Select posts from the Election Law Blog in 2021

After 50% drop in 1L academic dismissals in 2020, little increase in 2L academic dismissals in 2021

Last year, I flagged the sharp decline in 1L academic dismissals in 2020. 1L academic dismissals declined by more than 50%. I wondered if moving to pass-fail grading made schools reluctant to academically evaluate 1Ls with typical academic dismissal, and I wondered if we’d see an increase in 2L academic dismissals this year.

Cumulative 1L academic attrition rebounded to its 2019 level. But 2L academic attrition rose only slightly compared to 2020 and remained below 2019. (I also include “other” attrition, which includes withdrawals among other catch-call categories, for some comparison, too.)

  1L Attrition 2L Attrition
Acadmic Other Academic Other
2019 1186 219 1012 241
2020 545 113 841 240
2021 1113 296 940 309

In short, it seems a good number of 1Ls reaped a benefit of pass-fail grading in the Spring 2020 and avoided academic dismissal. That’s great news for 1Ls who spent 2 years in law school and can finish their third year to earn a JD. On the back end, it remains to be seen whether these students have more difficulty passing the bar exam. But it doesn’t appear most schools returned to now-2Ls to revisit their academic performance.

Law school 1L JD enrollment climbs to 9-year high as non-JD enrollment dips slightly

The 2020 law school enrollment figures have been released. They show the best first-year JD enrollment in a long time and a bit of a drop in non-JD enrollment. About 15% of law school enrollees are not enrolled in a JD program.

For the last seven years, 1L JD enrollment has been between 37,000 and 38,500, remarkable consistency. This year, it’s up to 41,710. That’s the biggest class since 2012-2013, which had an incoming class of 44,481. increase in the quality and quantity of applicants surely fueled the growth.

Total JD enrollment also increased slightly to 117,501, the highest figure since 119,775 in 2014-2015 (but still well off the peak of 2010-2011 with 147,525).

But non-JD enrollment is a different story. For the first time in a long time, non-JD enrollment declined. Last year, I thought pandemic-related travel restrictions coupled with some Department of Education regulations might have dampened the market for at least some foreign-educated non-JD enrollment. It might be that it’s catching up to some schools.

The ABA changed its definitions a few years ago, which resulted in a spike in reported non-JD enrollment, and despite the decline this year overall enrollment remains strong. (It’s also worth noting that those enrolled in both JD and non-JD programs simultaneously, at least in recent years, are counted in each set, so this slightly overstates, to an unknown degree, non-JD enrollment.)

21,044 were enrolled in non-JD programs, a drop of around 250 students over last year. It’s now about 15% of all law school enrollment.

Here I also highlight a handful of schools with the highest non-JD enrollment as a percentage of total law school enrollment. There are a few heavy-hitters that are driving a lot of the non-JD enrollment.

Lower California bar exam cut score yields modest increases in pass rates and decline in repeaters, but increase in attorneys appears to slow

Earlier this year, I looked at the change in California’s bar exam cut score (from 144 to 139), and what it looked like for the October 2020 bar exam. Unsurprisingly, bar passage rates jumped, especially among repeaters.

The July 2021 exam is now the third exam with the lower cut score. It’s yielded a couple of results (statistics here) that are interesting, in my view. First, repeaters have declined significantly, and pass rates for repeaters have returned to a fairly low level. Second, there has not been a significant uptick in new attorneys admitted to California this year.

Among first-time test-takers of the general bar exam who graduated from ABA-approved law schools, we’ve seen a relatively steady decline in overall test-takers. When the cut score was lowered in 2020, we saw a jump in passers. (The July 2020 exam was moved to October due to Covid-19 concerns.) The pass rate jumped from 71.7% in July 2019 to 82.4% in October 2020. It fell slightly to 78.9% this year (but still an increase, albeit a bit more modest compared to 2019). But all that’s much better than the 60-something% pass rates in July 2016, 2017, & 2018.

Over to repeaters. We saw a surge in repeaters in October 2020 among ABA-accredited schools, and a surge in those passing. Repeaters increased from 1368 in July 2019 to 1645 in October 2020. And the repeater pass rate climbed, too, from 34.6% to 49.7%. But this July, we saw a sharp decline to just 839 test-takers, and the pass rate fell to just 26.1%.

The decline in repeaters is no surprise—as more people pass the first time, we’d expect repeaters to drop, too. But the decline in the pass rate, I think, also shows that the lower cut score is sweeping in those most likely to ultimately pass. Those who are not passing with the new, lower cut score may be increasingly distant in scores, at the lower end of the bell curve if you will.

