shifts this balance of power among the the federal government and the state governments to say that it's foreclosing some authority from the States. And there's not affirmative enforcement authority given to the States as a result. So it seems very much limited to what's happening with the Fourteenth Amendment and doesn't really touch on other presidential qualifications, disputes, election disputes, ballot access disputes, if we're just dealing with Section 3.

It also seems that it would appear to foreclose some challenges even might arise after the election. This is some of the opinion that I'm still wrapping my mind around and trying to understand how different parts of the opinion interact with one another. But the courts emphasis on speaking about Congress and legislation, and how that remedy needs to be tailored adequately to the remedy that are to the harm that you've identified, really does seem to say that other challenges would be inappropriate—at least without specific congressional legislation. But it's very hard to identify exactly what the court is doing when it is when it is suggesting that Congress has a role here with legislation.

What are those things that Congress can do apart from legislation such as seating its own members, as opposed to enacting legislation? What things by as the concurring opinion points out general federal statutes, such as (which the concurring opinion does not mention) the Administrative Procedures Act or the Electoral Count Reform Act? What kinds of deference is going to be given to Congress when it is acting pursuant to those rules, or when courts are acting pursuant to those rules, rather than things under its enforcement authority under Section 3? So there are some myriad questions that are ahead. And it fails to provide some of the clarity, which I think was part of the goal of the opinion

Matters are now largely left to the political process. There will be major questions about presidential immunity coming up in the weeks ahead, as the Supreme Court hears that case, and a number of criminal challenges to Trump in the United States. I think there's not going to be a closing off of the fact that the public will continue to intensely dispute, what is an insurrection, whether Trump engaged in an insurrection, and so on going forward, but that will be a matter of debate in the general election. The Court has at least closed that door when it comes to states attempting to enforce it for their ballot access provisions.

There's not much to change with the USNWR rankings to disrupt the status quo

Last year’s dramatic overhaul of the USNWR law school rankings saw the potential for increased volatility in the new metrics. But not much at the top, and much more beneath. And USNWR can only use publicly-available data.

I worked on creating an alternative set of metrics to try to stress test the rankings and see what might change. I reduced the 10-month employment score from 33% to 30%, and I subdivided that further in 20% for last year’s graduating class and 10% for the year before, a two-year weighted average. I reduced the bar passage stats a bit. I added a couple of other statistics at a percentage point or two per metrics: median debt among recent graduates; median income among recent graduates; a scholarly citation metric derived from Hein; conditional scholarships revoked; academic dismissals. That’s six new factors and changing of weights.

The result? Not much change. In fact, not much worth even listing in a chart below.

Virtually all factors highly correlate with each other. The top schools have the best admissions metrics and the best employment outcomes and the most citations and the highest bar passage rates and dismiss very few. When you add more factors, you just keep measuring mostly the same things. This isn’t true for all things, of course. You can isolate some schools that have uniquely strong scholarly profiles; stronger employment outcomes or bar passage metrics; low debt. But these can be isolated factors, and it is hard to move unless you’re moving all of them.

In short, it’s quite possible that changes, once again, to the USNWR metrics are coming. But more important than whether schools move, I think, is the incentives the metrics create. They certainly affect school behavior. Schools are less inclined, I think, to “chase” LSAT and UGPA medians this cycle, for instance, because they are weighed less, and because employability as a proxy for later employment rates matters more. But it’s just to note that many efforts to rank schools suffer from the issue that most of these factors so closely relate to one another. The more material effect may be how schools alter their behavior in an effort to retain their current position in the USNWR hierarchy.

Law school academic dismissal and conditional scholarship eliminations, 2023

Last year, I highlighted the fact that law schools have wide variance in how they handle academic dismissals of first-year law students and how they handle reducing or eliminating scholarships. Both categories, I argued, are negatives for law schools and the kind of information that USNWR could (and perhaps should) incorporate into its rankings. I offered a few ways of comparing schools to one another.

Here’s a visualization of the percentage of first-year law students who were academically dismissed in 2023. These percentages are slightly different than the opaque percentages that are reported to the ABA. These figures look at enrollment as of October 5, 2022; and the ensuing total number of first-year law students who were academically dismissed the following year. The figures exclude transfers, and those who withdrew for other reasons. I organize the chart by USNWR ranking and only look at the top 100 schools.

