Recent trends in law school lateral hiring, 2019-2024

I recently pulled data from Professor Brian Leiter’s extraordinarily helpful list of law school hires. I looked at the last six years, 2019-2024, to see if there were any interesting trends. His reports capture the vast majority of law school lateral hiring, but perhaps misses a few. I tried to clean the data as best I could. This included de-duping, removing hires who changed their minds, and identifying the right year for a hire.

There are 706 laterals in the data set. There has been a sharp uptick in lateral hires, from 68 in 2019, to 99 in 2020, up to 153 in 2022 and 155 in 2023, tapering off a bit last year.

It’s also worth noting a significant amount of laterals do not end up in a U.S. law school, or did not come from a U.S. law school. Many land as university presidents or provosts, or into other departments, or into foreign schools. I report 617 coming from U.S. law schools and 657 going to U.S. law schools.

Of course, some of those laterals are law deans coming and going, which are different in kind, but I didn’t differentiate among those types.

Schools with the biggest migration out:

Brooklyn 11
Florida 11
Irvine 11
Duke 10
UCLA 10
Alabama 9
American 9
Arkansas 9
Colorado 9
Georgia 9
Houston 8
Ohio State 8
Penn State University Park 8
USC 8

And schools with the biggest migration in:

Boston Univ. 17
Virginia 17
Florida 16
Irvine 16
Emory 15
Georgetown 14
Michigan 14
UCLA 14
Berkeley 12
Texas A&M 11
USC 11
Brooklyn 10
Columbia 10
Wayne State 10

A few schools appear on both lists. A few others stand out (Boston University, Virginia, and Michigan) for some rather significant numbers of hires in recent years.

There are assuredly subtleties to these figures—for instance, as a percentage of overall faculty, it may be a large or small percentage.

Among top 100-ish schools that saw zero laterals out in six years, there were four: Harvard, NYU, Baylor, and Catholic. (Baylor is also distinctive in having zero laterals out and zero laterals in.)

Below is the aggregate data for the top 100-ish schools. Any data entry mistakes are my own!

Out In
Stanford 3 6
Chicago 7 8
Yale 1 6
Virginia 5 17
Penn 6 9
Harvard 0 9
Michigan 3 14
Duke 10 9
Northwestern 4 9
Columbia 3 10
NYU 0 5
UCLA 10 14
Berkeley 6 12
Vanderbilt 3 3
Washington Univ. 6 8
Georgetown 5 14
Texas 5 9
North Carolina 3 6
Cornell 6 5
Notre Dame 5 4
Minnesota 7 7
Boston Univ. 7 17
Wake Forest 5 5
Georgia 9 3
USC 8 11
Texas A&M 5 11
Boston College 3 6
Florida 11 16
William & Mary 5 5
Alabama 9 5
Ohio State 8 9
George Mason 4 3
BYU 2 0
Washington & Lee 6 5
Utah 6 4
Irvine 11 16
Florida State 6 5
Iowa 7 9
George Washington 6 9
Emory 6 15
Baylor 0 0
Fordham 4 9
SMU 4 1
Arizona State 6 5
Wisconsin 4 6
Illinois 2 2
Colorado 9 9
Indiana 7 6
Villanova 3 3
Davis 5 4
Connecticut 6 3
Pepperdine 2 0
Kansas 3 2
Washington 5 2
Temple 3 8
Tennessee 1 2
San Diego 3 2
Missouri 4 4
Penn State University Park 8 4
Arizona 4 3
Penn State Dickinson 3 5
Oklahoma 6 8
Maryland 3 7
Wayne State 3 10
Kentucky 3 1
Loyola Los Angeles 4 4
Pittsburgh 5 5
Houston 8 2
Cardozo 6 8
South Carolina 4 2
UNLV 2 1
Cincinnati 4 4
St. John's 7 8
Tulane 3 4
Seton Hall 4 4
Nebraska 5 1
Catholic 0 2
Northeastern 5 7
Florida International 5 1
Richmond 2 2
LSU 3 2
Drexel 2 1
Georgia State 2 1
Maine 4 0
Loyola Chicago 3 6
Belmont 1 0
Marquette 2 1
Texas Tech 2 2
Miami 6 6
Denver 5 3
UC Law SF 5 3
Drake 1 1
Duquesne 3 0
Stetson 1 0
Lewis & Clark 1 3
Oregon 1 1
Saint Louis 4 7
Chapman 1 0
American 9 6
Buffalo 5 3
Dayton 2 0
Rutgers 4 9

Some figures are lightly revised as schools share new information with me.

Four (unlikely) ways the 2024 presidential election ends up in the House of Representatives

Following up on a post I wrote in 2020, there’s been some discussion that the 2024 presidential election could be thrown to the House of Representatives.