One potential benefit of the new, lower cut score would be more attorneys admitted to California, which would increase availability of attorneys and, potentially, lower costs and increase access to justice for those unable to secure representation. But it’s not clear that’s been the effect, at least not yet. Certainly, in 2020, we saw a surge in passers. But this year yielded 5568 attorneys between the February and July 2021 bar exams, across all law schools, the general bar exam and the attorneys exam, you name it. That’s down from 6906 last year, and it’s even below the 5825 in 2019.

I want to be careful here. It’s of course not all the bar exam. The economy of California, the legal market of California, cost of living concerns—there are many reasons why attorneys might be inclined to take the bar exam elsewhere. Additionally, it’s not clear how many attorneys who took the bar exam in 2020 did so to take a secondary bar (e.g., to be admitted in a state outside of the state where they primarily practice) out of convenience.

In short, there are many reasons why the legal market in California may behave outside of the bar exam. And undoubtedly, the surge in passers in 2020 is great news for law schools, for students facing debt and the delayed practice of law, for those who would ultimately pass but now are admitted on the first attempt and need not spend more time studying, and so on. Many of those who would have been admitted in 2021 on a repeat are put into the 2020 first-time bucket, essentially an acceleration of admitting attorneys that will work its way out through fewer repeaters passing later.

But it’s worth watching to see whether there’s a demonstrable increase in licensed and practicing attorneys in the state of California after the lowering of the cut score. On that, we’ll have to wait and see.

Ranking the most liberal and conservative law firms among the top 140, 2021 edition

One of my most popular posts remains “Ranking the most liberal and conservative law firms.” That post is from 2013, and an update is long overdue.

At the outset, “ranking” a firm or calling it “conservative” or “liberal” is imperfect, I know, but I picked a title eight years ago and I’m sticking with it…. Better to call it, “which law firms contribute the most to Democrats or Republicans.” But I am updating the methodology, and I look forward to doing some even more interesting things with the data in the short term.

First, I looked at 140 law firms. I broke them out into two groups. The first are the AmLaw 100. The second are a group of 40 firms that fit the NLJ500 or Legal 500 plaintiffs’ firms. (Two firms appear in both lists, Paul Weiss and Quinn Emanuel.)

Second, unlike my 2013 ranking (where I looked at contributions to Barack Obama’s or Mitt Romney’s presidential campaigns), I expanded the window. This time, I focused on contributions to the Joe Biden campaign (including “victory fund) and the Donald Trump campaign (including “victory fund” and “Make America Great Again Committee”); the major party organizations (DCCC, DSCC, DNC, NRCC, NRSC, and RNC); and two major aggregators of campaign contributions, ActBlue (Democratic) and WinRed (Republican). There’s a little asymmetry here—Trump had four years of campaigning to Biden’s shorter window, ActBlue is more established than WinRed, etc.—but I think it evens out. These accounted for about 1/3 of all campaign contributions. (Future research will look at more.) I looked at the 2017-2020 period, a four-year window.

Third, I did not look at just attorney contributions, but I looked at any contributions from those employed by these firms. (See update below.) There are often different titles for attorneys (partner, counsel, summer associate, etc.) that are self-reported and are tougher to capture. And I thought it would be useful to include all contributions, even from consultants, paralegals, administrative assistants, and others employed by the firm for a broader portrait of the firm. Again, a judgment call here. I also looked for common misspellings, abbreviations, or alternative names for the firm (e.g., separating out the two Steptoe & Johnsons, etc.) to capture the most contributions.

So, that said, I’m sure there are errors in the data, but it’s a fairly good snapshot.

All told, I captured about $61 million in contributions to Democratic-affiliated groups compared to about $11 million for Republican-affiliated groups in 2017-2020, nearly a 6-to-1 ratio. (See update below.)

Below is a visualization of the AmLaw100 law firms. (By “percentage of contributions,” I mean by dollar figures, not individual instances.)

Many firms had fewer than 10% of contributions go to major Republican outlets. A handful had at least 25%, and just three crossed 50%. Even among those the figures are deceptive. At White & Case, for instance, there was a single $500,000 contribution to the Trump Victory Fund, more than half of all Republican contributions in this four-year time period.

The 40 plaintiffs’ firms results are below (asterisks denote the second listing):

Nine of these firms had $0 in contributions to major Republican outlets in this four-year period; another 6 had less than $100. And while some firms’ contributions were relatively modest (Bernstein, for instance, logged less than $1000 in total giving to these outlets, another deceptive way of looking at this data), others had contributions in the high six figures. Two firms, however, skewed toward Republicans.