You can see that most schools have zero or negligible academic attrition, and that it picks up slightly as the chart moves down. But a few schools have somewhat higher academic attrition, 5% or higher.

Now over to scholarship reductions or eliminations. The ABA does not distinguish between the two, or distinguish in the amount. Instead, any reduction or elimination is included. The percentage here is also slightly different than the ABA data—it is the percentage of the overall class in this chart, not the percentage among scholarship recipients. That is, if you did not receive a scholarship, you are included in the denominator in this chart, so this chart includes all 1Ls at each school.

There are far fewer schools that reduce or eliminate scholarships, because the vast majority of school simply do not have “conditional” scholarship policies. But, again, as one moves down the chart, one can see some more reductions or eliminations, with a handful eliminating or reducing scholarships for 10% or more of the class. And there is some overlap among academic attrition rates and conditional scholarship data.

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Hard questions about experiential learning and legal education

The American Bar Association created an Experiential Credits Working Group out of the Standards Committee suggesting three potential proposals—increasing the number of “experiential credits” in legal education from 6 to 9 or 15. There are some major, and difficult, questions to address.

A decade ago, the ABA added a requirement that all law schools would be required to include six “experiential” units to their curriculum as a condition for JD graduation. This would expand, perhaps significantly, that requirement.

From the beginning of the new proposal, let me open with this:

We have assumed that the value of experiential education in a professional program has been established through the literature on adult pedagogy and professional education pointing to the activity of using doctrine and skills in context in combination with the exercise of critical perspectives, values, and habits as necessary for professional formation.

Respectfully, this is something of a string of thoughts, opening with an “assumption.” Now the assumption, as it says, has been “established.” But established, how?

One might say, the ABA should examine whether, and how, the six-unit requirement has advanced the ends it was originally designed to achieve. From what I’ve seen, it has not achieved what it was designed to do. Professor Robert Kuehn, for instance, has chronicled how the implementation has been a “whimper,” with good evidence—there have been few substantive changes to curriculum; much occurred by “restructuring” how courses are labeled, something of an accounting issue; state bars have lamented the lack of preparedness of law school graduates; and so on.

Now, Professor Kuehn concludes, “The ABA should heed these calls for reform and revisit the proposals for fifteen-credits of experiential coursework and a mandatory, live-client clinical experience for all J.D. students.” I appreciate his thoughtful perspective (as he was quite involved in these matters a decade ago). But it’s unclear to me that if the evidence of partial implementation has been unsuccessful that a larger implementation would be successful. Now, perhaps part of this is an acknowledgment that schools must be pressed to do something beyond “accounting” or “restructuring” credits, to something quite dramatic. But it remains a surprise to me that this ABA proposal offers no assessment of what has or has not worked in the six-unit model. Instead of evaluating the existing program, it simply assumes that more is better—and, in fact, this assumption doesn’t offer quantity that is valuable, but some sense that more is always better in this context.

So, the “value of experiential education in a professional program has been established.” Established how? “literature on adult pedagogy and professional education.” This is surely right. Now, that said, there are many things that are valuable in professional programs—behavioral theories of a learning environment, or cognitive theories about internal motivation for learners, are also valuable. And this literature, the assumption notes, is “pointing to the activity of using [a] doctrine and skills [b] in context [c] in combination with the exercise of [d] critical perspectives, values, and habits as necessary for professional formation.” I add some subdivisions here. But I think [b] is doing most of the work. I think a lot of doctrine and skill can arise in combination with critical perspective, values, and habits necessary for professional formation. And, again, it offers no evaluation of tradeoff between this and other ways of professional formation.

To recap, then, I have some skepticism of (1) a measure of the efficacy of these programs, particularly in light of the change a decade ago and no evaluation of its success or changes in law schools; and (2) a proposal that something is “valuable” without much if any evaluation of tradeoffs.

To be fair, however, (2) does get some attention later:

However, this support for increasing the number of credits was coupled with concerns about [1a] challenges for part-time and/or evening students to meet an increased number of credits, [2] changes to the curriculum, and [3] financial and [1b] logistical ramifications. The roundtable unearthed concerns about the impact increasing the number of experiential learning credits might have on [4] bar exam performance and [2] the reduction of room for elective courses in a student’s schedule, among other things.

I also subdivided this section, and I think there are two [2]s, and two parts to [1]. I want to focus on a couple of these.