But how does this work? And how likely is it?

It happens when no candidate wins a majority of the Electoral College. The House (the new House, which is sworn in January 3, then joins the Senate to count electoral votes on January 6) then chooses among the top three vote-getters, with each state casting one vote. Vermont gets one vote; California gets one vote. It takes a majority (here, 26 states) to choose the next president. As occurred historically, a tie vote in a state’s delegation (say, one state with 26 representatives is 13-13) did not count toward that majority.

A so-called “contingent election” is rare. It happened in 1800, when it took 36 votes in the House before Thomas Jefferson was chosen as President. Since the Twelfth Amendment, it happened only once, after the 1824 election, when Andrew Jackson won a plurality of the electoral vote but John Quincy Adams carried the House vote in the contingent election. (The vice presidential election of 1836 was also thrown to the Senate.)

So, how can it happen? Briefly, there are four ways to look at it (with some sub-scenarios noted, and some even more unusual outliers omitted).

First, there’s a tie in the Electoral College. The 12th Amendment requires that the president receive “a majority of the whole number of electors appointed.” If two candidates tie at 269-269, the House chooses between those two candidates.

When did this last happen? Since the Twelfth Amendment, which separated presidential and vice presidential votes, never. (A tie did happen in 1800 under different presidential election rules.)

How is this scenario possible? Presidential electors are based on each state’s Senate and House delegation. The Senate always has an even number of Senators, because each state receives two. The House is currently fixed at 435 members, an odd number. The District of Columbia is guaranteed a number of presidential electors, but no more than the least populous state (which, at the moment, is three, two senators plus one representative). Even number (Senate) + odd number (House) + odd number (DC) = even number. (We could increase the size of the House to 436….)

What are the odds? Very low. Nate Silver, for instance, puts the odds of no one winning a majority (which includes a tie scenario and others, below) at less than 1 in 200.

Second, three or more candidates divide up presidential electoral votes on Election Day, and no one gets a majority.

When did this last happen? In 1824, four presidential candidates divided up the electoral votes. The top three vote-getters were then sent to the House. While Andrew Jackson had 99 electoral votes to John Quincy Adams’s 83 (but neither crossed 131, the number needed for a majority), the House ultimately backed Adams.

How is this scenario possible? It requires one or more strong third-party candidates. Because all states award their presidential electors on a winner-take-all basis (except for Maine and Nebraska, where it’s winner-take-all for two statewide, and winner-take-all, or really winner-take-each, per congressional district), a third-party candidate would need more votes than both the Republican and Democratic candidates in a state, and end up depriving those candidates of a majority in the Electoral College. Strong third-party candidates like Ross Perot in 1992 won zero electoral votes. Others, like George Wallace in 1968, won a substantial number of electoral votes but did not deprive a candidate of the majority in the Electoral College.

What are the odds? Very low—and here I’ll add, exceedingly low. I’ve seen no state polling to suggest that any third-party candidate is close to exceeding even 5% of the statewide popular vote total in any state. That is particularly true since the once-viable Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has withdrawn from the race.

Third, faithless presidential electors deprive the apparent majority-winner of electoral votes, and no one gets a majority.

When did this last happen? Never.

How is this scenario possible? When we vote for the president and vice president on Election Day, we’re actually voting for a slate of presidential electors who later formally vote for president and vice president. Those electors are typically “faithful” to the popular will of the people of the state. Sometimes, however, electors vote for someone else, behaving as “faithless” electors. Historically, however, faithless electors have been rare. They’ve been rarer still to defect from the majority vote-getter to someone else. A few years ago, the Supreme Court in Chiafalo approved of state moves to cabin the discretion of presidential electors. And the faithless electors in 2016 likely have prompted the parties to look closely at how they vet electors in 2020. So there aren’t many faithless electors in the first place, and by law there cannot be in some places.

What are the odds? Very low, likely exceedingly low. It requires a narrow electoral vote victory (certainly plausible), and faithless electors denying a majority (not just faithless electors generally). If the margin is 275-263, for instance—a seemingly-close election—you’d need six faithless electors from the winning candidate to defect to someone else. And Chiafalo reduces those odds further.

Fourth, the House rejects some number of electoral votes that denies any candidate of a majority.

When did this last happen? Never.

How is this scenario possible? There are a few ways it could occur, because Congress formally counts the vote. A state might not send electors to Congress (which seems unlikely in the present day). It could send a slate of electors, but Congress refuses to count them (like it did in Louisiana in 1872)—perhaps because Congress deems the votes not “regularly given.” It could choose between multiple slates of electors (which has only happened once since 1876, Hawaii in 1960), and end up with a tie (which has never happened). One wrinkle is that the winning candidate under the Twelfth Amendment is among those from “a majority of the whole number of electors appointed” (emphasis added). If Congress throws out votes, it depends on whether it includes those votes in the denominator of “electors appointed.” (In other words, if it throws out 20 electoral votes, it might go from a majority requirement of 270 of 538, to 270 of 538—with 20 votes not counting—or, instead, and easier to meet, 260 of 518.) In short, there are a number of complicated things that might happen in Congress, which would be unusual and historic decisions in Congress.