Among the ten firms that gave the most money in raw dollars to Democratic outlets (see update below):

Paul Weiss $2,084,171

Latham $1,877,357

Kirkland $1,820,246

Covington $1,794,277

Sullivan & Cromwell $1,579,112

Wilmer $1,424,903

Sidley $1,416,481

Morgan Lewis $1,352,160

Skadden $1,310,634

Boies Schiller $1,080,094

And among the ten firms that gave the most money in raw dollars to Republican outlets (note, of course, duplicates among the largest law firms, and the caveat for White & Case!):

White & Case $966,401

Kirkland $822,685

Proskauer $697,230

Gibson Dunn $468,283

McGuireWoods $383,280

Paul Weiss $353,148

Akin Gump $343,102

Womble Bond $330,725

Holland & Knight $297,266

Kasowitz Benson $291,990

Below is a table with all 138 firms (excluding the pair of duplicate listings), sorted by percentage of contributions to Democratic outlets. As I mentioned, there’s more to come in the months ahead—this is my first cut at many ways of slicing this data.

Firm D R D%
Berger Montague $563,692 $0 100.0%
Grant & Eisenhoffer $379,781 $0 100.0%
Kaplan Fox $77,572 $0 100.0%
Hagens Berman $71,775 $0 100.0%
Hausfeld $35,142 $0 100.0%
Berman Tabacco $21,182 $0 100.0%
Joseph Saveri Law $6,284 $0 100.0%
MoginRubin LLP $5,231 $0 100.0%
Bernstein Liebhard $635 $0 100.0%
Lief Cabraser $764,357 $30 100.0%
Herman, Herman $284,946 $15 100.0%
Bernstein Litowitz $205,015 $15 100.0%
Simons Hanley Conroy $424,296 $50 100.0%
Baron & Budd $472,147 $95 100.0%
Kessler Topaz $200,699 $55 100.0%
Cohen Milstein $294,106 $135 100.0%
Susman Godfrey $489,486 $500 99.9%
Seeger Weiss $131,268 $230 99.8%
Boies Schiller $1,080,094 $2,045 99.8%
Burg Simpson Eldredge $103,696 $262 99.7%
Fenwick $849,559 $2,970 99.7%
Seledny & Gay $68,150 $305 99.6%
Levin Papantonio $32,177 $151 99.5%
Beasley, Allen, Crow $123,253 $585 99.5%
Zelle $28,104 $162 99.4%
Labaton Sucharow $82,877 $546 99.3%
Kramer Levin $384,389 $2,845 99.3%
O'Melveny $948,486 $8,382 99.1%
Perkins Coie $964,601 $10,769 98.9%
Dicello Levitt $8,632 $100 98.9%
Morgan & Morgan $290,895 $3,555 98.8%
Shearman & Stearling $332,843 $5,047 98.5%
Pomerantz $19,756 $300 98.5%
Weitz Luxenberg $139,621 $2,245 98.4%
Schulte Roth $361,008 $6,081 98.3%
Debevoise $688,869 $11,802 98.3%
Covington $1,794,277 $33,529 98.2%
Robbins Geller $220,058 $4,157 98.1%
Reed Smith $536,807 $10,284 98.1%
Cleary Gottlieb $715,532 $15,909 97.8%
Jenner & Block $456,977 $11,051 97.6%
Crowell & Moring $448,249 $10,893 97.6%
Arnold & Porter $1,010,582 $27,555 97.3%
Morrison & Foerster $686,565 $20,164 97.1%
Gibbs Bruns $34,679 $1,200 96.7%
Goodwin Procter $633,974 $22,821 96.5%
McDermott $645,730 $24,701 96.3%
Fried Frank $343,140 $13,632 96.2%
Motley Rice $204,325 $8,147 96.2%
Orrick $512,834 $21,077 96.1%
Wachtell $781,376 $33,328 95.9%
Squire Patton $452,120 $19,432 95.9%
Milbank $226,005 $9,768 95.9%
Ballard Spahr $466,882 $20,190 95.9%
Napoli Shkolnik $14,702 $706 95.4%
Willkie $382,835 $19,520 95.1%
Robins Kaplan $119,526 $6,498 94.8%
Cooley $666,688 $36,707 94.8%
Skadden $1,310,634 $80,853 94.2%
Jackson Lewis $168,690 $11,035 93.9%
Morgan Lewis $1,352,160 $88,704 93.8%
Wilson Sonsini $419,257 $28,105 93.7%
Mintz Levin $161,211 $10,974 93.6%
Davis Wright $400,839 $27,564 93.6%
Latham $1,877,357 $135,776 93.3%