As to [2] I think the concern about changes to the curriculum and reduction of elective courses does get at the tradeoffs.

[3] is a recognition that requiring more experiential courses could come at an added financial cost.

[4] is a recognition that there may be a relationship between course offerings and the bar exam, and some risk that shifting this balance may adversely affect bar exam performance. Professor Kuehn has an important paper on this topic, suggesting the answer is no. At the macro level at these two schools studied under existing standards, it may well be correct. It would be interesting to evaluate how this plays out on a broader scale.

These are, I think, pretty important concerns. And to be fair, some of these questions of tradeoffs and requests for information are a part of a new ABA request for information from schools and stakeholders, per Paul Caron. (See, e.g., “The impact that increasing the number of required experiential credits will have on the ability of students to take elective courses”; “Costs associated with an increase in experiential credits”; and so on.)

But note that none of the questions ask about the existing practices or the adoption of the existing decade-old requirement. Indeed, some of the questions ask for even broader and more dramatic changes. (See, e.g., “Whether the Council should consider requiring a full experiential semester (offered as a single semester) of all law students”; “Whether other types of experiential learning, for example judicial clerkships, should be included within the Standard’s definition of an experiential course,” a change to the status quo.)

It’s disappointing to see such a proposal of potentially radical changes to legal education with no effort to examine the more incremental measure adopted a decade ago that appears, at least implicitly, to have failed to achieve what proponents desired.

One more point, and that’s to heterogeneity. And this point comes in two subpoints.

First, have any other schools adopted similar measures like the ones the ABA is proposing; if they have, have they succeeded in doing what they set out to accomplish; and if they have not, then why are these ideas, which as the original memo points out are “assumed” values, adopted? There are thorny questions to go through, to be sure. If changes aren’t adopted because of stagnant law faculty, that’s one thing. If they weren’t adopted because of systemtic weaknesses in the cost-benefit analysis, that would be worth knowing, too. And if they have been adopted, wouldn’t it be beneficial to know how those experiments have actually played out?

Second, more on experiments. The ABA’s own Task Force on the Future of Legal Education a decade ago posited, “We think legal education would be improved if there were more room for trying different models. . . . The Task Force recommends that participants in the legal education system, but particularly law schools, universities, the Section of Legal Education, the Association of American Law Schools, and state bar admission authorities, pursue or facilitate this increased diversification of law schools as they each develop plans and initiatives to address the current challenges in legal education.” A decade ago, I pointed out the irony of proposals like this juxtaposed with the ABA’s additional new requirements.

Frankly, additional mandates on legal education continue to stifle any innovation or heterogeneity among law schools. And it comes at a time when there’s greater skepticism from the ABA about homogeneity in, say, law schools admissions testing requirements.

But while the ABA seems more willing for heterogeneity in admissions, it seems to want homogeneity on many other things. Over the last couple of years, the ABA’s more recent changes also offer significant new uniform requirements on law schools, including:

  1. Providing “substantial opportunities to students for . . . the development of a professional identity,” and that “students should have frequent opportunities for such development during each year of law school and in a variety of courses and co-curricular and professional development activities.”

  2. Providing “education to law students on bias, cross-cultural competency, and racism: (1) at the start of the program of legal education, and (2) at least once again before graduation.”

  3. Providing “resources related to financial aid and student loan debt and the availability of individual student loan counseling at the law school, the university of which it is a part, or from third party sources”

  4. Providing “information on law student well-being resources,” “informing law students and providing guidance regarding relevant information and services, including assistance on where the information and services can be found or accessed.”

Several things aren’t clear to me. I don’t know how many schools do or don’t do these things. (I’m fairly sure nearly every law school has education on bias, cross-cultural competency, and racism at orientation, and that nearly every law school has information about well-being resources.) It’s not clear what the baseline looks like (e.g., how students currently respond to professional formation), or where it ought to lead (e.g., whether student loan outcomes are “better” in the future with the availability of that information). And each new requirement includes some allocation of law school resources (passed along to students in the form of tuition raises), sometimes new, or sometimes simply in ensuring compliance by developing a record for ABA accreditation purposes.

Undoubtedly, there’s been plenty of praise for the ABA, here and before, for “doing something” in response to actual and perceived problems. But whether it yields any benefits in the future seems impossible to measure.