Congress has also clarified under the Electoral Count Reform Act that is a state refuses to send its electors to Congress or if its votes are not “regularly given,” those votes also come out of the denominator. In other words, it becomes harder to “throw” the election to the House on this basis, because you would need to have a much larger margin. It is instead more likely that one candidate or another simply holds a majority (unless they happen to tie). Throwing out the winning candidate’s votes because Congress concludes the candidate is not qualified, however, creates the greater risk of an election being sent to the House.

What are the odds? Well, again, likely on the verge of exceedingly low. It takes a majority of both houses of Congress to vote to throw out votes. Congress has been reluctant to throw out electoral votes since Reconstruction. Recent attempts to do so in Congress—Florida in 2000, Ohio in 2004, and a slate of states in 2016 and in 2020—lacked even modest support in Congress (only Ohio 2004, and Arizona and Pennsylvania 2020, went to a congressional vote, where objections were soundly defeated and the votes were counted). It all depends on the complexity of the decisions left to Congress and Congress’s trust in the electoral outcomes—all with the added condition that these decisions ultimately deny any candidate a majority.

*

In short, the 2024 presidential election could end up in the House, as it could have done for any presidential election in the last 200 years. There are plausible reasons to think up any one of these scenarios. But, I think, it’s worth thinking through, with some precision about these scenarios, and how they may or may not occur.

Multistate Bar Exam scores for July 2024 rebound to highest level since 2013

The Multistate Bar Exam scores for July 2024 have been released, and they show promising signs. The mean scaled score is a 141.8, the highest since 2013’s 144.3 (before the grim numbers that started in 2014). That score is slightly higher than some other recent years (2014’s 141.5 and 2017’s 141.7), but a good bit higher than the 139- and 140-range scores in some other recent years.

We are now through the COVID-19 pandemic cohort, so the vast majority of Class of 2024 students taking the July 2024 exam had in-person instruction and a somewhat “normal” legal education experience. But it’s hard to draw many conclusions from small cohorts like this.

The figures suggest overall bar passage rates will increase in most jurisdictions. That may also portend slightly stronger employment outcomes for some students. Time will tell.

Law students, you can (and, maybe increasingly, should) say "no" to (some) judicial clerkships

A generation ago, a typical federal judicial clerkship experience looked like this:

A student would graduate from law school around May and begin a one-year (or sometimes two-year) clerkship in August. The graduate would then enter into legal practice—a firm, the government, or public interest practice—and begin a career in the second or third year out of law school. The graduate might have to move twice (to a clerkship, and then to a job) as opposed to once (to a job). The graduate at 25 years of age might begin the “ordinary” legal career at 26 (or 27). The clerkship was a “learning” opportunity—judges mentored clerks and helped develop their writing in that first year out of law school. (This was a system common in state courts, too.)

The system has radically changed in a generation.

Total placement into federal judicial clerkships among recent graduates has slid roughly 10% in the last decade.

And that’s despite the fact that the federal judiciary is very well staffed—judicial vacancies peaked around 2018, but they at recent stable lows and consistent with staffing a decade ago.

That means a comparable number of federal judges are hiring fewer recent law school graduates.

So, how are they filling positions? It could be an uptick in career clerks, but that doesn’t appear to be all of it.

A generation ago, virtually all Supreme Court clerks had just one prior clerkship experience. Now, nearly all of them have two, and sometimes three, clerkship experiences. We’re starting to see “stacking” of clerkships as an increasingly common practice. More students than ever are clerking for multiple federal judges. And more are clerking after graduation. Yale Law, for instance, has gone so far as to include an asterisk beside its clerkship statistics to add the number of clerkships for graduates that begin after graduation. For the Class of 2022, that’s 51 among graduates and another 30 after graduation. That was 42 and 43 for the Class of 2021—yes, more graduates had clerkships that began at least one year after graduating than in that initial year.

These two practices appear to be diverging by the type of judge. And here, this is something more anecdotal to report. And this report is overwhelmingly about court of appeals judges, a smaller cohort of all federal judges but who tend to hire three or four clerks each year as opposed to one or two more common for district courts.