Wilmer $1,424,903 $104,317 93.2%
MoloLamken $22,682 $1,687 93.1%
Weil $304,943 $22,734 93.1%
Loeb & Loeb $253,448 $19,305 92.9%
Venable $515,986 $40,034 92.8%
DLA Piper $1,023,423 $80,517 92.7%
Fragomen $147,320 $11,746 92.6%
Cahill $260,935 $24,916 91.3%
Ropes & Gray $524,768 $51,262 91.1%
Bryan Cave $466,366 $48,313 90.6%
Kilpatrick Townsend $188,884 $19,787 90.5%
Simpson Thacher $531,328 $55,795 90.5%
Faegre Drinker $165,891 $17,446 90.5%
Troutman Pepper $411,574 $43,744 90.4%
Cozen O'Connor $450,877 $50,052 90.0%
Blank Rome $419,866 $47,306 89.9%
Haynes and Boone $187,019 $21,364 89.7%
Paul Hastings $651,679 $80,412 89.0%
Seyfarth $316,918 $41,631 88.4%
Steptoe $444,029 $58,651 88.3%
Sidley $1,416,481 $188,789 88.2%
Sullivan & Cromwell $1,579,112 $213,897 88.1%
Dorsey $236,890 $32,327 88.0%
Quinn Emanuel $706,382 $104,250 87.1%
Hogan Lovells $720,025 $110,101 86.7%
Nixon Peabody $279,456 $42,747 86.7%
Norton Rose $240,355 $36,880 86.7%
Paul Weiss $2,084,171 $353,148 85.5%
McKool Smith $95,052 $16,652 85.1%
Nelson Mullins $317,407 $57,335 84.7%
Cadwalader $147,453 $26,716 84.7%
Olgetree Deakins $156,117 $29,215 84.2%
Greenberg Traurig $774,034 $144,995 84.2%
Baker McKenzie $278,722 $57,845 82.8%
Polsinelli $194,899 $40,510 82.8%
Jones Day $825,506 $180,284 82.1%
King & Spalding $831,622 $182,858 82.0%
Duane Morris $351,147 $81,164 81.2%
Littler $283,479 $66,001 81.1%
Fox Rothschild $207,568 $48,615 81.0%
Davis Polk $580,987 $144,977 80.0%
Katten $235,807 $59,367 79.9%
Mayer Brown $584,028 $149,546 79.6%
Sheppard Mullin $292,187 $76,171 79.3%
Locke Lord $131,402 $37,901 77.6%
Lewis Brisbois $149,093 $44,052 77.2%
Cravath $347,924 $103,555 77.1%
Pillsbury $321,200 $99,733 76.3%
Akin Gump $1,064,087 $343,102 75.6%
Dechert $359,039 $118,551 75.2%
Baker Botts $203,823 $67,908 75.0%
Akerman $336,528 $116,927 74.2%
Husch Blackwell $169,494 $60,715 73.6%
Foley & Lardner $224,329 $82,964 73.0%
Winston & Strawn $575,472 $242,797 70.3%
Kirkland $1,820,246 $822,685 68.9%
Vinson & Elkins $213,491 $97,663 68.6%
Alston & Bird $22,338 $10,362 68.3%
Baker Donelson $169,876 $80,649 67.8%
Gibson Dunn $933,762 $468,283 66.6%
Baker & Hostetler $187,262 $105,942 63.9%
Gordon Rees $89,923 $51,160 63.7%
Holland & Knight $467,830 $297,266 61.1%
K&L Gates $387,345 $254,137 60.4%
Fish $122,748 $85,136 59.0%
Womble Bond $408,260 $330,725 55.2%
Hunton Andrews $170,952 $143,421 54.4%
Barnes & Thornburg $219,289 $189,661 53.6%
McGuireWoods $295,863 $383,280 43.6%
Proskauer $417,600 $697,230 37.5%
White & Case $493,656 $966,401 33.8%
Kasowitz Benson $129,835 $291,990 30.8%
The Lanier Law Firm $51,399 $269,337 16.0%

UPDATE 11/8: Some have asked about whether it makes sense to include all contributors, regardless of job title, into this framework. As I mentioned, attorneys use a variety of titles, and others are ambiguous (e.g., “consultant”). I ran tests at a few of the larger law firms, and I looked at only those who unambiguously identified themselves in some attorney capacity. At these firms, they are 97.5% to 98% of the dollars given. It does not strike me that at many firms—if any—it would materially change the allocation if I did another refinement to include only those who unambiguously identified themselves in some attorney capacity.