This proposal to change “experiential” learning, I think, is along the same lines. There’s no baseline comparison or evaluation. There’s no effort to figure out what schools are doing and what works. There’s no articulation of what a successful implementation of the proposal will look like. Instead, it’s some value-laden assumptions and some mandates—but this one (unlike the more recent four proposals) with a direct consequence on the curriculum as a whole.

I look forward to the exchange of information among law schools in the months ahead as the ABA attempts to determine how it ought to proceed. And this is not to say whether these proposals are good or bad. It’s to ask whether there’s enough to suggest they should be placed as a requirement on all law schools without exception in the United States. But I am doubtful that the right questions are being asked to gather the proper information in the first place for us to evaluate without largely falling back on our priors.

NYU, Cornell, and the new USNWR law school rankings landscape

After I project next year’s USNWR law school rankings, as I did last May and again here in December, there’s always a lot of chatter about the changes, about schools moving up and down. But the more notable thing is why the schools have changed spots, and there’s not a lot of explanation built into a single ranking metric. And some schools attract more attention than others. I would say I’ve received a decent number of questions about NYU (projected to be around 11) and Cornell (projected to be around 18) than most other schools, as both are significantly lower than their typical ranking. Why?

It has much less to do with any changes at those institutions, and much more about the rankings methodology changes.

And one way of thinking about the change—and specifically the change that adversely affected NYU and Cornell the most—is a change from quality to quantity.

This is a crude approximation, and it’s also likely to be a bit controversial to frame it this way. But bear with me as I set it up.

As I noted last December, it was not clear to me what the “endgame” for law schools “boycotting” the rankings was. It certainly pressured USNWR to change its methodology, as it could only rely on publicly-available data. And USNWR did change, not only to publicly-available data, but also in its weights of existing factors. That included a shift from “inputs” (e.g., admissions statistics) and toward “outputs” (e.g., employment and bar passage). At a high level, that seems pretty ordinary.

But the more subtle shift is what I posit here, a shift from quality to quantity. Here’s what I mean.

Employment outcomes were, of course, always a part of the rankings, and a pretty big factor (18%). But 4% of the weight went to at-graduation jobs. Those were typically the most “elite” (or high quality) jobs—large law firms and federal clerkships, among others. That’s not publicly available data, so it dropped out. And the 10-month employment metric rose from 14% of the rankings to 33%. And that metric treats a job as a job—all jobs are the same, if they are full-time, long-term, bar passage required or J.D. advantage (and pursuing an advanced degree). As you can see here from my earlier blog post, how schools get to the best employment outcomes can vary dramatically.

NYU and Cornell place an overwhelming number of their graduates into “elite” law firm outcomes, so they suffered when the “at graduation” metric dropped off. And USNWR does not weigh the quality (actual or perceived) of jobs differently—a job is a job. NYU and Cornell had high reputational scores, likely in part because of their consistent elite placement into legal jobs. But those metrics dropped from 40% to 25% of the rankings, too. “Quality” metrics, if you will, began to drop off. Instead, quantity metrics increased—including raw employment placement 10 months after graduation. It’s simply a question of putting graduates through the bar exam and into a job. Maybe that sounds crass, but that’s the metric measured. And maybe it’s a good thing to measure these raw outputs—employed graduates are better than unemployed graduates.

So let’s see what happened in these employment metrics.

Recently I looked at the schools I estimated to be in the “top ten” of USNWR’s employment metrics. These are estimates, because USNWR does not release how it weights each category of employment. But three schools stand out among these top ten, as they are schools that typically do well in the rankings but are not among the top ten of USNWR rankings: SMU, Texas A&M, and Washington University in St. Louis. Let’s compare their employment outcomes with NYU and Cornell.

"Full weight" All other employment Unemployed Approx. emp. rank
SMU 97.8% 1.1% 1.1% top 10
Texas A&M 99.4% 0.0% 0.6% top 10
Washington Univ. 97.8% 2.2% 0.0% top 10
NYU 97.5% 0.4% 2.1% 20
Cornell 94.1% 2.0% 4.0% 40

You can see that “full weight” jobs are worse (slightly for NYU, more so for Cornell) and unemployed outcomes higher than the three “top ten” schools I list here.