Republican-appointed judges, particularly those appointed by President Trump, have had a fairly aggressive hiring plan. They have increasingly relied on interviewing and hiring first-year law students—and sometimes hiring them not for immediately after graduation but for some years out. And they are increasingly interested in “stacking” clerkships, as many of them are young, ambitious, and style themselves “feeders.” Given how many of them have appeared on one of Trump’s many “lists” of potential Supreme Court nominees, it is not a great surprise that they are vying over a small pool of clerks—not just outstanding students, but sufficiently credentialed to be potential Supreme Court clerks. It also reflects some desire to hire clerks who have already been trained elsewhere—in effect, making the job more efficient for the judge, who can spend less time “training” the clerk and more time managing the clerk’s work product.

Democratic-appointed judges, particularly those appointed by President Biden, have stuck more closely to the “plan,” which means that students must have at least two years of grades before being considered. But these judges increasingly prefer work experience—which means, hiring fewer clerks directly out of law school. They are not as aggressively “stacking,” but there are more appellate+district clerks than a generation ago (whereas many Republican judges are moving toward appellate+appellate clerks), although the combinations can of course vary. Like the Republican-appointed judges, hiring clerks with more work experience is more efficient.

This change has shifted a lot of costs.

For one, judges used to play a greater role as mentors training new law school graduates. If law school graduates are starting their careers elsewhere before clerking for a judge, the model has shifted away from that judge-led training and mentorship model. Not entirely, of course—clerks who are only a year or two removed from law school still have much to learn. But there is an expectation that the earliest training may well happen elsewhere. Sometimes that’s other judges. And sometimes that’s law firms. I suppose as long as law firms are willing to accept that role—spending the earliest years training and seeing those associates (who cannot practically be staffed on major long-term matters) leave for a clerkship (or two or three), perhaps to return—then the model will work.

For another, judges often had clerks serve as “ambassadors” for their chambers, and for the bench more generally, as attorneys go practice in the legal profession. If “stacking” is increasingly common, then there are simply fewer such ambassadors out in the world.

And a major cost is on law school graduates. At the beginning, I noted that 25-year-old graduates might move twice after graduating law school and begin their careers at 26. Now, the expectation is increasingly to move three or four times and push of the true beginning of a career path until perhaps 30, depending on how many years the interim jobs take place. And that can of course be later for students who are not 25 but older, who perhaps took a few years off between college and law school.

This is a significant burden for law school graduates. The moving costs are high. The pressure to postpone personal or family decisions given the itinerant nature of serial jobs is significant (a point I’ve raised relatedly in the law school teaching market, too).

The opportunity and financial costs of missing or disrupting years of typical legal service can be high. On the financial front, it used to be a generation ago that starting salaries were $160,000 (excluding bonuses) and a clerkship salary was around $50,000 with an expected bonus of $50,000. That gap has widened significantly. Starting salaries are now $225,000 (excluding bonuses) and a clerkship salary is around $65,000 with an expected bonus of $75,000 (potentially more for multiple clerkships).

But a graduate who clerks for three judges enters as fourth-year associate… essentially has the litigation skills of a first-year associate and a long ramp-up. Yes, a graduate can hit the ground running and ramp up more quickly than a first-year associate. But some skills (including navigating firm culture, and building trust and relationships with clients) cannot be short circuited. A graduate who works at a firm for a year or two, then heads off to clerk for a couple of judges before returning, likewise returns as a fourth- or fifth-year associate with a kind of soft reboot at the firm. And at some firms, non-share partnership arises in the sixth or seventh year, and pressure to perform well in a shorter period of time is high. Client development is trickier if grads are serially clerking or interrupting their practice to clerk.

For first generation law school graduates, these pressures can be particularly acute. They are navigating the legal profession with greater uncertainty, and they have the opportunity to make substantial money in practice, but then face countervailing pressure to give that opportunity up and move, perhaps repeatedly, with increasing uncertainty—and increasing questions about the value proposition.

It would be interesting if NALP or some other researcher could track future longitudinal outcomes of judicial clerks. Does stacking clerkships reduce the likelihood that someone remains in “big law” or makes partner? Or, maybe my intuition is wrong and it has no effect. Does it means people are more likely to head into government or become a judge themselves sometime? What are the longitudinal effects that we can expect?

But law students do need to ask hard questions. The first is, what’s the value of the clerkship? It is valuable, to be sure. It is the experience, the credential, seeing what goes on inside a judicial chambers. But students might want to ask hard questions about the value add of a second or third clerkship. Does the varied experience of district v. appellate or state v. federal offer enough potential value, or is the incremental benefit much smaller after having worked in a judicial chambers? Is being connected to two sets of judicial clerk alumni in their network of sufficient value? What are the lifestyle costs for family or personal life if these one-year serial positions in different cities stack up? If I want to clerk for the Supreme Court, what are my true odds in getting there with a third as opposed to just two clerkships, or a second as opposed to just one? What opportunity costs am I losing at my law firm, and am I willing to give that up?