UPDATE 11/11: Due to a data entry error, some Perkins Coie contributions were double-counted, which led to an inflated count. The data has been corrected.

Rethinking the best debt metrics for evaluating law schools

Last spring, I critiqued the methodology used in the latest USNWR rankings that added a new indebtedness metric. USNWR chose two categories, one which it gave slightly greater weight than another: the size of the average loan incurred among law students who incurred law school debt (3%); and the percentage of law students who incurred debt (2%).

In my judgment, it is nonsensical to separate those categories, as it disproportionately favored $0 in loans to $1 in loans.

But an additional category to consider is debt-to-income ratio. This is admittedly an imperfect measure, like all measures. But I make the case for it here.

This post, then, is an effort to look at alternative measures of indebtedness and what might have been.

(This post may be best viewed on a desktop or on a phone sideways.)

First, I’ll offer a few snapshots of these alternative rankings. One is to compare the way USNWR does the ranking (separating indebtedness from percent incurring debt) with one metric that combines them. Among the ten schools that would perform the best in this new metric (based on scaled score) - that is, the schools that do better with my averaging of everything rather than two distinct categories. (By “rank,” I mean the rank among the indebtedness score.)

  Average debt among incurring Pct debt USNWR score USNWR rank Overall average debt Overall average score Overall average rank Score delta
South Dakota $53,253 80% -0.03958 26 $42,602 -0.07447 8 -0.03489
Cleveland State $69,727 90% -0.00170 89 $62,754 -0.03420 52 -0.03250
Florida A&M $61,500 81% -0.02950 42 $49,815 -0.06006 17 -0.03056
Ohio Northern $71,134 88% -0.00479 83 $62,598 -0.03451 49 -0.02972
Nebraska $63,027 78% -0.03470 31 $49,161 -0.06136 14 -0.02667
Rutgers $62,210 75% -0.04213 22 $46,658 -0.06637 10 -0.02424
North Dakota $67,281 78% -0.03064 40 $52,479 -0.05473 26 -0.02409
Arkansas $68,877 79% -0.02690 48 $54,413 -0.05087 28 -0.02397
Texas Tech $56,898 72% -0.05385 7 $40,967 -0.07774 5 -0.02389
Utah $76,344 85% -0.00648 82 $64,892 -0.02993 57 -0.02345

And among the ten schools that would perform the worst - that is, that do better in the USNWR weighing than an overall average:

  Average debt among incurring Pct debt USNWR score USNWR rank Overall average debt Overall average score Overall average rank Score delta
Southwestern $190,184 82% 0.095404 183 $155,951 0.152034 183 0.05663
California Western $164,918 88% 0.084622 182 $145,128 0.130406 182 0.045785
St Thomas University $161,701 86% 0.077119 181 $139,063 0.118287 181 0.041167
Nova Southeastern $155,193 87% 0.073132 180 $135,018 0.110204 180 0.037071
Columbia $190,141 66% 0.05988 175 $125,493 0.09117 178 0.03129
Golden Gate $151,854 83% 0.061078 176 $126,039 0.092261 179 0.031183
American $159,723 76% 0.053056 172 $121,389 0.08297 173 0.029914
Harvard $170,866 70% 0.050374 168 $119,606 0.079407 171 0.029032
San Francisco $156,460 77% 0.052163 170 $120,474 0.081141 172 0.028978
Florida Coastal $145,245 86% 0.06143 177 $124,911 0.090006 176 0.028576

Now, these “score deltas” really mean little unless one sees how the fit in with the remainder of the USNWR scoring. Most schools would be affected by no more than 0.02. But for the schools at the outer ranges, it can have a material effect.

Note, too, that the worst-performing schools all get a little worse—these schools are ranked between 168 and 183, near the bottom of the metric in the first place. The top schools, however, range from 7th to 89th in the original metric, suggesting some greater penalty for affordable public schools across the range who do not have a lot of people graduating with zero debt.

One more thought. What about comparing the schools’ rankings on a third metric, the debt-to-income ranking I’ve used before? To do that, I’ll include both the USNWR debt rank and the average debt rank, so you get a sense of ordinal place. I’ll then sort by debt-to-income ratio, with another rank to compare how schools compare against one another. Absolute debt matters, true. But debt is also relative, and what comes after the J.D. matters a lot to students, too. That entire list is below. (There’s also some lag by a year, but it should still be a useful point of comparison.)