But the increased compression of the metrics leads to increased volatility—including dropping schools for even marginal differences in employment outcomes. NYU has around 2.1% (10 out of 473) of its graduates unemployed. That sinks its employment ranking to around 20th. Cornell has about 4% (8 of 202) of its graduates unemployed (or unknown). That puts its employment ranking around 40th. There’s tremendous compression at the top of these rankings. And given that employment is worth a whopping 33% of the overall rankings, marginal differences matter.

Let’s now compare the types of jobs. I’ll pull out three types: employment at firms with 501 or more attorneys; at firms with 101 to 500 attorneys; and federal judicial clerks. I sum those three categories at the end for a total, separate out all other outcomes, and the final unemployed figure. Finally, I include the raw total number of graduates at the end.

501+ firm 101-500 firm Fed Clerks Total All other Unemployed Total Grads
SMU 22.2% 9.3% 4.8% 36.3% 62.6% 1.1% 270
Texas A&M 7.6% 4.1% 4.7% 16.3% 83.1% 0.6% 172
Washington Univ. 31.7% 12.3% 8.4% 52.4% 47.6% 0.0% 227
NYU 54.5% 12.3% 6.3% 73.2% 24.7% 2.1% 473
Cornell 73.8% 7.4% 3.5% 84.7% 11.4% 4.0% 202

”Quality” is a controversial measure, to be sure. Students, of course, can have high quality employment outcomes in state court clerkships, public interest jobs, and government. These categories, however, are probably among the most competitive, if not the most sought after, categories of legal employment that offer students the highest salaries and the most options at the end. Again, controversial measure, to be sure, and not a one size fits all. But it’s worth the point of comparison.

For NYU and Cornell, the at-graduation metric and the elevated reputational score rankings likely helped account for some of the elite job placement. At Cornell, 84.7% land in these elite jobs, an astonishingly high percentage. At NYU, it’s 73.2%. The other three schools I list here aren’t particularly close. And for NYU, it’s all the more impressive that it graduated 473 students, nearly or more than doubling what most of the other schools do. It’s an extraordinary effort to secure that many high quality jobs for its graduates.

But note that, for USNWR purposes, those placement rates aren’t captured. It’s just jobs. It’s the quantity of placement. Getting students out of that “unemployed” bucket is basically the way to rise in the rankings these days.

I don’t mean to pick on any particular schools—they’re all strong schools in their own ways, and they offer some contrasts with one another and points of comparisons in the rankings. And it also doesn’t mean that students aren’t graduating into meaningful and successful careers. It’s simply a way of explaining why schools like NYU and Cornell are sliding in the new metrics, and others are finding success.

One more detail. Bar passage has become a major figure, too—up from 3% to a whopping 18%. But NYU’s first-time bar passage rate was 32d, and Cornell’s 57th, compared to all other schools.

These schools did not exactly have a bad bar passage rate. NYU had a first-time pass rate of 94.9%, nearly 14 points above the average of passers in jurisdictions where its graduates took the bar. Cornell was 90.3%, nearly 10 points above. But those numbers pale in compares to schools like North Carolina (20 points above), Harvard (20 points), UCLA (19), Chicago (19), and Berkeley (19).

The raw outputs aren’t that different. North Carolina, for instance, had a 93.75% first time pass rate, even lower than NYU. But the North Carolina state bar rates were quite low compared to New York’s so, UNC outperformed by 20 points, a higher rate than NYU. This delta of outperformance is a good way of accounting for bar difficulty. But it sets up schools like NYU and Cornell for worse outputs because the state bar is easier and the competition in the state is high quality. The first-time pass rate in North Carolina was 72%; in New York, it’s 83%. (I noted this several years ago with the decision in California to lower the cut score of the bar exam—it has the incidental effect of reducing the apparent quality of bar passage stats of schools like Stanford and UCLA.) And maybe it’s a good reason for including ultimate bar passage as a separate metric—as I wrote earlier, “So maybe there’s some value in offsetting some of the distortions for some schools that have good bar passage metrics but are in more competitive states. If that’s the case, however, I’d think that absolute first-time passage, rather than cumulative passage, would be the better metric.” But It’s literally impossible for NYU or Cornell to overperform the New York bar by more than 17 points.

In short, if you have a question about why a school moved up or down in the rankings, it can usually be distilled into “employment and bar passage.” And if methodological changes are coming, the most likely targets will be these areas, where compression and volatility can lead to surprising changes year over year.