Career development offices have every incentive to place students into clerkships. Students have great desire to obtain clerkships. Judges want the most capable and qualified candidates.

But we may be at a breaking point for the current system. Students should be asking hard questions, the kind of questions that didn’t need to happen a generation ago. Students can—and sometimes should—say no to certain clerkships. There are material tradeoffs worth considering. (And for more, see former Judge Gregg Costa, here.) But they are hard tradeoffs, and ones not always intuitive to law students barely a semester into law school.

I’m sure this post will not be popular with judges. But, on the flip side, I might suggest that law students in 2024 have much more to consider when committing to a job that takes them into the year 2030, and perhaps some recallibration is in order.

UPDATE August 2, 2024: I’m very grateful for the extended feedback I’ve received on the post, with a lot of mixed feelings! I thought a few additional thoughts might be in order.

First, as I emphasize, I think judicial clerkships are a great thing! I think they add tremendous value for the bulk of law students, particularly those who are interested in litigation. As I write, “It is valuable, to be sure. It is the experience, the credential, seeing what goes on inside a judicial chambers.” Do not lose sight of the good things! The post, however, focuses on “some” clerkships, particularly stacking clerkships, and some of the tradeoffs that come.

Second, I think the decision of many judges to move away from hiring new grads to grads with work experience is a suboptimal thing. I highlight some of the reasons for the tradeoffs in the post, and I entirely understand why judges would prefer to do it. But I think it is worth exploring—in another lengthy blog post, perhaps!—about what the temporary clerkship role is and what it ought to be. That is, what is the reason for temporary as opposed to career clerks? What is the mentorship that is expected, or preferred, in the temporary role, if any? It’s another heavy exchange worth considering.

Third, things are heavily context-specific. It is quite possible that a second or third clerkship, stacking clerkships, moving frequently, will be good things for you in your individualized situation. But, I think, the value is probably less than many anticipate, and there are hard questions and tradeoffs that should be asked and answered. I cannot give complete guidance because every situation is different—quite literally idiosyncratic. But it is worth having an honest conversation, and I think these are some of the questions that can help students figure things out.

Fourth, it would be nice to have a lot more data than the limited data sets I have and the anecdotal compilations I have here. It would be nice to know how students with one clerkship v. multiple feel about it after the fact. It would be nice to track their careers. It would be nice to evaluate whether clerking immediately after graduation or taking time to work is helpful. It would be nice to know if people didn’t have to move but could clerk in the same city as their job, or clerk twice in the same city, made the experience better. I just don’t know. But these are questions that, I think, are worth asking and exploring.

How did more than 30 law schools survive class actions concerning allegations of misrepresentations in employment statistics?

The third in an occasional series I call “dire predictions.”

March 2012 was a turning point for law schools. 14 law schools were facing consumer protection class actions on allegations that they misrepresented their employment statistics, deceiving prospective law students and current law students on the value proposition of a legal degree.

From a feature in February 2012 in New York Magazine’s “Intelligencer”:

“We believe that some in the legal academy have done a disservice to the profession and the nation by saddling tens of thousands of young lawyers with massive debt for a degree worth far less than advertised,” David Anziska, wrote in a statement today. “[I]t is time for the schools to take responsibility, provide compensation and commit to transparency. These lawsuits are only the beginning.”

So do Anziska, Strauss, and Raimond actually have a shot at making these lawsuits stick? Well, yes, says Paul Campos, a professor at the University of Colorado Law School — particularly if the law schools are compelled to turn over their internal job placement data, which could prove so embarrassing that the law schools would decide to settle with the plaintiffs.

From a lengthy feature in March 2012 by the same author in New York Magazine:

It’s not yet clear whether the lawyers have proof that NYLS and the other defendants are cooking their numbers. What they do have is at least one favorable precedent: Last year, San Francisco’s California Culinary Academy was sued for misleading applicants about their chances of landing gainful employment in the gastronomic arts, leading to a settlement under which the school reportedly issued tuition refunds to as many as 8,000 students. Anziska, Raimond, and Strauss hope to use the discovery process to compel their targets to turn over all their internal data on their graduates’ livelihoods and to see how that data squares with the claims posted on websites and in recruiting literature—or, barring that, to show that the schools aren’t really trying to keep complete, accurate figures to begin with.

“In that case, the schools will have to disclose a lot of potentially embarrassing information,” predicts University of Colorado law professor Paul Campos, a prominent skeptic of law schools’ self-reported placement numbers. That is, if the schools don’t cut deals to make their cases go away. As you learn in Intro to Civil Procedure, lawyers can win without going all the way to trial.

As of March 15, 2012, the plaintiffs announced they’d file claims against “20 more law schools,” in addition to the first 14.