USNWR debt rank Average debt rank 2019 debt-to-income ratio Debt-to-income rank
BYU 4 2 0.76 1
Cornell 104 117 0.78 2
Northwestern 137 146 0.78 3
Stanford 100 113 0.80 4
Harvard 168 171 0.82 5
Duke 126 135 0.83 6
Penn 131 141 0.84 7
Virginia 133 139 0.90 8
Chicago 166 164 0.90 9
Hastings 122 122 0.94 10
Iowa 70 75 0.94 11
Washington University 25 35 0.94 12
Columbia 175 178 0.95 13
Wayne State 8 9 0.95 14
Illinois 13 25 0.96 15
Yale 102 115 0.97 16
Temple 53 53 0.97 17
Michigan 121 123 0.97 18
Georgia State 37 31 0.98 19
Vanderbilt 99 110 0.98 20
Texas 43 64 0.99 21
Alabama 5 3 1.00 22
Wisconsin 21 21 1.04 23
NYU 141 142 1.04 24
Kansas 55 51 1.04 25
Nebraska 31 14 1.04 26
Texas Tech 7 5 1.05 27
Tennessee 20 23 1.05 28
Arkansas 48 28 1.08 29
Boston University 44 61 1.09 30
Houston 38 44 1.10 31
Utah 82 57 1.12 32
Cincinnati 12 11 1.12 33
Missouri 18 16 1.13 34
Georgetown 135 144 1.13 35
UCLA 94 103 1.13 36
Oklahoma 10 22 1.15 37
Connecticut 32 40 1.15 38
North Dakota 40 26 1.16 39
Baylor 152 156 1.16 40
UNLV 36 36 1.17 41
CUNY 69 67 1.19 42
Boston College 60 78 1.19 43
Berkeley 124 130 1.20 44
Georgia 11 18 1.23 45
Rutgers 22 10 1.24 46
Villanova 28 37 1.25 47
Indiana-Bloomington 54 63 1.25 48
University of St Thomas 30 27 1.25 49
Mississippi 14 15 1.25 50
Drexel 19 20 1.26 51
Hawaii 34 42 1.27 52
Fordham 91 102 1.27 53
Penn State-Dickinson 1 1 1.29 54
Penn State-University Park 56 50 1.29 55
USC 110 120 1.30 56
Arizona 3 4 1.30 57
Tulsa 154 116 1.30 58
New Hampshire 62 43 1.33 59
Notre Dame 127 131 1.33 60
Florida State 23 12 1.34 61
George Mason 9 19 1.34 62
Mitchell Hamline 125 126 1.36 63
Washington 66 80 1.37 64
North Carolina 29 39 1.39 65
Case Western 57 69 1.41 66
Arizona State 45 54 1.43 67
LSU 63 72 1.43 68
Washburn 78 70 1.44 69
Richmond 90 94 1.44 70
Oregon 96 88 1.44 71
Duquesne 109 98 1.44 72
Florida 6 7 1.44 73
Northern Illinois 72 58 1.45 74
West Virginia 58 62 1.45 75
Akron 49 33 1.46 76
Washington & Lee 65 76 1.47 77
Indiana-Indianapolis 85 83 1.48 78
Pace 105 105 1.49 79
William & Mary 24 34 1.50 80
Ohio State 52 55 1.51 81
Montana 84 68 1.51 82
Quinnipiac 107 93 1.51 83
St Louis 101 97 1.51 84
St John's 86 95 1.52 85
Cardozo 33 56 1.53 86
Michigan State 92 86 1.54 87
Irvine 111 119 1.56 88
Texas A&M 51 46 1.56 89
Colorado 87 87 1.57 90
Northeastern 59 48 1.58 91
Arkansas 15 13 1.58 92
San Diego 132 137 1.59 93
New Mexico 68 66 1.60 94
Chicago-Kent 73 79 1.61 95
SMU 77 89 1.61 96
Kentucky 75 59 1.61 97
South Dakota 26 8 1.63 98
Buffalo 79 74 1.63 99
Memphis 80 71 1.65 100
Toledo 46 38 1.66 101
Wake Forest 61 73 1.66 102
Louisville 88 85 1.66 103
Minnesota 35 47 1.66 104
Cleveland State 89 52 1.68 105
Albany 119 92 1.68 106
Seton Hall 103 111 1.71 107
Wyoming 16 29 1.72 108
Syracuse 130 121 1.72 109
Brooklyn 76 84 1.74 110
Emory 81 91 1.76 111
Maryland 67 82 1.77 112
Tulane 129 136 1.79 113
Balitmore 138 127 1.79 114
Davis 39 60 1.81 115
Pittsburgh 106 101 1.81 116
Drake 98 99 1.83 117
Idaho 114 106 1.84 118
District of Columbia 142 124 1.85 119
Missouri-Kansas City 74 77 1.86 120
FIU 64 65 1.89 121
Santa Clara 165 167 1.90 122
Loyola-Chicago 71 81 1.97 123
George Washington 143 151 1.98 124
Loyola-Los Angeles 157 160 1.98 125
Lincoln Memorial 120 107 1.98 126
Northern Kentucky 93 90 1.99 127
Suffolk 118 114 2.03 128
Ohio Northern 83 49 2.04 129
South Texas 149 152 2.05 130
Western State 115 112 2.06 131
South Carolina 97 96 2.06 132
St Mary's 171 169 2.07 133
Catholic 159 161 2.07 134
Gonzaga 151 147 2.08 135
Southern Illinois 41 30 2.12 136
New York Law School 128 134 2.13 137
DePaul 134 133 2.13 138
Loyola-New Orleans 162 158 2.15 139
Chapman 167 170 2.20 140
Lewis & Clark 148 155 2.24 141
Regent 27 32 2.25 142
Howard 145 128 2.26 143
Florida A&M 42 17 2.27 144
Denver 164 168 2.28 145
Creighton 113 109 2.29 146
Pepperdine 140 145 2.30 147
Hofstra 123 129 2.30 148
California Western 182 182 2.33 149
Capital 116 118 2.35 150
Mercer 146 148 2.35 151
Detroit Mercy 2 6 2.35 152
Massachusetts-Darmouth 156 149 2.36 153
Widener Commonwealth 173 165 2.37 154
Seattle 158 157 2.45 155
Miami 117 125 2.46 156
Roger Williams 147 138 2.49 157
Belmont 95 104 2.50 158
Samford 112 108 2.50 159
McGeorge 178 177 2.55 160
Willamette 160 162 2.58 161
Stetson 139 143 2.59 162
American 172 173 2.70 163
Dayton 47 45 2.76 164
Golden Gate 176 179 2.84 165
Campbell 153 154 2.85 166
Illinois-Chicago 163 163 2.87 167
Marquette 169 166 2.87 168
Mississippi College 136 132 2.95 169
San Francisco 170 172 2.96 170
Nova Southeastern 180 180 3.14 171
Charleston 174 174 3.18 172
St Thomas University 181 181 3.23 173
Southwestern 183 183 3.40 174
Ave Maria 179 175 3.54 175
Florida Coastal 177 176 4.95 176
Maine 17 24 n/a n/a
Liberty 50 41 n/a n/a
Western New England 108 100 n/a n/a
Faulkner 144 140 n/a n/a
Vermont 150 153 n/a n/a
Elon 155 150 n/a n/a
Oklahoma City 161 159 n/a n/a