But that never happened. Those 20 schools were never sued.

And by March 21, 2012, a decidedly different result came from a New York court:

A state judge on Wednesday threw out a class-action lawsuit against New York Law School, one of the first of 15 schools hauled into court for allegedly inflating their job-placement and salary statistics to attract applicants.

The sweeping ruling, which could have an effect on the 14 other lawsuits filed since last summer and 20 others that have since been threatened, was issued by Judge Melvin L. Schweitzer, of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (a trial-level court in spite of its name).

In a 36-page ruling, the judge found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the law school had misled them "in a material way." Judge Schweitzer also said applicants to New York Law School had plenty of information available to them about their realistic chances of getting a job.

Courts continued to reject these claims. None of these lawsuits “stuck.”

Winning the press release (i.e., the filing of a complaint) is quite different from getting to the merits—much less surviving the motion to dismiss stage. And it turns out that legal education is quite different as a value proposition than, say, culinary school.

That’s not to say all schools made it out of the recession unscathed. Many closed. But losses in the class action domain never materialized.

Projecting the 2025-2026 USNWR law school rankings (to be released March 2025 or so)

Fifty-eight percent of the new USNWR law school rankings turn on three highly-volatile categories: employment 10 months after graduation, first-time bar passage, and ultimate bar passage. USNWR has tried to smooth these out by using a two-year average of these scores. (Next year, it might well use a three-year average or three-year weighted average.)

Because USNWR releases its rankings in the spring, at the same time the ABA releases new data on these categories, the USNWR law school rankings are always a year behind. This year’s data include the ultimate bar passage rate for the Classes of 2019 and 2020, the first-time bar passage rate for the Classes of 2021 and 2022, and the employment outcomes of the Classes of 2021 and 2022

We can quickly update all that data with this year’s data (as I made an effort to do, with some modest success, early last year). And given that the other 42% of the rankings are much less volatile, we can simply assume this year’s data for next year’s and have, within a couple of ranking slots or so, a very good idea of where law schools will be. (Of course, USNWR is free to tweak its methodology once again next year. Some volatility makes sense, because it reflects responsiveness to new data and changed conditions; too much volatility tends to undermine the credibility of the rankings as it would point toward arbitrary criteria and weights that do not meaningfully reflect changes at schools year over year.) Some schools, of course, will see significant changes to LSAT medians, UGPA medians, student-faculty ratios, and so on relative to peers. Some schools have significantly increased school-funded positions after the change in USNWR methodology. And the peer scores may be slightly more volatile than years. Likewise, lawyer and judge scoring of law schools appears to be more significantly adversely affecting the most elite law schools, and that trend may continue.

But, again, this is a first, rough cut of what the new (and volatile) methodology may yield. High volatility and compression mean bigger swings in any given year. Additionally, it means that smaller classes are more susceptible to larger swings (e.g., a couple of graduates whose bar or employment outcomes change are more likely to change the school’s position than larger schools).

If you are inclined to ask, “How could school X move up/down so much?” the answer is, bar and employment, bar and employment, bar and employment.

Here’s the early projections. (Where there are ties, they are sorted by score, which is not reported here.)

UPDATE: I continue to have difficulty assessing Wisconsin’s two law schools due to diploma privilege and how USNWR purports to measure bar passage statistics, so their rankings may be lower than would be expected.

School Projected Rank This Year's Rank
Stanford 1 1
Chicago 2 3
Yale 3 1
Virginia 3 4
Penn 5 4
Harvard 5 4
Michigan 7 9
Duke 7 4
Northwestern 9 9
Columbia 9 8
NYU 9 9
UCLA 12 13
Berkeley 13 12
Vanderbilt 14 19
Washington Univ. 14 16
Georgetown 14 14
Texas 14 16
North Carolina 18 20
Cornell 18 14
Notre Dame 20 20
Minnesota 21 16
Boston Univ. 22 24
Wake Forest 22 25
Georgia 24 20
USC 24 20
Texas A&M 24 26
Boston College 27 28
Florida 28 28
William & Mary 29 36
Alabama 29 33
Ohio State 29 26
George Mason 29 28
BYU 33 28
Washington & Lee 33 33
Utah 33 28
Irvine 33 42
Florida State 37 48
Iowa 37 36
George Washington 37 41
Emory 40 42
Baylor 40 46
Fordham 40 33
SMU 43 42
Arizona State 43 36
Wisconsin 45 36
Illinois 45 36
Colorado 45 48
Indiana-Bloomington 48 42
Villanova 48 48
Davis 48 55
Connecticut 48 55
Pepperdine 52 52
Kansas 52 46
Washington 52 48
Temple 52 54
Tennessee 56 52
San Diego 56 68
Missouri 58 61
Penn State Law 58 68
Arizona 58 55
Penn State-Dickinson 58 75
Oklahoma 58 55
Maryland 63 55
Wayne State 63 55
Kentucky 65 61
Loyola-Los Angeles 65 61
Pitt 65 91
Houston 65 68
Cardozo 65 61
South Carolina 65 66
UNLV 71 78
Cincinnati 71 78
St. John's 71 68
Tulane 71 78
Seton Hall 71 61
Nebraska 71 82
Catholic 71 94
Northeastern 71 68
Florida International 71 68
Richmond 80 66
LSU 80 91
Drexel 80 75
Georgia State 80 75
Maine 84 120
Loyola-Chicago 84 78
Belmont 86 91
Marquette 86 68
Texas Tech 88 82
Miami 88 82
Denver 88 89
UC Law-SF 88 82
Drake 92 82
Duquesne 92 94
Stetson 92 98
Lewis & Clark 95 82
Oregon 95 82
St. Louis 95 94
Chapman 98 108
American 98 98
Buffalo 98 108
Dayton 98 108
Rutgers 98 103
This content was stolen from ExcessOfDemocracy.com

(Any mistakes are my own. One data collection note. I often transpose some schools due to inconsistencies in how the ABA reports school names. Schools beginning with Chicago, Saint, South, or Widener are most susceptible to these inconsistencies.)

Will an earlier big law firm recruiting calendar change the market for prospective law school transfer students?

Back in 2018, the National Association for Law Placement loosened some of its calendar and deadlines for on-campus recruiting for law schools and law students. The concern was largely antitrust, coordinating behavior from large law firms that could affect the labor market. Law firms continued the inertia from early practices, but they also began to move recruiting earlier: on-campus interviews (OCI) still happened in fall of 2L, but some were moving to August or flirting with summer dates. The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 helped accelerate the move: rather than investing in laborious and time-intensive OCI, screening interviews could happen quickly over Zoom, and could be pushed earlier into the summer.

This inevitable unraveling continues. Bloomberg reports that some OCI is moving to spring 1L year. The bulk of OCI will be be complete at many firms by July 1, although many will still have some spots available for later placement, but surely a minority of spots.

This is, on the whole, bad for law students, as one semester of grades, minimal writing samples, no appearance on journal, and the like make for thin resumes. Employers likely will increasingly rely on proxies like undergraduate institutions and undergraduate grades. Relatedly, it can create additional pressure for first generation law students, who may not be as attuned to how early the law firm hiring process takes place and might miss opportunities that students with attorneys in the family might know about. It puts pressure on schools to have additional education and career development awareness (perhaps with more such staff) for students.

But an interesting Reddit thread raised a different concern. How does this change in market affect transfer students?

One of the big perks of students transferring “up,” if you will, is taking advantage of the new school’s OCI. If your new school has more robust OCI opportunities for the fall of 2L year, it redounds to your benefit to transfer and take advantage of them immediately. Students often give up significant scholarships at lower-ranked schools to take on significant debt at higher-ranked schools. Part of that tradeoff is the benefits of OCI.

But what if OCI moves to spring of 1L or that early summer of 1L year—well before transfer applications are accepted and completed? The benefits of OCI would seem to be lost—as would a major reason to take on additional debt, switch schools (and sometimes moving states), and transfer.

To be sure, there are other benefits of a school—the alumni network, the reputation benefits, and so on. There are many reasons a transfer might be deemed beneficial. But if one of the major reasons for transferring disappears, I wonder if we might see a change in student behavior. And for schools that have previously heavily relied on transfer students for budgetary purposes or to keep 1L admissions classes look a certain way for LSAT and UGPA medians, it could be quite disruptive.

This might be why more schools are moving to early transfer applications, too. If schools realize that the benefits for transferring students are moving earlier, they need to incentivize students to apply earlier, accept them earlier, and give them the potential benefits earlier.

It might also be why we see declining transfer applications overall as well. But there are many market forces at work (a good economy for a few years makes the urgency for transferring less, I would assume), and it’s possible this changes as we see softening recruitment.

It’s one interesting relationship between two things I hadn’t thought much about (the moving OCI window and the transfer market), and one I’ll be watching in the years ahead.

One-point increase in student loan rates could cost new law school graduates tens of thousands of dollars in added debt

CNBC reports the new student loan interest rate figures, and they are pretty dire for higher education in general and law schools in particular:

For graduate students, loans will probably come with a 8% interest rate, compared with 7% now, he said.

Plus loans for graduate students and parents may have a 9% interest rate, an increase from 8%.

From a simple student loan calculator, we can make some estimates on debt and repayment. $150,000 in student loans ($50,000 per year) at 7% interest results in around $90,000 in total interest. That jumps to $105,000 in total interest if the rate is 8%. That’s an extra $15,000 in interest (and debt), hidden from students at the outset of the loan, and that does not redound to the benefit of the law school.