Multistate Bar Exam scores drop but remain consistent with scores since 2014

It was difficult to project much about the bar exam last fall given the pandemic. Jurisdictions made many changes to how they administered the exam. When the MBE scores were released last year, usually a harbinger of overall pass rates, we saw just 5700 July 2020 test-takers, down from 45,000 or so in a typical July. Many states developed novel exams; some changed cut scores or offered versions of “diploma privilege.” Early signs in some jurisdictions, however, pointed to dropping passing rates.

Now the MBE scores have been released, and the scores are a drop from July 2019—but still consistent with scores between 2014 and 2019.

I opted to leave the July 2020 MBE information blank in the chart, as it offers little for historical comparison (although it was much higher last year). You can see that scores bottomed out in 2018 at 139.5, so the 140.4 this year is a bit above that. Nevertheless, the decline from July 2019 suggests that bar passage rates continue to be a challenge for law schools and graduating law students. (Of course, the lower MBE mean does not automatically translate to lower bar pass rates, but it does portend that result.) We’ll see what individual jurisdictions continue to reveal in the weeks ahead.

Early signs point to dropping July 2021 bar exam results

Back in 2014, I noted early warning signs of a precipitous drop in bar exam pass rates around the country. The MBE scores were much lower. Part of that may have been attributable to an ExamSoft error, which I ultimately concluded was unlikely, and, at first tentatively blaming the NCBE’s administration of the exam, later backed off that claim as well, attributing the bulk of the decline to a decline in overall student quality as a major part of the answer.

What’s old is new again. July 2021 saw a major ExamSoft error, and now we’re beginning to see a downtick in bar passage rates. From five jurisdictions, and reporting overall results (not first-time results) so far:

Iowa, -12 points: July 2020, 83%; July 2021, 71%

Nebraska, -17 points: July 2020, 89%; July 2021, 72% [Nebraska offered a much smaller second exam in 2020, too]

New Mexico, -18 points: September 2020, 89%; July 2021, 71%

North Dakota, -11 points: July 2020, 76%; July 2021, 65%

South Dakota, +3 points: July 2020, 70%; July 2021, 73%

West Virginia, -19 points: July 2020, 77%; July 2021, 58%

Wyoming, -13 points: July 2020, 85%; July 2021, 72%

It becomes increasingly difficult to compare year-over-year exam results as the format and timing change, and as new variables enter the mix. Some possible variable to consider….

ExamSoft. Here we open with problems attributable to a remotely-administered exam as administered by ExamSoft. Not all of these jurisdictions were remote (e.g., Nebraska was in person). But certainly same-day exam problems are a significant issue. Stress and sleeplessness from the first day could trickle over to a second day, albeit with a more indirect effect. North Carolina, for instance, has already announced it would lower its cut score by 2 points specifically because of software issues. This is not unprecedented—California, for instance, made modest adjustments to the cut score for some test-takers after an earthquake hit testing sites in 2008.

Online learning. Many law students taking the bar exam had nearly half of their law school educational experience shifted largely, if not exclusively, online. It’s not clear what pedagogical effect that had on students in the long term. It would not surprise me that graduating 3Ls “lost” some amount of learning in the pandemic, which later translated to lower bar exam performance.

Pandemic fatigue. Relatedly, one could easily multiple the concerns from the July 2020 administration of the bar exam to prolonged difficulties arising from the coronavirus pandemic. Early summer 2021 may have been some of the better moments for most test-takers, so it’s difficult to know how it may have affected test-takers later in the summer.

Credentials/academic dismissal. These tend to be more individualized assessments at institutions. The incoming class of 2017 was not materially better than the incoming class of 2018—they were, from all I can see, largely comparable. Whether individualized decisions at schools, including academic dismissal rates, affected scores remains to be seen.

In short, I’m cautious about assigning any, all, or none of these responsibility for the decline in scores so far. We may see scores at other states increase, negating the premise of this post. But I’d say these are more likely to be canaries in the coal mine. I’d anticipate lower scores in many states, and a lot of questions about the cause. I wouldn’t rule out these possibilities so far, and I hope to see clear-eyed analysis of the possible sources for declining rates.

This post has been updated as results come in or are corrected.

With a sharp rise in LSAT scores, it's worth keeping an eye on the law school Class of 2024

The entering law school class, the Class of 2024, is a booming and highly-credentialed class. Applicants rose significantly (more than 12%), and while we’ll wait to see the final matriculant statistics until next month, that should translate into much higher incoming class sizes. One can attribute all sorts of causes, from the pandemic to politics, to the increased demand, mostly non-falsifiable narratives at this point.

But most surprising, in my view, is the sharp rise in LSAT scores. Those scoring 175 or higher were always a small band of applicants, but that pool more than doubled year over year. Those in the 170-174 LSAT band rose 56.5% year over year. And even the 160-169 LSAT band, which had over 13,000 applicants in 2020, rose more than 25%.

It’s possible, of course, that those more interested in law school were simply more highly credentialed this year and more likely to succeed on the exam. But I’d watch another factor that arose last year: the introduction of LSAT-Flex. That exam is online, unlike the traditional paper-and-pencil test in a limited proctored location offered at fixed times over the year. It’s also a shorter exam: LSAC reduced the number of sections from 5 (including one “experimental” section) to 3, a significant reduction in the “stamina” required to endure the exam.

I would be very interested to see the future psychometric studies from LSAC. I’d also be interested to see schools' 1LGPA correlations next year, and later whether the LSAT is as predictive of bar exam performance (standing alone, it is somewhat albeit predictive across law schools, more predictive when considered as a part of an index score, but much less predictive than 1LGPA or LGPA).

It could be that the test is now less predictive of 1LGPA performance given the changes in the exam. Or, perhaps, it’s actually more predictive, as the stamina components of the traditional format of the exam were less predictive. Or perhaps it has not changed at all, and the exogenous explanations are the right ones.

Whatever the case, it’s a significant shift worth watching in the years ahead.