On $75,000 per year in student loans ($225,000 in total), interest jumps from $135,000 to $158,000, an increase of $23,000.

Even more modest debt, like $25,000 per year ($75,000 in total) sees interest jump to from $45,000 to $53,000, although $8000 is much more manageable increase.

(These figures of course are exacerbated by another hidden cost, the ending of subsidized graduate student loans in 2011, which allows interest to accrue during law school.)

Student debt loads reported by the Department of Education can factor in these interest figures, and they can be helpful in assessing which programs see some of the highest debt loads upon graduation (and shortly after graduation), along with salary data.

But it makes a robust economy (as big law firm salaries are $215,000 to start and big law hiring remains high, for now, but is on the down slope), and a school’s robust loan repayment assistance program (LRAP), all the more important for legal education. But as a hidden cost, it requires some foresight from law schools to anticipate and prepare for the challenges ahead.

Which law schools saw the biggest changes in employment placement after USNWR gave "full weight" to new categories of jobs?

Back in 2016, I noted how a lot of law school-funded positions “dried up” once USNWR stopped giving those jobs “full weight” in its law school rankings. Yes, correlation does not equal causation. And yes, there were other contributing causes (e.g., changes in how the ABA required reporting of such positions). But the trend was stark and the timing noteworthy.

The trend is likewise stark, at least in one category.

USNWR is now giving weight to full-time, long-term (1 year or longer) bar passage-required and J.D. advantage jobs funded by law schools. It is also giving weight to those enrolled full time in a graduate degree program.

In two categories, graduate degree and bar passage-required, there were not significant variances from previous years. For bar passage-required jobs, that is perhaps understandable. Such positions have hovered between 200 and 300 for several years (239 last year, 212 the year before), and they are really driven by a handful of schools that can sustain a kind of “bridge” program for students interest in public interest work.

For graduate degree, it actually hit an all-time low since reporting began—just 344, down from 375 last year, and down from the record 1231 for the Class of 2010. I had thought this might be a tempting position for schools to press students into to give them “full weight” positions for USNWR purposes. Not so.

But the one category that did stand out was J.D. advantage jobs funded by the school. Here, again, we are in an incredible small category of jobs—just 97 for the Class of 2023, only one quarter of one percent of all jobs. (And again, it’s worth noting, even though these three categories combine for less than 700 graduates among 35,000 graduates, it was one of the leading charges of the pro-”boycott” law schools.) But there is a marked uptick, returning to a pre-2015 high.

We also know that not all these jobs are randomly distributed. They can be concentrated at some schools. We can also try to identify if some schools saw a marked rise in these three categories of jobs last year. But of course, there can be volatility from year to year in any particular category.

I looked at the 2020, 2021, and 2022 average of law schools’ output into these three categories of previously-lesser weight employment outcomes. I then compared to see how the placement in the Class of 2023 compared to the previous three-year average in these combined categories. The top 15 schools are listed below.

Employment placement in full time, long term, bar passage required or JD advantage jobs funded by the school or in graduate degree programs
SchoolName 2020-2022 avg 2023 Delta
PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY 2.2% 8.2% 6.0
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 0.6% 4.8% 4.2
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA 0.0% 3.7% 3.7
ARKANSAS, LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF 2.2% 5.7% 3.5
YALE UNIVERSITY 11.7% 15.2% 3.4
WASHBURN UNIVERSITY 0.0% 3.3% 3.3
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 1.2% 4.3% 3.1
SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF 0.4% 3.4% 3.0
CORNELL UNIVERSITY 1.9% 4.6% 2.7
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY 0.3% 2.9% 2.7
ARKANSAS, FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF 3.3% 5.9% 2.6
MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF 2.5% 5.0% 2.4
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY 1.0% 3.3% 2.3
UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO-SUNY 0.3% 2.5% 2.3
WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF 1.2% 3.5% 2.3

As I wrote back in 2016, correlation is not causation, and there are of course confounding variables and factors in place at any given institution. But there’s no question the change in “full weight” categories by USNWR comes at a time when some schools are undergoing material changes to their typical employment outcomes in categories that previously did not receive “full weight” but now do. And while many of these figures appear to be small changes, we know that very small changes in the new methodology can yield big differences: “By shifting about 3 percentage points of a class from “unemployed” to a “full weight” job (in a school of 200, that’s 6 students), a school can move from being ranked about 100 in that category to 50.” (Note: this effect is somewhat diluted as it is a two-year employment average, but if the same thing happens year over year, the effects will remain the same.)

As the law firm hiring market slows down, I’ll be watching the overall trends and the individual trends for the Class of 2024 in particular.